The End of Syria as We Know It

At the time of writing, rumors of Assad’s death remain unconfirmed, but it appears he did not reach Latakia (by the time of publication, the Russian news agency TASS reported that Assad had been granted asylum in Moscow - editor’s note). Indications suggest that the Alawites chose not to resist in the coastal strip encompassing Latakia and Tartus, where Russian bases are located. Does this mark the end of Russia’s presence in Syria? Possibly, though much depends on agreements between Russia and Turkey. Even if such agreements exist, Russia may still lose these bases if other factions, particularly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reject them. While most Syrians harbor negative views of Russia, many are equally opposed to the prospect of their country being dominated by Turkey and its pro-Turkish jihadists from the Syrian National Army (SNA), which, unlike HTS, is notorious for looting, lack of discipline, and atrocities. This bolsters HTS’s chances of dominance despite its jihadist origins linked to al-Qaeda. Regardless of how the issue of Russia’s military presence in Syria is resolved, the current situation can be exploited both by and against Russia, propaganda-wise. On one hand, if the worst-case scenario (massacres, chaos, factional warfare) unfolds, Russia will blame the West as the supposed architect of these events. On the other, pro-Russian authoritarian regimes, particularly Iran and Shia forces in Iraq (persuaded by Russian ambassador Kutrashev’s propaganda), should receive a clear message: Russia is an unreliable ally, and relying on it is a mistake.

The biggest loser in the current situation is Iran and its allies, the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. Iran and Shia militias in Iraq have lost an ally, as Syria will no longer be Shia-Alawite. If Turkey attacks the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the US withdraws its protective umbrella over the Kurds, Iran may consider a tactical alliance with the SDF. However, this scenario seems unlikely as the Kurds prefer deals with the US or potentially even Israel. Iran’s inability to secure a new strategic ally in Syria marks a geopolitical defeat. Hezbollah, too, finds itself in a difficult position. Weakened militarily by Israeli airstrikes and now severed from its primary ally, Hezbollah’s inability to prevent this development highlights its vulnerability. This could present an opportunity for Lebanon to emerge from its political crisis (caused by Hezbollah) and potentially repatriate Syrian refugees, provided stability returns to Syria, which, again, is an optimistic, yet uncertain scenario. However, Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm easily, and in a worst-case scenario, it could drag Lebanon into conflict with Syrian jihadist groups. Besides, Lebanon might also fear that if Syria strengthens under a new Sunni regime, in some perspective (certainly longer than a few months), the state could return to the ideology of Greater Syria and seek to subordinate Lebanon. It’s worth remembering that the Syrian occupation of Lebanon ended less than 20 years ago. Such an intervention becomes even more plausible if Hezbollah remains armed.

However, it does not seem that Iraq has any reason to be concerned. Jolani will not repeat Baghdadi’s mistake and does not intend to create some sort of transnational entity. Iraq also did not make the mistake of intervening in Syria and now has even less reason to do so, as the Syrian-Iraqi border is well-secured. Of course, the open question is whether these two states will maintain diplomatic relations in the near future. It should be remembered that Jolani began his militant career in Iraq within the ranks of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Iraqi al-Qaeda, whose main goal was the killing of Shias. Undoubtedly, hostile relations between Syria and Iraq would benefit Israel, for whom the current developments are not entirely favorable. Weakening Assad through a jihadist rebellion and cutting Iran off from Lebanon was beneficial, but Assad has not been very active in attacking Israel since 7th October. The replacement of a weak leader from the Alawite minority, hated by the Sunni majority, with a stable Sunni regime (if one emerges, this remains one of the options) would pose a threat to Israel, especially since Hamas (originating from the Muslim Brotherhood) has more in common with HTS than with Iran. Therefore, there are already reports of intense Israeli airstrikes in Syria, likely aimed at weakening the military potential of the “new” Syria (whatever that may entail).

