Weaponised history: Russia’s pressure on the northern flank

Dr. Aleksander Olech: How has the use of historical narratives by Russia evolved into a tool of political influence, particularly against Finland and Sweden, and what does this indicate about Russia’s broader strategy in Northern Europe?

Patrik Oksanen: Over the last decade Russia has moved from using history as an element of national identity to deploying it as a front-line instrument of state power and ambition. History, Russian patriotism and imperial ambitions are woven as one. What we see today is not just „memory politics”, but a weaponized history serving the ambition of the Kremlin.

In the case of Finland, and to a lesser degree Sweden, the Kremlin uses three main narratives:

-„Nazi collaborator” focusing on Finland fighting alongside Germany 1941-1944 in the Continuation War. For Sweden the Russian propaganda centers around trade during WWII. These narratives are picking history as it pleases Russia, not mentioning USSR attack on Finland in 1939 or Sweden’s delicate balancing act while being more or less disconnected westwards after the invasion of Denmark and Norway, when Germany and USSR were allies.

-Finland is accused of a false „genocide in Karelia” and made up atrocities against Soviet POWs, such as absurd claims Red Army soldiers were buried alive or that there where gas chambers in Karelia - which is absolutely nuts but serves the purpose to make Finland Nazi-looking.

-Sweden and Finland are portrayed as morally compromised NATO satellites without their own sovereignty, and heirs to a supposedly fascist or Russophobian tradition that fuels revanchism against Russia, and thus becomes a threat to the Motherland. 

This evolution of narratives is important for two reasons. First, these are not random provocations, but building blocks in a justificatory logic: if Finland can be portrayed as historically criminal, Russia’s current hostile policy can be framed domestically as defensive and morally necessary. Second, the same pattern appears in other theaters, against Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland. This suggests a coherent strategic approach in Northern Europe: use history to question the legitimacy of neighbors, create doubt among Western audiences, and prepare the ground for political, economic or even military coercion and if deemed necessary to reach Russian goals military aggression, all dressed like a sheep in defensive rhetoric to hide the aggressive wolf. 

In short, the shift is from commemorating the past to mobilizing the past as a weapon in today’s security policy. History has become central to the Russian state, its security thinking and also gives the pretext for justifying the goal of Moscow dominance over all lands that historically have been under the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, that ambition is bad signs for Poles, as well as Finns and others.  

Given the experience of Finland and Sweden, how can NATO and its allies better detect early signs of historical manipulation used to undermine national sovereignty and strategic cohesion within the Alliance?

One key lesson is that history-based influence operations rarely start with a surprise. They start with weak signals that many capitals dismiss as „domestic Russian noise”, that are brewing over time to form strategic narrative and action. 

Some indicators to watch:

-Narrative inflation: a sudden increase in the frequency of specific historical accusations in Russian state media, Telegram channels and „expert” discussions;

-„Evidence” appearance of historical claims, such as new „archive findings” in the NKVD-files, „excavation” of burial places and so on;

-Production of literature, An English version of the „Black Book” against Sweden and Finland was published December 1st by the Russian Foreign Ministry;

-Legal and paralegal moves: new investigations, draft laws or court cases in Russia concerning historical „crimes” of a specific NATO/EU country, judicial repressions against Russian historians and journalists or even Westerners challenging Kremlin’s storytelling, like the director of the Narva museum in Estonia, Maria Smorževskihh-Smirnova, who was sentenced by a Russian court to 10 years of prisons for using her freedom of expression as an EU-citizen in a EU-country. An outrageous example of Transnational Repression;

-Symbolic pressure: vandalism of monuments, removal or „relabeling” of memorial plaques, and local officials participating in such acts;

-Diplomatic echo: these historical narratives entering MFA briefings, ambassadorial statements or international fora;

-Political statements from Duma members, Security Council, Lavrov or even Putin. 

