Europe reduces reliance on the U.S. arms imports

While Europe is gradually strengthening its defence industrial base, long development timelines and consensus-driven political processes continue to inhibit the acquisition of essential military capabilities. Despite recently achieving several defence-related milestones, European NATO members remain heavily dependent on imports for critical capabilities, especially fighter aircraft and long-range air defence systems. 

This dependence is becoming increasingly problematic as U.S. military resources are stretched by multiple security commitments, including ongoing escalations in the Middle East and other regions. Developing comparable capabilities domestically requires time and sustained political coordination, which Europe has often struggled to achieve.

New trends in Europe’s procurement strategy

As a consequence, Europe faces a dilemma: while it seeks to strengthen its own defence industrial base, the volatility of the current security environment leaves little time to develop key capabilities domestically. Coupled with the increasingly uncertain relation with the U.S., Europe seeks alternative import avenues, which in turn might generate new risks. 

For decades, the United States has been Europe’s primary arms supplier. While Washington still holds this position, the share of European NATO states« arms imports from the U.S. declined from 64% to 58% between 2021 and 2025. At the same time, the overall volume of European arms imports increased dramatically, rising by more than 140% compared to the previous five-year period as European states accelerated rearmament following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, according to  SIPRI data, European NATO countries have increasingly turned to alternative suppliers such as South Korea, France, Germany, and Israel.

These trends beg two questions about Europe’s procurement strategy: does growing diversification of arms imports strengthen Europe’s security, or merely replace one dependency with another? And what does this trend mean for the future of the transatlantic relationship? 

Comment by Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): The SIPRI data on arms transfers show that the U.S. continued to play an important role as supplier of major arms, especially combat aircraft and air and missile defence systems, to Europe in the past 5 years. Based on pending orders or advanced procurement plans by NATO Europe, in particular involving a total of over 460 F-35 combat aircraft to 12 European states, the U.S. arms industry is poised to remain a very important supplier of key military technology to Europe. The continuing demand for U.S. equipment is hardly surprising, as the U.S. offers superior technology in several military areas. Also, many European states will think twice before creating additional logistical burdens by adding other types of weapons to the US-supplied arms they already have. Finally, a substantial demand for U.S. arms continues as European states recognise the importance of arms trade in saving as much of the military relations with the U.S. now and in preparation for the next U.S. administration from 2029.

At the same time, the European states are responding to what they perceive as a vastly increased threat from Russia, combined with growing distrust towards the Trump administration, by rapidly expanding their arms industries. As a result, we can expect that the share of European-made weapons in European arms procurement will increase. In particular, in those areas in which the European arms industry has well-established strengths, such as armoured vehicles and artillery, submarines and other major warships, radars, and increasingly in air defence systems and drones. At the same time, and somehow in contrast to European efforts to rapidly rearm, the European industry has many pending orders for exports of advanced arms to other parts of the world. In particular, the Middle East and Asia.

External Suppliers: South Korea and Israel

The European NATO members« arms imports can be divided into internal and external suppliers. Thanks to its relatively short delivery timelines and competitive costs, South Korea emerged as one of Europe’s key external defence suppliers, accounting for 8.6% arms imports of European NATO members in the last five years. Examples include Poland’s large-scale procurement programme, including K2 Black Panther main battle tanks, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, K239 Chumnoo multiple launch rocket systems, and FA-50 light combat aircraft.

One of the key advantages of the K2 Black Panther programme was the rapid delivery of initial „gap-filler” units, which reportedly arrived within the same year the agreement was concluded. This speed reflects South Korea’s significant production capacity and its willingness to scale manufacturing quickly. At the same time, the procurement introduces additional complexity for the European forces, as the K2 becomes the third main battle tank type in service alongside Leopard 2 and M1A1/M1A2 Abrams platforms. While this diversification can enhance supply resilience and reduce dependence on a single supplier, it may also generate logistical and maintenance challenges. Critics have also pointed to concerns regarding the role of the domestic defence industry and the still-unresolved negotiations over industrial cooperation and technology transfer, as in the Polish example.

