Andrew Michta: Such a peace plan would push Russia towards further aggression

Why is the Donald Trump administration so intent on having a new peace plan for Ukraine adopted as quickly as possible? What might the clause about Poland mean? Why have the United States still not published a new National Security Strategy? Does the White House not understand Russia and China today? What should Europe do in the current situation? Michał Górski spoke with Prof. Andrew Michta about all this.

Michał Górski, Defence24: How do you assess the timing of the U.S. 28-point peace plan for Ukraine? Why is this happening now? Isn’t this perhaps the worst possible moment for Kyiv, struggling with problems in the Pokrovsk offensive and corruption scandals?  

Prof. Andrew A. Michta, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; University of Florida’s Hamilton School for Classical and Civic Education: Since the start of his second term President Trump has repeatedly said he wants to end this war — but why these negotiations have started now is something known only to the president and his people. The corruption scandal does not help Ukraine. And what we saw in the initial form of the agreement before the Geneva talks was essentially the imposition of conditions on Ukraine that favor Russia. 

To me this is a moment that could potentially be pivotal. If Ukraine were somehow forced to accept this plan, it would shift the balance in US-Russia, Europe-Russia, and US-Europe relations in a bad direction. So so much depends on how the Geneva negotiations alter that initial agreement. 

The urgency to close this war, which the Trump administration has spoken about, is now reaching a decisive point. Look at the stages we’ve gone through. Ukraine is still being supported by the U.S., but in a different way. The fact that the U.S. is selling arms to Ukraine via Europeans is an important signal: the aim is to reduce operational costs and concentrate on other theaters. I view that with concern.   

Various sources report attempts by the U.S. administration to pressure Ukrainian authorities. According to the Financial Times, President Zelensky has until 27th November to accept the proposed plan. Lack of agreement (according to Reuters) would be associated with the U.S. restricting intelligence sharing and deliveries of new batches of weapons to Ukraine. Why is there such time pressure? Is China the main reason?   

Partly yes, and on the other hand, from the very beginning I thought, although it seemed unlikely, that the Trump administration believes it can reset relations with Russia. In that way it wants to pull Russia away from China. This is the inverse of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s approach. 

Now it is an attempt to change U.S.-Russia relations. As Axios wrote, if an agreement were reached the next steps would be economic normalization in relations, which is an incentive for the Russians.

I think a lot has changed since the switch from the Biden administration to Trump’s. The Biden administration had no strategy for a final settlement to the war in Ukraine. On the one hand I’m proud that President Biden firmly said he would not allow further Russian aggression, but on the other hand I think his administration wasted time and did not craft a vision of final victory. 

President Trump constantly says that if he were president, not Joe Biden, this war would not have happened. That’s an important signal that the aim is to close the operation. The administration sees the war as a „bad deal” that distracts from other priorities and consumes resources. 

I don’t know whether this is solely about the Indo-Pacific. It’s interesting that a new National Security Strategy still hasn’t been published. People talk about a shift to the Indo-Pacific, but in my view a second option could emerge: that the United States opts for hemispheric defence. Hence the talk about Greenland or Canada. That would be logical. If the United States were to limit its military posture both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, it would have to focus on the hemisphere. President Trump is trying to rid our hemisphere of Russian and Chinese influence (the conflict with drug gangs in Venezuela and Colombia). In that context, further supporting Ukraine would make little sense for the administration. And of course Donald Trump emphasizes the need to end the war to limit human losses. That is a goal he often talks about.

Returning to the potential agreement we discussed at the start: I believe that without thorough modifications to what was initially proposed, it could be costly not only for Ukraine but also for Europe. It’s not only about the number of soldiers or weapons, as the Pentagon counts it. Morale matters too. If the Russians managed to reach an agreement, they would be rewarded for aggression. From their point of view, they would have beaten NATO. That narrative would be presented by Putin to Russian society. In my view they would then be even more willing to take risks in pressing for concessions from Europe.     

How would Ukrainian society react? The corruption scandal is simply a disgrace toward the people sitting in the trenches, shedding blood, while oligarchs steal funds that should be destined for soldiers to fight. The question is what will happen within the state itself — what about Zelensky? He is trying to save relations with President Trump, but I do not think he is succeeding fully.  

Looking at the plan, one can say it is an attempt to motivate Russia. It includes, among other things, a point on possible amnesty for those responsible for war crimes. Isn’t that effectively an attempt to dismantle the existing order and international law? 

That order collapsed a long time ago. I understand the outrage, but since 2008 we’ve seen how the Russians step by step use military force to gain tangible geopolitical advantage. How did Europe react to the invasion of Georgia? Nord Stream 1 was completed. Later came Crimea in 2014, and Germany quietly opened Nord Stream 2.   