Turkey remains the biggest state-level winner. A significant portion of the victorious units is affiliated with it, but any attempt to install in Damascus a puppet opposition government that has been residing in Istanbul for years will likely face resistance both within Syria (HTS and SDF) and in the region. Israel, which currently has poor relations with Turkey, might support the SDF in such a situation. Likewise, Arab states such as the UAE or Saudi Arabia will not approach such an increase in Turkish influence in the region enthusiastically, although they lack many options to counteract it. Moreover, these states have no good options regarding Syria’s future, as they also fear the creation of an Islamic state modeled on al-Qaeda or the Muslim Brotherhood, and democracy, for obvious reasons, is not their ideal scenario. Chaos is also not a good option for them, as it could lead to the resurgence of terrorist threats and general regional destabilization. The best scenario for them would be a weak central government based on an ethno-religious compromise and the transformation of Syria into a decentralized federation. This is one of the possible options, but it is not the most likely.

From the West’s perspective, the situation in Syria is a challenge, and whether it will be favorable or not depends on how events unfold. Undoubtedly, the best option would be a truly free Syria, where new authorities are elected in free elections, and the rights of ethno-religious minorities (Sunni Arabs constitute only about 60–65% of Syria’s population) are guaranteed. It is worth remembering that this is not entirely abstract for this country, as Syria experienced several periods of multi-party elections between 1945 and 1970. However, it does not seem that elections are the goal of HTS or Turkish proxies like the SNA. Another good option would be an ethno-religious deal that guarantees control zones and minority rights, but this is also quite doubtful. On the other hand, one cannot rule out dark scenarios for Europe involving increased terrorist threats and a new wave of migration. Of course, regarding the latter issue, returns of Syrians to the country are also possible if the situation stabilizes. This particularly applies to Syrians living in Lebanon, Turkey (although some have already taken root there), and Jordan, but mass returns from Europe should not be expected. There is also the possibility that some refugees (Sunnis) will return, while others (Alawites, Christians, and possibly Kurds) might flee.

The main forces within Syria currently are HTS, SNA, and SDF. HTS is the strongest and most disciplined group, which is causing increasing trust in it among Syrians. Nevertheless, there is no certainty that Jolani’s declarations about accommodating all ethno-religious groups in the new Syria are genuine. After all, under Sharia law, non-Muslim minorities are obliged to pay jizya, and Nusra (HTS’s predecessor) imposed this tax a decade ago on the territories it conquered. While it was not as harsh as the situation for non-Sunnis under ISIS’s “caliphate,” it was still persecution. Regional states also distrust Jolani. It is unlikely that he will proclaim an Islamic emirate of Syria modeled after the Taliban (even though he represents the same ideological current). For now, Jolani is acting very pragmatically. Instead of executing Assad regime members, he has decided to take control over them. His forces have captured Prime Minister Mohammad Gazi al-Jalali, who has been retained as a “temporary prime minister” under Jolani’s authority. Jalali, a Sunni and a secondary figure in the ousted regime, provides Jolani with two advantages. First, the continuation of the government’s work is necessary to prevent chaos (e.g., maintaining infrastructure operations). Second, later taking power from Jalali (which is certain, though the legal procedure remains unknown) will give Jolani legitimacy and facilitate international recognition. Of course, Jolani’s consolidation of power is just one possible scenario, as bringing other factions, especially the SNA, under control will be a challenge for him.

It cannot be ruled out that HTS might seek an agreement with the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control a significant portion of Syria, including cities like Hasaka, Qamishli, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. However, clashes are already taking place between the SDF and the SNA in Manbij, west of the Euphrates. The open question remains whether there is an agreement between the U.S. and Turkey to block further Turkish expansion into SDF-controlled areas, or if Turkey will seek to completely destroy and eliminate this formation from the game (and any potential arrangements regarding Syria’s future). If the latter, the next question is what allies the SDF might find to prevent this. Options include Israel and Arab states on one side, or Iran and Shia militias from Iraq on the other.

Unfortunately, dark scenarios are also possible, including a civil war between various factions, the establishment of an Islamist regime modeled after the Taliban, the resurgence of ISIS, as well as retaliatory massacres and persecution of non-Muslim minorities.