4 % of GDP for Defence in the Constitution. Head of the National Security Bureau Explains Why [INTERVIEW]

Jakub Palowski, Defence24.pl: We’re speaking on the eve of the NATO summit in The Hague. There’s a lot of talk about defence spending, but we know it’s really about real capabilities. Minister, what exactly are Poland’s demands?

Brig. general. ret. Dariusz Łukowski, Head of the National Security Bureau: Real capabilities must fulfill what was previously designed under regional planning. We want to focus on capabilities that will strengthen Alliance deterrence, by showing that we have forces, an effective command chain, everything integrated and ready to act.

Where do we stand now on the regional plans? The discussion began earlier, at the Madrid and Vilnius summits.

The regional plans have already been implemented at both the Allied and national levels. Building those capabilities is underway—for both the Polish Armed Forces and our Allies« forces.

The next issue is shaping new capabilities. The Alliance is monitoring developments in Ukraine in real time, analyzing them, and on that basis determining needs. Expectations regarding the force levels required to respond to threats are also being verified. A strong emphasis is being placed on air and missile defence, this is a key lesson from this conflict. We’re also talking about the broad deployment of autonomous systems and AI-based solutions to support decision-making processes so they proceed as efficiently as possible.   

A higher level of defence spending, which will be mentioned in the declaration from The Hague summit, is necessary in order to, as I mentioned earlier, fulfill plans with real, effective capabilities.

There have been media reports that, under NATO’s new planning, the Alliance will ask, or even require, some Allies to increase their troop numbers. There was talk of Germany and tens of thousands of additional soldiers. Will similar demands be made of Poland?

Let me begin by saying that for Poland this matter is clear. Regardless of the Alliance’s decision, we consistently point to the need to expand our capabilities. Today, we are already planning to meet NATO’s potential expectations at the national level.   

We must remember, however, that capability-building is time-consuming. Even once equipment is contracted, you must wait for deliveries, implementation, training, and unit cohesion—sometimes even for the formation of entirely new units.

At the same time, we support our NATO Allies so that—like Poland—they effectively make up for delays in building their capabilities. This includes, for example, the Bundeswehr, which is slowly beginning to realize such a program.

This topic is, of course, linked to the decisions to be taken at the summit, since they involve defence investments, i.e., increased capital outlays on technical modernization and the expansion of defence industry capabilities. These elements are the foundation of strong armies. It is a process currently underway, and Poland is a staunch advocate. Unlike some Allies, we already recognize that this is indispensable.  

President Andrzej Duda has proposed enshrining in the Constitution the requirement that 4 % of GDP be spent on defence from the state budget. Why choose such a solution?

A firm, constitutional guarantee of maintaining defence spending at 4 % of GDP stems from those actions and investments strengthening our defence that have already been undertaken or will soon be launched. I emphasize: it is a logical continuation of current investments. As I have signaled repeatedly, purchasing equipment is only one part of the process.  

Currently, vast outlays are being devoted mainly to signing arms contracts. The next step will be to create the conditions to move from procurement to having fully capable military formations—equipped, trained, and certified to operate that equipment. For that to happen, a number of conditions must be met: providing supporting infrastructure, training additional personnel, and maintaining the entire system in a state of readiness for many years. That, too, requires significant outlays.  

If defence spending fell below a certain threshold, the results of these investments could be squandered. Capabilities might be lost due to a lack of funds for equipment maintenance, personnel manning, and so on.

Enshrining the higher spending level in the Constitution provides a long-term perspective and, what’s more, sends an important message.

What message is that?

First, it signals to potential adversaries that our investments in defence are no whim or hysteria triggered by the war in Ukraine. This is a long-term effort, because we interpret the threat from Russia as long-term.

Second, on the domestic front, the constitutional provision will bring a sense of stability. For the defence industry, it confirms the validity of its investments. The goal is for defence contractors not to fear programming long-term projects.  

Third, also internally, it sends a message to young people considering a military career, that the armed forces offer opportunities for development and a professional career for many years, not just until the conflict in Ukraine ends.

Critics argue that public finances already have enough legally mandated expenditures, and this would limit flexibility to respond, for example, to economic crises. How do you respond?

From that perspective, we must remember that Parliament, representatives elected by the people, could modify this provision if necessary. It would require truly serious circumstances that could threaten the functioning of the entire state or cause a public-finance crisis. Any change would, however, need a constitutional majority, not just an ordinary law. The status of defence spending in Poland’s legal system would thus rise significantly, providing a more stable basis for funding defence tasks.  

In the view of President Andrzej Duda and the BBN, the importance of defence issues in today’s security environment, amid growing threats, is so great that it should be regulated at the constitutional level. This will provide a solid foundation for funding and allow changes only in especially justified cases and with the consensus of a decisive majority of political forces.

The presidential bill refers explicitly to budgetary expenditures. At present, a significant share of defence spending comes from the Armed Forces Support Fund. Why focus on budget expenditures? And won’t this put pressure on other areas of public spending, like social benefits?

I am aware that today a large portion of defence spending is financed from the Armed Forces Support Fund. Looking long-term, only a budgetary provision gives us true certainty of funding.

Financing the Support Fund depends on many factors. It is well known that not all planned funds ultimately reach it. Meanwhile, defence requires stability—especially when we have more complex structures and more modern equipment in the field.

In the current situation, 4 % of GDP for defence from the state budget is essential. It is the necessary solution for us to strengthen Poland’s defense over the long term and in a stable manner, providing an adequate response to growing threats.  

Thank you for the conversation.