I’m far from taking seriously European leaders« statements that international law is being raped. International law is only as good as governments« determination to enforce it. If you don’t do that, you see Putin’s gangsterism, which believes it will pay no price. The Russians formally want stipulations that there will not even be attempts to hold them accountable for committed crimes.  

We are only defending ourselves, while the entire initiative is on the other side. The Chinese are watching and see that we absolutely do not want to take risks. Russians fly into NATO airspace with planes and drones, and the NATO secretary-general proudly says we will not shoot down those Russian planes but will elegantly escort them, and that is supposed to be proof of our strength. Sorry to say, that’s nonsense. I once told a German politician: „You are not strong, you are fat.” Russians look at this fat Europe that cannot mobilize and has had a »vacation from history« for the last 20 years.     

The United States has made its own series of mistakes. We prepared our military to fight jihadists as if they were the greatest threat to the U.S., but in reality they were never an existential threat. That cannot be compared to the danger posed by states such as Russia, China, and even Iran or North Korea.

@ Andrew A. Michta for Defence24.pl, 25th November 2025.

If you had told me 10 years ago that Asian troops (North Korea) would be fighting on the European theatre and that NATO would have no response, I would not have believed you. I suspect that if Ronald Reagan, not Joe Biden, were president, an American carrier would have sailed not far from Shanghai and the Americans would simply have demanded those troops withdraw. It is true that President Biden appealed to Beijing to pressure the North Koreans, but it was not backed by force, it was not decisive… And most importantly, the presence of North Korean troops in this war is yet another proof that deterrence in Europe has failed repeatedly. 

One point in the plan concerns Poland. (Point 9 reads: European fighters will be stationed in Poland). How can that be interpreted? After all, European fighters are already present on our territory — as we saw on 10 September during counter-drone operations. What would this change?

For me this is an unclear point. On the one hand it can be interpreted as meaning European weapons would be withdrawn from Ukraine and stationed in Poland and other European countries. On the other hand it might mean additional aircraft. It’s unknown. For me the most important element of this point is that the Poles weren’t at the table while such matters were being debated as part of this agreement at all. We’ve recently seen Europeans negotiating with Marco Rubio (the UK, Germany, France). Poland, as a key flank state, was not present.      

How seriously should we take yet another promise to provide security guarantees? Are they still worth anything, especially given the lack of details?

Sorry, but that’s just drivel. Earlier comments by the British or French that their troops could be stationed in Ukraine… What troops? Where would they come from? You need a 1:3 rotation to think about something like that. Who will take such a risk? The Russians will play cat and mouse with them…    

There are no real security guarantees here unless the United States gets involved. If this arrangement is imposed and there are no guarantees from the US, then there simply are no guarantees. Everything signals to me that the US does not want to go in that direction. 

Remember that Secretary Rubio also has limited capabilities. In the final analysis the decision will be made by President Trump. Secretary of State Rubio is trying to improve the agreement, but it must be accepted by President Trump.   

But Witkoff is closer to the president…

Of course. I think Marco Rubio is in a difficult position. The traditional Marco Rubio is an internationalist. He comes from the Republican school that looks at the world almost in a Reaganite context — that the United States should play an international role because it strengthens the country’s prosperity and security. Witkoff is a real estate person who in an interview with Tucker Carlson spoke almost admiringly of Putin…   

The problem with U.S. policy toward Russia is that the president does not have people around him who understand Russia. I fear that few have people who understand China and Beijing’s systemic goals well. This is because what used to be the so-called deep state in Washington was dismantled during the previous Trump term; it used to try to shape his policy and sometimes even block it. The U.S. today effectively does not have a National Security Council staffed in full. Rubio fills that role, but there is too little backing. A moment will come when President Trump will have to build his own expert apparatus. But this is not that moment, and we are making key decisions.     

What should Europe do in the current situation?

Arm — arm. Not only in aircraft and tanks, but above all it’s about sensors, satellites and communications. I don’t think a U.S. withdrawal from the Old Continent is an immediate threat, but Europe must have the right means. Observation of Russian territory is in the domain of American technologies. Right now we provide Palantir, other platforms, and Finnish-Polish ICEYE. Without that, Ukraine would be in a very hard situation, and so would Europe.    

There is no „free lunch.” The European defense industry has been neglected. Perception of the level of threat is divided. I recognize that a real breakthrough in Europe will only happen when the pipelines are dismantled — until Germany does that, I remain skeptical. If Ukrainians were forced to accept an agreement, „business as usual” would resume soon after. The fundamental question for the future of security on the Continent is whether there is true leadership in Europe. Unfortunately, I do not see it.