Finnish shelters. A history lesson for modern civil defence
Photo. CGP Grey/Wikimedia Commons/CC2.0
In an era of growing geopolitical tensions, driven among other things by the war in Ukraine and changes in international security policy, the shelter system is becoming one of the key elements of civil defense.
The Finnish shelter system is a unique example on a global scale of long-term civil security policy, deeply rooted in historical experiences and a national culture of resilience. Its origins date back to the dramatic events of the 20th century—the Winter War (1939–1940) and the Continuation War (1941–1944) with the USSR. These conflicts made Finns realize that the survival of the state depends not only on the army but also on the preparation of the civilian population.
After World War II, during the Cold War tensions, Finland—despite maintaining neutrality—systematically developed protective infrastructure, integrating it with urban planning and spatial development. The key document that solidified this policy was the Civil Defense Act of 1958, which established the obligation to build shelters in new buildings. Contemporary legal frameworks are defined by the Rescue Act (379/2011), which imposes on investors the duty to construct shelters in residential, office, or industrial facilities exceeding 1,200 m² in area.
Today, Finnish shelters are not treated as relics of the Cold War but as an active element of security infrastructure. Across the country, there are about 50,500 shelters providing spaces for 4.8 million people—equivalent to about 87 percent of the population. In Helsinki alone, the number of protective places exceeds the number of residents by 34 percent, meaning that even in the event of maximum threat, the city can provide shelter for everyone.
About 85 percent of the shelters are private structures located in residential, office, or commercial buildings. In peacetime, they serve as garages, warehouses, or gyms, but in a crisis, they can be converted into shelters within 72 hours. They are built from reinforced concrete and equipped with air filtration systems, water and energy reserves, and emergency communications.
In terms of durability, they meet strict standards—they can withstand the shock wave from a 100-kiloton nuclear bomb explosion at a distance of 1.5 kilometers or a direct conventional attack.
Multifunctionality of infrastructure
Finnish shelters are a model example of a practical and integrated approach to civil defense, where functionality and daily use combine with preparedness for crisis situations. Unlike in many countries, where shelters remain unused and often fall into oblivion, in Finland they form a full-fledged part of urban infrastructure—maintained in excellent condition thanks to regular use and mandatory technical inspections.
In peacetime, Finnish shelters serve recreational and utility functions—they are used as underground parking lots, sports halls, swimming pools, warehouses, and even playgrounds. As a result, they not only stand empty but also generate economic and social benefits. In Helsinki, there is, among others, the largest shelter in the country, located 20 meters underground, capable of accommodating 6,000 people. On a daily basis, this facility serves as a basketball court and gym, and in the event of a threat, it can be transformed into a fully functional protective facility within a few hours.
The Finnish civil defense system is based not only on infrastructure but also on citizen preparedness. The law requires every household to maintain stocks of food, water, medicines, and basic hygiene supplies for at least 72 hours. This means that every citizen is part of the national resilience system—ready to survive short-term cutoffs from energy, water, or food supplies.
According to a 2023 audit by the Ministry of the Interior, as many as 91 percent of Finnish shelters are fully ready for conventional threats, such as bombings or explosions, while 83 percent meet standards for chemical and radiological protection. Although some facilities require maintenance of filtration systems and seals, the overall condition of the infrastructure is considered very good.
Such effectiveness is the result of close cooperation between the state, local governments, and the private sector, as well as high social awareness. Finnish shelters are thus not passive safeguards but an active element of security culture, embedded in everyday life and a shared sense of responsibility for survival in the face of crisis.
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NATO entry increased investments
After joining NATO in 2023, Finland did not slow down the development of its defense potential. The country consistently implements the so-called „total defense” model, which encompasses both armed forces and civilian structures.
Investments in civil defense currently account for about 2 percent of GDP, and according to government plans in Helsinki, this indicator is set to rise to as much as 5 percent in the coming years. The Finnish system assumes full societal involvement in defense actions—from mandatory military service for men (and in practice, broad participation of women in training) to an extensive volunteer defense system, within which citizens are trained in crisis response, first aid, evacuation, or territorial defense.
The Finnish „total defense” model combines military, civilian, and technological elements, creating a coherent national security system. It includes, among others, a developed network of population shelters, strategic reserves of raw materials and food, as well as close cooperation between the private sector and the state in threat situations.
Poland at the beginning of the finnish path
Poland, like Finland, borders Russia, making it vulnerable to similar threats. However, Poland’s shelter system is significantly less developed in comparison. According to the 2023 Fire Service inventory, the country has about 2,000 shelters for 300,000 people, which is about 0.8 percent of the population, as well as 9,000 hiding places for 1.1 million people, or about 2.9 percent, and 224,000 temporary places, for example in subways or tunnels, for an additional 1.1 million, totaling below 4 percent for 38 million inhabitants.
Older data from 2013 indicate 28,687 shelters with a capacity of 1.135 million places, or about 3 percent of the population. In Warsaw, the largest city, expenditures of around 117 million zlotys are planned for modernization, but this is a drop in the ocean of needs.
In 2025, the Act on Population Protection and Civil Defense came into force, mandating from 2026 the construction of shelters in new multi-family buildings and public facilities, with the goal of providing places for at least 50 percent of the urban population and 25 percent of the rural one. The program for 2025–2026 provides 5 billion zlotys, or about 1.25 billion dollars, for modernizations and new constructions, with priority for the „Eastern Shield.”
Nevertheless, experts warn that many „shelter places” are just basements or garages that protect against weather but not against bombings. There is a lack of a coherent inventory and training: in 2025, over 2,000 facilities were inspected, but only a thousand meet the criteria.