NATO and its allies should treat this threat seriously. That requires integrated monitoring of history-related content in Russian information space, analysis that connects incidents into pattern recognition, just what the Finland study tried to achieve. 

And then rapid, factual and calm responses at the political level to prevent Russian narratives from defining the frame. This must be combined with a long term work on opening up archives, educating the public about a complex and messy history that Russia wants to manipulate, together with proactive international work. 

The Russian MFA published this summer a report that stated the need for an international campaign, in UN among other foras, against Finland about claimed historical crimes. If not being met, it could hurt the international reputation and position of Finland (and other countries in our region) on the global arena. Efforts like these must be met together by Nordic-Baltic-Poland. We must understand that the information battlefield is not just only local, but also global. 

The earlier we recognize that history is a tool, the harder it becomes for Moscow to weaponize it effectively.

How do Russian influence operations in the Nordic countries compare to similar actions in the Baltic States and Poland, and what patterns emerge in terms of political and security pressure applied to these regions?

In general terms the heat from the Russian side is higher against Poland and the Baltics than the Nordics. There is a family resemblance across all these theaters, but with local adaptations.

In the Baltic States and Poland, Russia focus heavily on:

• USSR:s innocence and benign acting in the early years of WWII; no Secret protocol, "Poland started WWII" and the Baltics "joined freely" USSR. - Soviet victory in WWII as a moral shield.- The narrative of "liberation" versus "occupation".- The alleged discrimination of Russian-speaking minorities.

The Nordic region is divided in two categories; east and west. The countries in the West have another history as either being occupied by Nazi-Germany (like Norway and Denmark) or secured by the Western allies (Iceland) than the ones to the east. So the Russians can use WWII-history more against Sweden and Finland  in ways that are familiar to the Poles and Baltics, but slightly different.

• Historical episodes like the Winter War, Continuation War and cooperation with Germany are reframed to present Finland as inherently "Nazi" or genocidal, with a present day revanchism (here the Continuation War, the follow up from Winter War, really spooks the Russian).  - Sweden is targeted as a hypocritical "neutral country" that supposedly benefitted from Nazi Germany while now posing as a moral judge – and as a new NATO front-line state.

The common pattern is delegitimization to portray the neighbor as historically immoral. Normalization of hostility, if the neighbor is „Nazified”, almost any Russian counter-measure can be justified. Segmentation, to tailor narratives to divide regional states from each other and from the wider Alliance – for example, pushing the idea that this region is dragging NATO into unnecessary confrontation. So while the content differs the function is the same: to create moral asymmetry and political vulnerability.

What specific vulnerabilities of the Nordic and Baltic countries — including Finland, Sweden, and Poland — make them particularly susceptible to history-based influence operations, and how can these vulnerabilities be mitigated without compromising democratic values?

The main vulnerabilities are not a lack of education, media literacy or constitutional patriotism, but rather that our societies are used to self-criticism and nuance. This is a strength, but it can be exploited when Moscow presents our own debates as „proof of guilt” or jumping in and putting amplifiers on certain aspects that are in some way not historically incorrect, but could be blown out of proportion and thus also created to be something else. Let us take the case of POW:s in Carelia, it was lack of food and planning that led to that the conditions were bad during the Winter 1941-1942 and USSR POW:s died due to the conditions, but it was improved over time and it is well know by Finnish historians. This has been distorted by the Russian propaganda as genocide and that even gas chambers were used. Which is, and let me underline it again, is an absurd and completely made up false claim.  

History can be complex and painful: Border has changed, occupations, cooperation with or resistance against Nazi Germany – all of this provides fertile ground for selective storytelling, not the least in Social media with memes and short and shallow „truth” designed to raise emotions. We also have a fragmented memory culture, with generational gaps, different regional experiences and diverging national narratives that can be played against each other.

