Russia’s information war 2025: disinformation as an operational weapon
Since 2022, Russia’s information operations have moved beyond propaganda. In 2025, the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns are synchronised with missile strikes, cyberattacks and intelligence operations — designed not to persuade, but to disrupt, paralyse and control perception. Moscow’s strategy fuses technological automation, military timing and psychological targeting. This is no longer narrative warfare; it is cognitive combat.
Russia’s information campaign functions as a parallel front line — operating continuously, 24 hours a day, through Telegram ecosystems, automated botnets and AI-driven content generators. The objective is to undermine Ukrainian command cohesion, destabilise civilian morale and fracture Western consensus on continued military support. Every major missile strike is followed by a three-to-six-hour narrative surge, coordinated across digital platforms, presenting destruction as „precision engagement” and masking civilian casualties.
Operational patterns and current campaigns
In August 2025, a forged deepfake video of President Zelensky calling for capitulation — produced with the AI modelGeroy-3 by the 72nd Information-Psychological Centre in Sevastopol — demonstrated Moscow’s capacity for synthetic command deception.
In October 2025, Russian botfarmOrion (GRU, Bryansk region) launched a coordinated false story about a mutiny in Ukraine’s 59th Brigade. The operation, exposed by CERT-UA, illustrated a new cycle of instant, machine-generated military misinformation.
Ongoing Operation „Skvozniak” manipulates public energy data, inserting false weather and consumption statistics to trigger fears of blackouts before winter 2025/26. In parallel, fake Telegram channels impersonating Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence publish fabricated evacuation orders — an attempt to disrupt command verticals and confuse territorial defence units.
Operation ”Traffic” spreads narratives about alleged NATO weapons smuggling through Moldova and Romania, aiming to discredit Western logistics and weaken alliance trust. Russian media ecosystems then amplify the story using state channels and proxy journalists in Europe, Latin America and Africa.
AI-enabled psychological operations
The Kremlin’s new platformMiratorʹets-2 (Миротворец-2) uses artificial intelligence to analyse sentiment in Ukrainian networks and generate adaptive narratives that resonate emotionally with specific audiences. These systems feed thousands of automated accounts in multiple languages — Polish, German, French and English — operated by companies Analitika-Media and InfoKontur. The messaging focuses on „war fatigue”, „corruption in Kyiv”, and „economic collapse”, aimed at reducing the political appetite for sustained Western assistance.
Localised PSYOPS are also active in front-line regions such as Donbas and Zaporizhzhia. Civilians and soldiers receive SMS messages from Russian numbers (+7 prefixes) reading: „Your command has abandoned you” or „Lay down your arms and survive.” These are supported by DDoS attacks on communication systems to compound chaos and isolation.
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Ukraine's counter-operations
Ukraine’s response is now proactive and offensive. The 83rd Cyber Warfare Centre in Odesa conducts Operation Black Storm — precision strikes against Russian propaganda infrastructure, disabling domains and Telegram channels directly at the source. The Molfar-2 unit works in real-time verification of deepfakes, in partnership with Bellingcat and OpenFact, identifying and neutralising fabrications within ninety minutes of publication.
In 2025, Kyiv established the Centre for Perception Operations, led by General V. Kowal, integrating military, media and technological instruments into a single command. The result is a shift from defensive messaging to active perception control — exposing, documenting and countering disinformation before it embeds in public discourse.
Strategic trends and impact
Russia’s approach is systemic and relentless. Disinformation cycles are embedded in the operational plan: each cyber strike or missile salvo is accompanied by an information payload designed to distort interpretation and delay reaction. The aim is not credibility but confusion — to make every version of events equally doubtful.
However, the impact outside the Russian media sphere is diminishing. Despite technological sophistication, Moscow’s narratives now resonate primarily within the Global South and pro-Russian echo chambers in Europe. Western and Ukrainian counter-capabilities — rapid attribution, open-source forensics and integrated cyber-media responses — are reducing the Kremlin’s decision-shaping power.
Analysis
Russia’s disinformation in 2025 functions as a weapon of tempo. Its success relies on speed — to inject falsehoods before verification mechanisms activate. Ukraine’s evolving strategy, built on automated detection, cross-domain coordination and information transparency, narrows that window. The operational logic is clear: whoever controls the pace of credible information controls the cognitive battlespace.
For the West, sustaining Ukraine’s informational resilience is no longer a communications issue — it is part of collective defence. The Kremlin’s capacity to manipulate perception has direct implications for military readiness, public cohesion and deterrence credibility. Disinformation remains Russia’s cheapest, fastest and most adaptive weapon. Neutralising it demands military-grade precision, forensic speed and allied unity.
Author:Petryk Valentyn Mykhailovych
