NATO Wants a Large Land Army. What shall Poland do? [COMMENTARY]

Thorsten Jungholt, a journalist for the German paper Die Welt, wrote about NATO’s increased land force requirements, based on documents prepared under the leadership of American General Christopher Cavoli (NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and French General Pierre Vandier (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation).

NATO’s Plans

The new guidelines are a result of political decisions made at NATO’s 2023 summit in Vilnius, where leaders agreed that NATO should have the capability to defend its entire treaty territory and keep its forces in constant readiness. In other words, political leaders gave the military the green light to prepare NATO’s planning so that the alliance can defend “every inch” of its territory, even against Russia’s combat-experienced army, which could grow to 1.5 million troops after transitioning to a wartime economy.

What was the outcome? While 82 land brigades were considered sufficient in 2021, NATO now needs 131. The number of higher-level formations has also increased—divisions from 24 to 38, and corps commands from 6 to 15. There are also significantly higher demands for specific capabilities, such as ground-based air defences, where capacity must be increased fourfold in some areas that had previously seen major cuts.

It’s no secret that meeting these requirements will be a huge challenge for NATO countries. Even after Russia annexed Crimea, when NATO’s demands were much lower, member states struggled to meet them, especially in the land domain. Documents from countries that made them public (like the Netherlands) reveal this, but it’s widely known that land forces were particularly hard-hit by reductions in countries like France, the UK, and Germany.

It’s also important to note that the battlefield environment is undergoing significant changes, especially with the mass use of unmanned systems. This suggests that increasing NATO armies’ size must go hand-in-hand with transforming how they operate.

Equipping and staffing newly formed units alone could be an enormous challenge. For example, Die Welt suggests that Germany would need five more land brigades to meet NATO’s requirements. Today, Germany has eight, a ninth is being formed for deployment in Lithuania, and a tenth is planned. However, the Bundeswehr is struggling with recruitment and hasn’t recovered like the US Army has. NATO’s Military Committee Chair, Admiral Rob Bauer, said on the TV programme Buitenhof that spending 2% of GDP on defense won’t be enough, and that expenditures should rise to 3-3.5%. His remarks confirm that Die Welt’s reports reflect the direction NATO’s planning is heading, even if final results may differ somewhat.

Meeting defense spending and equipment criteria is one thing. Finding soldiers willing and able to serve is another. Demographics are a commonly cited issue, but radicalized youth attitudes in Western countries, stemming from the migration crisis, further shrink the pool of potential recruits.

A question may arise, as to what would happen if the NATO member states fail to meet all of those criteria. Situations as such did occur during the Cold War - back then a different planning framework was utilized, although the Vilnius summit decisions bring the system closer to its Cold War status quo. The failure to meet the NATO requirements could translate into deterioration of credibility of the alliance as a whole. It may also justify the US willingness to pull back from NATO, with all of the ramifications involved in that. Of course, this would not happen overnight. 15 years is the full length of the NATO planning cycle. The question is, how much time is left to achieve these capabilities. Realistically, member states should be driven to achieve such levels, even if they are not achieved completely, but partially. Any other scenario would be threatening for NATO’s credibility. There is some optimism in the fact that NATO’s guidelines are being taken seriously by the allies, although various social or economic problems may hinder their fulfillment.

It is also worth mentioning another point, looking at the political decisions made at the Vilnius summit. Assuming NATO can adapt effectively to the evolution of the battlefield, the potential offered by the new force model after expansion should effectively deter Russian aggression. This would be not only by imposing consequences on Moscow after any potential aggression (“deterrence by punishment”) but by having capabilities that prevent Russia from achieving its aggressive goals (“deterrence by denial”). However, it’s no secret that Russia will not only work to enhance its military capabilities but also take steps to limit NATO governments’ and societies« willingness to build such potential. Therefore, one could say that the capabilities of NATO’s New Force Model are a kind of indicator of the “price of security”. The question is whether allied countries that do not border Russia will be willing to pay it.

Consequences for Poland

NATO’s planning guidelines also have consequences for Poland. On one hand, they mean Poland must continue expanding its Armed Forces, particularly the Land Forces. The reason is simple: Poland is a NATO member and must meet its commitments for both self-defense and collective defense under Articles 3 and 5 of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, countries like Germany and the Netherlands are likely to struggle to reach the required force levels, especially in the land domain.

This makes it even more critical for Poland to build up its military potential. Recent decisions by the Ministry of Defense show a commitment to strengthening the Land Forces, including increasing their size. For example, Poland recently signed a contract for 96 Apache attack helicopters, which will require the formation of new Army Aviation units. Additionally, the new 8th Infantry Division HQ has been relocated to Kielce, signaling that this division will be formed, even if the process is extended over time. Recently, Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Bejda also confirmed that funding for implementation contracts with the Republic of Korea in the second stage has been secured through the BGK Bank. This means not only the potential finalization of the negotiated K2PL tank deal but also other „forgotten,” yet important, contracts for K9A1/K9PL howitzers and Homar-K launchers from December 2023 and April 2024.

Equipment deliveries for the Land Forces, at least in some areas, are being secured, although in other sectors (such as IFVs or counter-drone systems), the situation is far worse. Nonetheless, the direction of increasing their numbers is being maintained.

It’s important to remember that numbers alone are just one (though fundamental) element of building capabilities. Increasing the number of personnel involves many risks that must be managed, primarily regarding training. Both its quality and its adaptation to the changes on the modern battlefield. There is much to improve here, and the large-scale involvement of the Polish Army in flood relief (let’s emphasize, no longer in rescue operations, but in addressing the aftermath), or border protection, certainly impacts the capacity for proper training.

Logistical and communication problems cannot be ignored either, as no number of personnel or combat equipment will help without these elements. In other words, increasing personnel numbers inherently carries the risk of creating formations that appear strong on paper but lack real capability in critical areas. This is referred to in English as a “hollow force,” a term known from the post-Vietnam War period in the U.S., which can be loosely translated as “a force with limited capabilities.” In Poland, the euphemism “capabilities with limitations” is often used, which has various meanings, and some say it sometimes covers for a lack of real capability. It’s no secret that in the Polish Armed Forces, commanders at various levels are often pressured to present a favorable picture of the situation to their superiors, and issues of logistics and communication (sometimes provided by soldiers’ personal equipment at the individual or team level) tend to be pushed to the background. But in the case of a real threat (war), these problems will come back with multiplied force.

Addressing these issues, which need to be discussed openly and are sometimes (or even often) dismissed as senseless rambling, during the process of building an image of a strong army will not be solved by the former assumption of a “small but modern” army. This simply isn’t possible, neither due to the nature of modern conflicts, Poland’s geographic location, nor, as it turns out, NATO’s documents.

The question arises, how to create the conditions for the Polish Armed Forces to build the necessary capabilities? Besides a high level of defense spending, difficult, strategic decisions may be needed, as well as a willingness of superiors to listen to problems. Only then will building and maintaining capabilities remain a priority at the appropriate level, parallel to creating resilience throughout the state against aggression. We also need to recognize that there are no simple solutions here.