Ankara’s energy pivot: Diversification, new alliances and implications for NATO

Energy resources remain a central element of every state’s security policy worldwide. Turkey is no exception: located at the juncture of Europe and Asia and facing rapidly growing energy demand, it has for years sought to diversify both sources and partners. Its role within NATO remains strategic, yet relations with the Russian Federation, combined with an active regional policy, continuously generate controversy among allies. Ankara, which fields the second-largest army in the Alliance, now faces the necessity of reconciling its energy interests with political pressure from the West and the risk of excessive dependence on Moscow.  

National level

Turkey’s energy security remains heavily dependent on imports. Ankara still imports approximately 70–75% of its energy resources, making it one of the largest energy importers in the region. Authorities, however, are consistently pursuing an increase in the share of domestic sources in the energy balance. In 2019, production from indigenous resources accounted for merely 31%, but by 2025 it had exceeded 45%, mainly thanks to the development of renewable energy sources and the modernization of domestic power plants.  

Akkuyu nuclear power plant, being built by Russia’s Rosatom, remains the emblem of energy cooperation with Russia. The first unit is scheduled to be commissioned at the end of 2025 (there are delays, so probably in 2026), and the entire investment is to be completed by 2027. The plant is intended ultimately to cover roughly 10% of the country’s energy demand. Although this project underlines the scale of Russian-Turkish cooperation, Ankara is simultaneously advancing a range of initiatives aimed at limiting dependence on Russian commodity supplies.  

Turkey is also investing intensively in renewable energy. In 2025, more than half of installed generation capacity comprised renewables — primarily solar, wind and hydro. Ankara is implementing an ambitious plan whereby the share of renewable energy in the national mix is to rise to 65% by 2030. 

Diversification

Turkey remains a net energy importer, and its economy still relies substantially on imported natural gas. In 2025 Russia supplies roughly 37% of imported gas, Azerbaijan 25%, and Iran 15%. The share of LNG deliveries from the USA, Qatar and Algeria is steadily increasing, exceeding 20%. 

In recent years Ankara has expanded infrastructure, including LNG terminals at Marmara Ereğlisi and Aliağa, and increased the throughput of the TANAP and TurkStream pipelines. Despite maintaining cooperation with Moscow, Turkey is gradually transforming into a regional gas hub — for both Southern Europe and the Caucasus states.

This has given Ankara leverage to negotiate more favourable terms with Gazprom and other suppliers. Simultaneously, the government is in talks with Gulf states to increase LNG supplies and with Iraq regarding a future pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan fields.

New projects

In recent months Turkey has intensified diversification efforts, signing a series of agreements intended to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. The most important of these is the Sinop nuclear power project, which was originally to be executed by Russia’s Rosatom. In 2025 Ankara changed course, signing a trilateral memorandum of cooperation with the United States and South Korea covering the construction and financing of a new nuclear power plant in the country’s north. The project remains in the conceptual phase, but start-up is planned for 2032–2033, with an estimated installed capacity of about 4.4 GW.  

Concurrently, as part of a policy to increase gas supply security, state operator BOTAS concluded a 20-year contract with global energy group Mercuria, which will come into effect in 2026. The agreement foresees deliveries of 4 billion cubic metres of LNG per year, corresponding to roughly 10% of Turkey’s current annual gas consumption. This contract has strategic importance — it will secure stable supplies while bypassing the Russian route. 

Domestic development of renewable energy production is also advancing. In Niğde province a 1.1 GW solar plant paired with an energy storage system is under construction. The project is being implemented in cooperation with Masdar from the United Arab Emirates and is valued at about USD 1 billion. Once completed, the installation will become one of the largest of its kind in the region.  

Turkey is also strengthening its extraction capabilities beyond its borders. In 2025 Ankara, in cooperation with Azerbaijan and BP, signed an agreement for joint development of the Shafaq-Asiman block in the Caspian Sea. This field is of strategic importance — its estimated resources exceed 120 billion cubic metres of natural gas, with production intended to begin in the second half of 2026. 

At the same time, gas infrastructure within the country is being developed. In north-western Turkey, in Kırklareli province, construction is underway on a modern 850 MW gas-fired power plant by ENKA. The investment is in its final implementation phase, with commissioning scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2025. Once operational, the plant will feed the national grid, providing stabilising capacity for a system becoming increasingly reliant on renewables.  

