The Baltic States regional security integration: Countering Russia's threat

On the one hand, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been among Ukraine’s most devoted supporters since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. On the other, they rank among NATO’s top defence-spending leaders. Amid persistent hybrid threats from Russia in the Baltic Sea region — from repeated airspace violations and the sabotage of undersea critical infrastructure to the weaponisation of migration — the depth and resilience of the Baltic states« security integration have rarely been more critical. In an era of renewed great-power confrontation, the old maxim still holds for Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius: „In Union There Is Strength”.

Maintaining deterrence

At the core of the Baltic states« deterrence posture stands NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), with the UK leading in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, and Germany in Lithuania. The eFP has evolved from multinational battlegroups (1,000-1,500 troops) to brigade-sized formations (3,000-5,000 troops) following recent official decisions taken at the Madrid Summit (2022) and reaffirmed at the Vilnius Summit (2023).

This renewed military capacity directly reinforces the Baltic states« posture and integration into NATO’s collective defence architecture. It also follows the recent accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. From Russia’s perspective, the threshold for potential aggression is currently much higher. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are no longer an exposed frontier of NATO or the EU, nor completely isolated members of the Alliance — even despite their geographical vulnerability.

The Baltic states have aligned with the Alliance’s burden-sharing through full acceptance of the so-called „Hague Commitment”, which calls for at least 3.5% GDP for defence-spending and an additional 1.5% GDP for defence-related elements (critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, defence industrial base,etc.). This full commitment is now being translated through an overall increase in national defence budgets for 2026: Estonia will raise its defence allocation to 5% GDP, Latvia has recently adopted 4.91% GDP, and Lithuania approved a draft budget of 5.38% GDP.

Additionally, the Baltic Defence Line is currently being jointly built by the Baltic states — a multilayered, in-depth fortification system running along their shared borders with Russia and Belarus. This initiative has a dual purpose: deterring potential full-scale invasion or hybrid threats, and countering illegal migration during peacetime. While its implementation remains gradual because of legal and administrative constraints, it has strong symbolic value.

Building Resilience

Bridging military deterrence and civil resilience, the Baltic states have adopted a comprehensive total defence policy. Trilateral cooperation on preparations for total defence is maintained between the three countries, with strong inspiration from the Nordic states« Cold War models of civil security.

Beyond mere political declarations, this framework permits them to anticipate major crisis or high-intensity conflicts. It is illustrated by proactive measures such as the large evacuation exercise held in Vilnius in October 2025 — the Vyčio Skliautas 2025 drill — or the Comprehensive Defence approach supported by Latvia.

The Baltic states« resilience is further consolidated by an emergent and expanding domestic defence industrial base. Estonia has seen the newly innovative company Frankenburg Technologies seeking to develop low-cost anti-drone missiles. Foreign investments are also being attracted, as German Rheinmetall has committed over €300 million to an artillery ammunition facility in Lithuania and over €275 million for a similar project in Latvia. Finnish Patria has also invested in Latvia in an armoured carrier vehicles assembly line in Valmiera. These projects revitalise small to medium-sized cities in the Baltic states by creating jobs, potentially attracting other foreign capital, and ultimately creating a cohesive NATO-standard market — one that is not so far from the frontline in Ukraine.

The emergence of a Baltic defence industrial base is backed by the EU’s SAFE programme - a €150 billion loan that will finance urgent defence initiatives. The three states have pursued allocations, with Estonia targeting €2.6 billion, Latvia €5.6 billion, and Lithuania €6.3 billion.

The SAFE programme would allow the countries to possibly become self-reliant in specific defence industry segments and,in fine, possibly secure military supplies in an era of supply-chain disruption. Therefore, allying economic vitality with civil resilience for a larger integrated regional security framework is the key.

Conclusion

Beyond the evident convergence of their security policies, the Baltic states experience a dynamic and healthy competition. In an environment defined by danger and urgency, this ultimately leads to a top-down comprehensive integration, resulting in a virtuous cycle that deepens regional interdependence. This process between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, boost their collective strategic weight over the long term.

Regarding resilience, the sustainability of defence spending in the long term remains a key issue: maintaining a defence allocation of around 5% GDP imposes a structural fiscal burden on relatively small economies. Other sectors will inevitably suffer decreased investment and financial pressure. European funds, whether through SAFE or other cohesion-policy instruments, are time-limited and subject to EU budgetary cycles. In other words, the current efforts are achievable only as long as solidarity persists at EU level. The tension between strategic imperative and economic reality must be assessed.

Regarding deterrence, the Baltic Defence Line risks becoming obsolete unless it is designed to support the fast-shifting nature of military innovation on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Line was a product of political will and a military need, but its symbolic nature should not compromise its operational value. In that sense, the recent evocation of an EU Drone Wall represents an interesting opportunity to address this issue by extending the scope of defence from the ground to the airspace.

Today’s world of great-power rivalry and new transactionalism might be fatal for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But while the United States« National Security Strategy 2025 mentions a return to the Monroe Doctrine through the „Trump Corollary” — meaning a disengagement from Europe and a focus on the Western hemisphere — the document expressly states that „Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States” (p. 30). This affirmation, tempering the rhetoric of complete disengagement, is important for the Baltic states.

Bonded by the urge of time, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have succeeded in becoming an important voice in the Euro-Atlantic arena by having a strong integrated regional security framework. Therefore, they must continue to act together according to the maxim „In Union There Is Strength”.

Author:Robin Sonnendrücker is pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in Law & Diplomacy (LL.B.) at Riga Graduate School of Law (RGSL), Riga, Latvia. His academic research focuses on international security and foreign policy.

Robin is a Baltic Security Foundation affiliate — promoting the security and defence of the Baltic Sea region. He previously worked in France and Switzerland.Alongside his studies, Robin is running an 𝕏 account dedicated to analyzing the geopolitics of the Baltic Sea region (@Baltikum\_24). He is also a member of EPIS Network and YATA LV.*