Europe wants a seat at the negotiating table. But who will represent it?

French President Emmanuel Macron is among the potential candidates. He has repeatedly advocated a stronger French role in shaping Europe’s security architecture and has expressed a willingness to engage directly in diplomatic efforts. However, his political horizon is limited. His second presidential term ends in May 2027, raising questions about his ability to oversee a prolonged negotiation process. Another possibility is Kaja Kallas, whose uncompromising position towards Russia appeals to many Central and Eastern European countries, particularly those on NATO’s eastern flank. Nevertheless, she lacks the broad political backing needed to speak on behalf of Europe as a whole. Any appointment would require agreement among the principal European governments and EU institutions. The experience of Josep Borrell, the former EU High Representative, also demonstrates the difficulties of establishing a credible and unified European diplomatic voice.

The format of the negotiations raises further questions. During earlier meetings in Abu Dhabi, selected European representatives and international partners were involved, but Poland did not participate as a separate delegation. Warsaw subsequently joined the discussions in Dublin. This is a positive development, although Poland’s precise role in the next stages remains unclear. The same applies to the Nordic and Baltic countries, which face some of the most immediate consequences of Russia’s military and political activities. Decisions concerning Europe’s future security arrangements cannot credibly be made without sufficient representation from the countries most directly exposed to the Russian threat.

Some political assessments suggest that the coming winter could be the last of the war in its current full-scale form. Such predictions should nevertheless be treated cautiously. Even if a ceasefire is eventually reached, it will not eliminate the Russian threat or automatically guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security. Moreover, negotiations led by Washington may extend well beyond the immediate terms of ending hostilities. They could shape Europe’s security arrangements for years to come. European participation must therefore be more than a diplomatic formality, and it should not depend solely on Washington’s decisions or Moscow’s willingness to engage.

The fact that discussions are continuing is undoubtedly important. However, Europe must establish its own priorities, responsibilities and negotiating mandate. Simply securing a place at the table will achieve little if individual countries pursue conflicting objectives or if their representatives lack the authority to make commitments. What is needed is a figure with sufficient political standing, diplomatic experience and credibility to secure the confidence of both Europe’s major powers and those countries directly threatened by Russia.

The central question is whether Europe should appoint a single representative capable of advancing a common position or continue allowing individual governments to pursue their own national interests. Equally important is whether the negotiations should focus solely on ending the war in Ukraine or also address the long-term security of the European continent. Europe must decide whether it intends to defend Ukrainian interests, protect its own security or reconcile both objectives within a coherent negotiating position. These goals need not be contradictory, but they require political agreement and credible leadership. Without either, Europe risks becoming a participant in negotiations whose outcome will largely be determined by others.