Confucius Institutes – Soft Power or a tool of Chinese Intelligence?
The Confucius Institute (CI) programme was launched in 2004 with the aim of establishing one thousand facilities by 2020. At its peak – according to both Chinese and international data – there were more than 500 institutes and around 750 „Confucius Classrooms” in over 160 countries, making them the largest state-run network of cultural centres in history operating directly within academic institutions. Already at the beginning of the previous decade – as recalled by the Central Tibetan Administration – the then head of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda department, Li Changchun, described them as „a key element of China’s external propaganda apparatus.” The effectiveness of this strategy is confirmed by the Brand Finance ranking: in 2025, Beijing rose to second place in the Global Soft Power Index, which experts link precisely to the extensive CI network.
Intelligence, Pressure and Financial Leverage
American and British intelligence services classify CIs as tools of the PRC’s economic intelligence. As early as 2018 – as The Economic Times recalls – FBI Director Christopher Wray warned in the Senate that „every student sent by Beijing undergoes a party vetting process” and may be asked to obtain research data. The Stanford Review described the case of an agent of China’s Ministry of State Security who posed as a student in order to acquire results of work in AI and robotics and to recruit „friendly” informants. As the China Law Translate portal explains, the legal basis for such actions is China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law; Article 7 obliges all citizens and organisations – even abroad – to cooperate with the intelligence services.
According to the latest UK-China Transparency report (cited by The Guardian and MyJoyOnline), more than half of surveyed sinologists confirmed that Chinese students in the United Kingdom had been instructed to observe their peers and suppress discussions about repression of Uyghurs, the status of Taiwan, or the origins of SARS-CoV-2. Those who refused to cooperate experienced harassment themselves – or their families in China did. Analysis by the Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI) indicates that Chinese students contribute around GBP 2.3 billion per year to UK universities; according to Times Higher Education, in some postgraduate courses they account for up to 75% of tuition income. HEPI notes that such „dependence” prompts some rectors to ignore controversies so as not to risk a serious budget gap.
Increasingly Strong Western Response and China's Image Manoeuvres
As University World News reports, Sweden closed all its CIs as early as 2020. In the United States – according to BasicResearch.Defense.gov materials – the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), in Article 1062, prohibits the Department of Defense (DoD) from providing funding to US higher education institutions that host a Confucius Institute. The ban does not apply to direct scholarships for students, and foreign universities are not covered. The provision came into force on 1 October 2023. The only way to maintain funding is to obtain a written waiver from the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is responsible for accepting and evaluating applications under the Confucius Institute Waiver Program (CIWP).
The definition of a „Confucius Institute” adopted in the NDAA includes any facility funded directly or indirectly by the government of the People’s Republic of China, regardless of its official name. In practice, this means that after 1 October 2023, American universities maintaining a Confucius Institute without a valid waiver will lose access to Department of Defense funds, and every element of cooperation with a Chinese entity must undergo a detailed legal, financial, and security audit.
According to Times Higher Education, Australia, using the Foreign Relations Act 2020 (a law aimed at ensuring that agreements between state or territorial governments – and their entities – and foreign entities do not adversely affect Australia’s foreign relations or conflict with Australian foreign policy) has cancelled six university contracts. In Poland, as reported by TVP3 Wrocław and Gazeta.pl, in 2023 the senates of the University of Wrocław and Warsaw University of Technology decided not to extend cooperation with the Confucius Institute, deeming it risky for the autonomy of academic programmes.
In response to these actions, China attempted rebranding. According to the ChinaObservers portal, in 2020 the CI headquarters (Hanban) was transformed into the Center for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC), and funding was transferred to the CIEF foundation. Analysts assess this step as an image manoeuvre: the new „language centres” operate on the same principles, making it harder to monitor their ties to the PRC’s security structures.
New Regulations and Consequences of Lack of Transparency
As The Guardian describes, from 1 August 2025, the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act applies in the United Kingdom. The Office for Students announced that any agreement containing ideological clauses – including those for hiring lecturers from China – must be amended or terminated. Already 20 British CIs have come under OfS scrutiny, and the fine of GBP 585,000 previously imposed on the University of Sussex shows the scale of potential sanctions. Jacqui Smith, a junior minister in the Department for Education, stressed in The Guardian that academic freedom „is non-negotiable” and any form of intimidation on campuses will be severely punished.
According to UK-China Transparency, the institutes, initially perceived as a soft power tool, have become an instrument of political and intelligence influence: combining language teaching with ideological control, acquisition of sensitive technologies, and transnational intimidation. As long as – HEPI emphasises – agreements with CIs are not fully public and procedures for protecting academic freedom are not effectively enforced, universities risk losing autonomy and states risk leakage of strategic knowledge and growing counterintelligence costs.
Five Pillars of Safe Academic Cooperation
For years, Confucius Institutes have raised questions about funding transparency, academic autonomy, and research security. For this reason, it is necessary to introduce a system of safeguards that could limit China’s political influence, while not giving up the benefits of international academic cooperation.
The first and simplest safeguard is full transparency of agreements – publishing all provisions along with information on funding sources eliminates hidden clauses that could limit freedom in staff selection or research topics.
The second pillar is systematic security assessment of research projects. In the face of growing interest in areas combining artificial intelligence and biology by states pursuing both civilian and military goals, it is necessary to apply procedures similar to those used in defence grants, and dual-use projects should undergo export control for data and technology.
The third element is diversification of language partnerships: Taiwan’s Huayu BEST programme and ASEAN university initiatives prove that learning Chinese does not have to entail dependence on Beijing.
The fourth safeguard is secure channels for reporting abuses, allowing students and staff to anonymously report cases of intimidation or political pressure without fear of retaliation.
The fifth component is international coordination – as exemplified by the Five Eyes alliance, which has adopted common standards for exchanging information on threats to academic research and a mutual warning system against foreign interference on campuses.
The combination of these five measures – transparency of contracts, rigorous project verification, alternative language programmes, secure reporting channels, and multinational counterintelligence data exchange – forms a coherent protective chain. Each link addresses a specific gap: from financial incentives, through the risk of technology leakage, to political pressure. In this way, China’s influence can be reduced without giving up the benefits of international academic cooperation.
The future of Confucius Institutes therefore depends not on changing their name or cosmetic rebranding, but on introducing real, enforceable rules of transparency and oversight; without them, academic centres may become yet another arena of the global game for influence, information, and technology.
Author: Adam Jawor