Israel accounted for 7.7% of European NATO imports, and has filled mainly Europe’s air- and missile-defence capability gap. Several European NATO states have already procured Israeli systems, including Germany’s acquisition of the Arrow-3 ballistic missile defence system,  Finland’s  purchase of David’s Sling, and Slovakia’s procurement of the Barak MX air-defence system. In addition, Israeli companies provide Europe with other key capabilities like drones, cyber technology, and advanced sensors. 

Israel is affected by the ongoing escalation in the Middle East, which, like in the U.S. case, naturally imposes a strain on its arms export capabilities. At the same time, Israeli systems benefit from extensive operational experience, as they are frequently tested in real combat conditions. One example is the Arrow-3 missile defence system, designed to intercept high-altitude ballistic missiles and  reportedly capable of countering advanced threats such as Russia’s Oreshnik „hypersonic” ballistic missiles, Iskander systems, and Kinzhal missiles deployed in Belarus and the Kaliningrad exclave. Furthermore, the Arrow-3 systems already constitute a major component of the European Sky Shield Initiative, increasing intra-systems interoperability. 

Internal suppliers: France and Germany

Alongside external suppliers, intra-European arms transfers have also expanded as the European defence industry attempts to respond to rising demand. France and Germany remain the largest defence producers within Europe, and their systems increasingly circulate within the European market. French platforms such as the CAESAR self-propelled howitzer or Aster air defence missiles, and German systems including Leopard 2 tanks or IRIS-T air defence, illustrate how European states continue to rely on established industrial leaders within the continent.

Nevertheless, intra-European cooperation still faces structural limitations. European defence industries remain fragmented along national lines, while major joint programmes often encounter political disputes and industrial competition. Projects such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) illustrate both the ambition and the difficulty of building a truly integrated European defence-industrial base capable of meeting the continent’s growing military requirements.

Pieter D. Wezeman also points to the broader implications of these trends for Russia’s position in the global arms market: It is hard to see how Russian arms exports could substantially grow again in the foreseeable future, even if the Russian war against Ukraine would end and Russia would no longer have to prioritise the production of arms for its own forces over those for export.

The sharp fall of Russian arms exports was largely due to substantial decreases in exports of major arms to in the first place China, and also to Algeria and Egypt and over a longer period to India. As our report shows, the backlog of arms exports from Russia is generally far lower than those of the U.S. and France, and for several categories of arms, they are much lower than those of most other top-10 arms suppliers. The underlying factors for the drop in Russian arms exports remain, and are reinforced by the effect that trade sanctions have on the capability of the Russian arms industry to produce advanced and reliable arms.

Russian arms exports to China are very unlikely to substantially increase again, as China has opted to rely on its own weapons, which by now are competitive with Russian arms, also in the rest of the world. In India, Russian arms are increasingly crowded out by weapons from India’s own industry, and by better weapons and often with better technology sharing opportunities from a growing group of foreign suppliers, including France, Israel, the U.S., South Korea, and Germany. Other countries have given in to pressure from the U.S., which has increased since 2022, not to buy Russian arms. Public information indicates that Egypt has been a prime example of such a country when it cancelled a contract for some 24 Su-35 around 2022. Only Algeria appears to remain a loyal customer of Russian arms, having recently ordered some batches of the latest Russian combat aircraft.

What Europe’s diversification means for Washington

Europe’s diversification of arms imports should therefore be understood less as a strategic decoupling from the United States and more as a response to urgent capability gaps. The rapid deterioration of the security environment following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced European states to seek faster procurement solutions while domestic production capacity is still expanding.

For the United States, these developments do not necessarily represent a loss of influence. American defence systems remain central to Europe’s military posture, particularly in areas such as combat aviation, missile defence, and strategic enablers. At the same time, a stronger and more diversified European defence market could ultimately strengthen NATO by allowing European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own conventional capabilities.

In the short term, diversification of arms imports can help reduce reliance on a single supplier while domestic capabilities are being developed. However, imports should complement, not replace, long-term investment in Europe’s own defence industrial base.

Authors: Dr. Aleksander Olech and Karolina Kisiel