Nuclear weapons for Nordic countries
Europe is entering a decisive moment: relying solely on the American nuclear umbrella no longer appears credible, yet building its own deterrent may be the only way to keep Russia in check. The debate that began in Denmark and the Nordics could soon define the future of European security — and it is equally crucial for every state on the Eastern flank.
The Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Danish Parliament, Rasmus Jarlov, has publicly called on Europe to take decisive steps to enhance its own defence capabilities, specifically by considering the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons or the development of an independent deterrent. According to Jarlov, the current geopolitical situation in Europe requires that countries on the continent not rely solely on security guarantees from the United States. He emphasizes that the changing strategic realities and increasing tensions with Russia make it necessary to create a European mechanism capable of effectively defending against nuclear threats. Jarlov stresses that independence in deterrence should not be viewed as a provocation, but as a responsible step toward ensuring stability and security across the continent.
Jarlov argues that the United States is no longer willing to risk its own security for the sake of Europe, which is a key point in the discussion on European defence autonomy. He warns that excessive reliance on the American nuclear umbrella could result in Europe becoming a passive observer of global crises rather than an active participant in its own defence. In his view, the only credible way to counter potential nuclear threats from Russia is for the European Union to establish its own nuclear umbrella, providing the continent with a genuine deterrence capability and strengthening strategic stability in the region.
The debate over independent nuclear deterrence is also emerging in the Nordic countries. In Sweden, a country that previously ran a secret nuclear program, voices have resurfaced suggesting that it may be worth reconsidering the possession of its own nuclear weapons or establishing a joint Nordic nuclear umbrella. Similar discussions have taken place in Finland, which in recent years has actively strengthened its presence in NATO structures and is exploring new forms of strategic security in response to growing threats from Russia. While these ideas are met with significant scepticism and Nordic countries officially remain committed to their non-nuclear status, the emerging voices indicate a growing awareness in the region of the need for tangible deterrence measures. Jarlov and Nordic policymakers emphasize that such initiatives could not only increase regional security but also strengthen Europe’s position in global geopolitics and provide greater strategic autonomy in uncertain times.
Experts note that discussions about a European nuclear umbrella and the potential return to national nuclear capabilities in Nordic countries could mark the beginning of a broader debate across the European Union. Considering such an option would require not only enormous financial and technological investments but also building a shared political consensus among member states. Questions also arise regarding the reaction of NATO and the United States, which may perceive a European nuclear arsenal as both a complement to and potential competition with their own security guarantees. Regardless of the final decisions, this debate demonstrates that Europe is increasingly seriously evaluating the possibility of strengthening its own deterrence, including in the context of rising tensions on the continent’s eastern flank, signalling that the issue of an independent nuclear policy may become one of the key elements of strategic discussion in Europe in the coming years.
Read more
With regard to states in Central-Eastern Europe, it is very unlikely that they will acquire, create or attempt to engage in nuclear programmes. It must be said that any such ambition would be shut down extremely quickly by the United States. Moreover, it would certainly trigger a furious reaction from the Russian Federation, including open threats of a direct attack. For countries on the eastern flank, the idea may seem tempting and strategically beneficial, but in practical and political terms it remains almost impossible.
At the same time, the case of Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that giving away nuclear capabilities for security guarantees is not a smart move. The assurances collapsed, and Ukraine was invaded. Today, Russia fears only nuclear states or true superpowers. Unfortunately, the physical presence of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in Eastern Europe is limited, which only encourages Russian aggression. Under these conditions, the nuclear umbrella, thousands of allied soldiers, or even the debate about developing nuclear weapons, is becoming increasingly crucial.
Europe will not wake up tomorrow with a new nuclear arsenal, but the debate itself changes the strategic calculus. For Nordic countries, deterrence is no longer a theoretical discussion – Russia is active in the Baltic Sea every week. For Eastern flank states, the lesson from Ukraine is equally clear: only credible power, deployed in the region, can prevent the next aggression. Therefore, even if nuclear weapons remain unrealistic for most countries, the combination of shared planning, allied deployments and Nordic–Baltic cooperation creates a defensive depth that Russia must take into account. In deterrence, perception matters as much as capability.
Authors: dr Aleksander Olech, Mateusz Gibała