Mitigating these vulnerabilities does not mean sanitizing history. On the contrary. We need to invest in quality history education and public history, not for our past but for our future so that citizens recognize propaganda when they see it. Thus it is important to support independent historians and archives – transparency is our advantage, not a weakness. Develop „memory resilience”, for example, rapid documentation and restoration when monuments are vandalized; clear public communication when historical accusations are fabricated. Create regional dialogue on history, so that Finland, Sweden, the Baltics and Poland can understand each other and avoid being played against one another.

The goal is not to replace one dogma with another, but to make our open, democratic approach to history more robust in the face of authoritarian manipulation. And by doing this also increases our ability to recognize the method of historical distortion from Russia. 

To what extent does Russia’s strategy of exploiting historical grievances undermine NATO’s cohesion, and what steps can the Alliance take to prevent political and military fragmentation caused by such influence campaigns?

The risk is not that NATO will suddenly disintegrate because of a historical narrative, but that cohesion will be eroded at the margins which in the long run could have a great effect: 

Allies may become more hesitant to support certain partners if they are portrayed as historically „problematic”.  Domestic audiences in other countries, who know less about Eastern and Northern European history, may be more receptive to Russian frames like „these countries have always been extremists”. Within NATO, Moscow’s aim is to create a hierarchy of „good allies” and „troublesome allies” based on distorted history.

To counter this, NATO can:

-Acknowledge history as a security vector. Strategic communications and public diplomacy should not treat WWII and the Cold War as purely symbolic topics. Here NATO has done public communications, for example in highlighting the brave forest brothers who resisted USSR occupation;

-Promote shared understanding of Europe’s 20th century. That includes clear recognition of Soviet crimes and occupations, not just Nazi ones;

-Back allies when they are targeted. When Finland, Sweden, the Baltics or Poland are attacked with fabricated historical accusations, the response should be collective, not left to the country alone. Russia wants to take us down one on one in every field. We must have a holistic approach to counter this. - Integrate history into resilience planning. Hybrid threats doctrines should explicitly include history-based influence;

The key is to ensure that Russia cannot use „selective memory” as a wedge inside the Alliance. If we look more broadly we can see that China employs the same methodology to rewrite WWII-history to advance Chinese interests towards Japan and Taiwan. The same idea of solidarity and collective countering should be used in the Pacific - we truly need to have the global eye on this matter and not think it is a local problem. 

What lessons can be drawn from ongoing influence campaigns in Northern and Eastern Europe for NATO’s strategic communication, and how should the Alliance adapt its deterrence strategy to counter such operations effectively?

I think three main lessons stand out. First, deterrence today is not only about tanks and missiles, but also about the narrative space. If Russia can set the historical frame, it gains freedom of action in the present. NATO’s strategic communication must therefore be proactive in the historical domain, not just reactive. And I believe a coalition of the willing must go broader, deeper and globally together - in concert with NATO strategic communication. 

Second, credibility comes from facts and consistency, not from propaganda. The Alliance should support independent research, fact-based commemoration and open archives. That is how we lay a foundation to win the long game of narratives.

Third, we need better integration between strategic communication, hybrid threat analysis, national memory policies and historical research. But also do not forget popular culture; movies, Netflix series, music and books are superpowers of a free society. Popular culture can not be underestimated in how the West won the Cold War (and then we lost the peace through social media (but that is another story)). 

Deterrence strategy should explicitly recognize that attacks on monuments, trials in absentia over alleged WWII „crimes”, and disinformation about past wars are preparatory phases for political and potentially military aggression. When those patterns appear, it should trigger a coordinated response – diplomatic, communicative, and, if necessary, enhanced forward presence.

In essence, the lesson from Northern and Eastern Europe is simple but uncomfortable:\ if we leave history uncontested, we leave part of our security flank unguarded, and we might lose our future. 

About the author of the report: Patrik Oksanen is a Strategic Advisor at the Centre for Societal Security at the Swedish Defence University

The full report is available here: https://mpf.se/psychological-defence-agency/publications/archive/2025-12-11-history-as-a-battlefield—russias-information-war-against—-finland-2025