Turkey: Between Russia and the West

Despite new cooperation vectors, Ankara does not intend to sever ties with Moscow altogether. On one hand it intensifies relations with Gulf states, Azerbaijan and the United States; on the other it maintains channels of communication with the Kremlin. President Erdoğan has repeatedly emphasised that cooperation with Russia is pragmatic, and projects such as TurkStream or Akkuyu are for Turkey primarily sources of transit revenues rather than instruments of dependency. 

Russia, despite sanctions, continues to treat Turkey as a key economic-energy partner in the region. Both sides have converging interests in trade, transport and infrastructure investment, although political trust remains limited.

Dilemma for NATO

Turkey’s energy policy, often divergent from the Alliance’s line, remains one of NATO’s greatest challenges. Ankara, on one hand supporting Ukraine and acting as mediator, on the other maintaining close relations with Moscow, balances between East and West. The Alliance, aware of Turkey’s strategic importance, cannot afford open confrontation with Ankara on this matter. 

At the same time, it is increasingly evident that Turkey is attempting to redefine its role in the European energy security architecture. If LNG projects, new nuclear plants and Black Sea exploitation succeed, Ankara could achieve genuine energy independence over the coming decade.

For NATO this represents both an opportunity and a challenge. An energy-independent Turkey will become a more assertive actor, yet less susceptible to Russian pressure. For Moscow, the loss of influence in the Turkish energy sector would be a strategic blow, weakening its position in the Black Sea basin and the eastern Mediterranean. 

Expert voice

Dr Karolina Wanda Olszowska, Faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University and the Institute for Research on Turkey, notes:

”Turkey consistently uses its relations with Russia as an element of a pragmatic energy strategy, while at the same time striving to avoid excessive dependence on a single supplier. Maintaining cooperation with Moscow brings Ankara tangible economic and political benefits, but fully anchoring energy security on Russian supplies would constitute a serious risk — both economically and geopolitically. Ankara already has experience of energy coercion — an example being Iran’s suspension of gas deliveries in January 2022, which led to significant disruptions in Turkish industry and almost necessitated restrictions for households.

From Turkey’s perspective, a much safer direction is to develop cooperation with Azerbaijan. Central in this context is the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), the core element of the Southern Gas Corridor, which enables transport of supplies from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field via Georgia and Turkey to Europe. At the Greek border TANAP connects to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), delivering supplies to Western Europe. Complementing this system is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), known as Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum, which plays a significant role in the flow of gas to Turkey. Ankara also counts on new investments, including potential projects involving Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey through the Nakhchivan corridor.

Concurrently, discussions have resurfaced regarding the feasibility of a Qatar–Turkey pipeline running via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. Although economically attractive, this project faces major technical challenges and political risk given its >1,500 km route through a highly unstable region.

An important element of Turkish strategy is the development of domestic energy sources. In addition to investments in renewables, Ankara is steadily expanding its exploration and production fleet. Turkey now operates one of the largest drilling fleets in the world — four deep-water units (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han) and two seismic vessels (Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, Oruç Reis). In 2020 drilling at the Tuna-1 well led to the discovery of the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea, with subsequent work revealing the Amasra and Türkali deposits. Sakarya’s estimated reserves amount to 710 billion m³, and gas deliveries to the national network began in 2023.

By combining diversification of supply sources with the development of domestic resources, Turkey seeks to strengthen its position in the regional energy architecture and minimise the risk of political pressure from major suppliers.”

Forward-thinking actions?

In 2025 Ankara enters a new phase of its energy policy, shifting from a country dependent on Russian supplies to an increasingly pragmatic power. Agreements with the United States, South Korea, Azerbaijan and Gulf states demonstrate that Turkey is consistently pursuing liberation from reliance on a single vector. This does not, however, imply a total rupture with Moscow; the relationship remains commercial and based on mutual economic benefit. 

For NATO, Turkey remains an indispensable but challenging partner guided by its own strategic calculations. Its growing energy independence could, over time, strengthen the security of the Alliance’s southern flank, provided Ankara maintains a balance between cooperation and autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow.