France’s security: Paris after the Olympic Games

A year before the Games began, the head of the Organising Committee announced that Paris would become the safest place in the world. That was a huge challenge, because the competitions took place from Île-de-France through Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Nice and Saint-Étienne, and culminated in an unprecedented opening ceremony along a six-kilometre stretch of the Seine. Contrary to concerns, the Games passed without any major consequential incidents, and the security system proved effective.

Full mobilization

The whole operation to organise multi-level, comprehensive protection under the label »Paris 2024« was the largest security mobilization in France during peacetime since World War II. On the day of the opening ceremony, more than 45,000 officers were deployed along the Seine and at key points in the capital. Support was provided by 18,000 soldiers, but crucially — and throughout the Games — there were tens of thousands of private security personnel. 

The system was continuously supported by constant monitoring, partly based on artificial intelligence solutions (kept in place to this day), an access-pass system with detailed vetting of all holders, police and military patrols and ready-to-act counterterrorism units, and by closing parts of transport infrastructure and dividing Paris into specific access zones. Such a multi-layered protection architecture had one important objective: to minimise the risk to security across a large, open area while preserving the ability to react quickly. Big initiatives come with big costs — the mobilization of services was estimated to cost about €1 billion. 

Global cooperation

At its foundation lay, of course, cooperation among services, which has been developing continuously for years and after the Olympic Games reached a new, higher level. Coordination of security agencies was maintained within new command structures. The Ministry of the Interior launched the National Coordination for the Security of the „Olympic Games 2024” and the National Strategic Command Centre — an interministerial control unit that analysed incoming information and synchronised operational decisions. After the Games, this model was assessed not only as a pillar for maintaining communication, but also as a key instrument for implementing an information policy towards the public and for countering disinformation.  

Importantly, a tangible effect of concentrating security forces in the capital was a drop in detected crime during the Games. At the same time, other regions of France were weakened because a significant portion of personnel had been seconded there. This highlights a substantial problem of territorial balance in the face of security challenges. The stronger the protection of Olympic zones, the greater the challenge for services in other cities to provide security. Other countries organising large international events face similar dilemmas.   

International cooperation was also at the heart of the Paris 2024 security project. France was supported by around 2,000 foreign officers and soldiers (including personnel from Poland). A cooperation centre was set up in Paris with more than 200 liaison officers from 191 countries. This not only increased real-time information exchange but created a standard of interoperability for future events within the EU and NATO. For several weeks the French capital became a fortress, and security cooperation had a global character — certainly a starting point for further joint actions.   

New tech

Large-scale deployment of so-called „augmented cameras” was introduced during the Games. This is algorithmic image analysis without facial recognition, legally limited to detecting a predefined set of phenomena (for example, large masked crowds, objects resembling weapons, etc.). French authorities emphasised the absence of biometrics and the role of human operators as decision-makers. A dispute then — which continues to this day — arose over whether and in what form to retain recorded images. This fits into a broader European debate about the role of artificial intelligence in public spaces. Paris, however, retained its observation capabilities after the Games.    

The second key element was protection of airspace and counter-UAS defence. On the opening day a temporary no-fly zone with a 150-km radius was introduced, covering civilian traffic as well. In Villacoublay a counter-drone coordination center operated, and the air forces applied the DPSA concept — the creation of anti-access zones that were under constant surveillance with sensors and were covered by neutralization measures. 

A laser system, HELMA-P, developed by the company CILAS and designed to counter drones at distances up to 1 km, was also deployed during the Games. This confirmed France’s readiness to test a new generation of directed-energy weapons under real conditions. Lighter versions such as HELMA-LP are being developed in parallel, as are projects for more powerful lasers to counter projectiles and missiles. 

Sabotage or failure?

The third pillar was cybersecurity. The National Agency for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) mobilised hundreds of specialists and protected hundreds of public and private entities involved in organising the Games. The agency is responsible for protecting France’s critical infrastructure, responding to cyber incidents and coordinating actions in the event of attacks. During the event it conducted round-the-clock network monitoring, resilience testing of systems and close cooperation with international partners to neutralise potential digital threats.  

More than a hundred incidents were recorded during the Games, some of which disrupted the organisation. One widely reported case was the disruption of rail traffic on the day of the inauguration. On the night before the opening ceremony there was coordinated sabotage of the SNCF rail network — about 500 signalling cables were burned and cut on key sections of TGV lines (Croisilles, Pagny-sur-Moselle, Courtalain), paralysing traffic for many hours and affecting nearly one million passengers. The incident caused delays and logistical difficulties, but French authorities quickly restored system functionality. Special services and the anti-terrorist prosecutor’s office investigated whether it was a technical failure, sabotage, or part of a broader cyberattack. 

Although an investigation by the DGSI (the French counterintelligence service) officially indicated possible links to radical „ultra-left” circles, there have been suggestions that the coordinated nature of the attack could point to external actors, including Russia, interested in destabilizing and undermining France’s image during an event of such significance. One person was arrested, but the investigation remains open and no formal charges have been brought to date; the identities of other saboteurs (there were several) have not yet been established.

While the inquiry showed the incident had a limited impact on the Games« overall security, it highlighted the scale of hybrid threats that accompany such large operations.

A successful lesson

Most importantly, the Games forced the development of a practical public-private partnership in the field of cybersecurity. It is being further developed after the Games and thus today strengthens the state’s resilience to future threats.

Finally, mass vetting procedures were carried out — more than one million people were screened and thousands were excluded from participating in the event. Police together with special services (headed by counterintelligence DGSI) verified people who wanted to attend the event. Many were excluded, and several incidents and attacks were prevented. 

From a security perspective, restricting access to the Olympic zones proved very effective. It reduced the risk of criminal acts and radicalisation among some participants. Although this sparked controversy and debate about the limits of prevention, experiences after past attacks and now after the Games indicate that France will increasingly intensify vetting of participants in large events. 

France post-Games

It should be emphasised that after the „Paris 2024” event France possesses a proven, multi-layered architecture for securing global events, which is a valuable achievement. It succeeded in combining military capabilities (on land, at sea, in the air and in space) with the actions of police, security services, the public and private sectors, the cyber domain, AI-based solutions and international cooperation.

Pillars such as ready command centres, rapid force mobilisation, efficient incident response and multi-level coordination mechanisms can be further developed and reused. As a result, France has become one of the key reference points and a potential consultant on security for countries organising Olympics or World Cups.

There was no attack or serious incident, so the security balance is positive. Paris 2024 was a test passed by French and international services. Many of France’s security solutions, however, require further political commitment and dialogue with society. Where strict control appears, concerns about excessive state repression also arise — especially in a society as religiously and ethnically diverse as France. 

Games and beyond

In the years ahead France’s challenge will no longer be securing single large-scale mass events, but maintaining the level of security demonstrated during the Olympics on an everyday basis across the entire country, while controlling costs and respecting civil liberties. France has huge military and cybersecurity capabilities and a rapidly developing public-private cooperation. Nevertheless, the state of national security after the Olympic Games remains affected by incidents.

The goal for the coming years is to sustain capabilities not only for reaction but for prevention of threats. The project of protecting citizens (and the state more broadly) is not a sprint but a marathon. To use sporting terminology: Paris 2024 was successful qualifying rounds. After several setbacks in recent years, the real competition will begin at the main tournament, in the next decade.   

This article originally appeared in Polish on the website of the Polish Institute of Sports Diplomacy.