Africa and the Middle East - 2024 Summary

At the end of 2024, Defence24 traditionally reviews the most important events in Africa and the Middle East. These volatile regions once again found themselves at the center of global attention. Although it was not a peaceful year, a full-scale conflict involving NATO countries was avoided. Below, we present the 10 most significant events of the past 12 months.

The next phase of the Lebanese war and the ceasefire with Hezbollah

The war between Israel and Hezbollah, ongoing since October 8, 2023, represents one of the most serious escalations of conflicts in the region in over a decade. Hezbollah, a Shia militia operating in Lebanon and supported by Iran, intensified attacks on northern Israel in response to Israeli actions in Gaza following the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023. Israel retaliated with airstrikes targeting Hezbollah positions in Lebanon and Syria. The conflict quickly escalated into regular clashes, resulting in widespread destruction and the displacement of civilians on both sides of the border.

Initially, the fighting consisted of localized border skirmishes but soon evolved into full-scale warfare, including air raids, artillery shelling, and the use of advanced technologies such as drones and cyber warfare. It is estimated that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) launched approximately 14,000 rocket attacks throughout the conflict.

A key event occurred on September 17, when mass explosions hit pagers used by Hezbollah fighters, reportedly as a result of cooperation between IDF and Mossad. The attack killed dozens of militants and injured thousands. Later, in September 2024, Israel carried out a strike on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut, killing the group’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah.

On October 1, 2024, Israel launched a ground offensive aimed at destroying Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Israeli forces claimed to have eliminated 70% of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and significantly weakened its combat capabilities, dealing a blow to the group’s status as a key member of the „axis of resistance”.

The humanitarian and political impact of the conflict has been severe. In Lebanon, over 1.4 million people were displaced, and much of the civilian infrastructure was destroyed, deepening the economic crisis. In Israel, around 96,000 residents were evacuated from border areas, with 45 civilians and 75 IDF soldiers killed by rocket attacks. A ceasefire agreement was implemented on November 27, 2024, brokered primarily by the U.S. and France. According to the agreement, Israel was to withdraw troops from southern Lebanon within 60 days, Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL troops would be redeployed, and offensive actions by Israel and Hezbollah would be halted.

The agreement was described as a „permanent ceasefire” by President Joe Biden, although questions remain about the durability of peace in the region. Both Israel and Hezbollah continue to emphasize their right to self-defence, heightening the risk of renewed escalation. Further uncertainty stems from the dispute over the Shebaa Farms (a strip of land between the Golan Heights and the Lebanese-Syrian border) and Iran’s role as Hezbollah’s sponsor.

Although Israel achieved a military victory, it now faces humanitarian and political costs associated with waging wars on multiple fronts. The international community, including the U.S. and France, will need to monitor the ceasefire’s implementation and support Lebanon’s reconstruction, a challenging task given ongoing regional tensions.

Middle East expert Paweł Rakowski commented that the year 2024 in Lebanon was marked by Israel’s war with Hezbollah. The state, along with most non-Shia areas, remained passive in the face of the crisis, which spread from border regions to the Bekaa Valley and Shia neighborhoods in Beirut at its peak. The state and the Lebanese people chose passivity to avoid internal collapse. The outcome of this war was insufficient to prompt a grassroots effort to remove Hezbollah from its dominant role in Lebanon. The death of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, will reshape Lebanese politics in the long run. However, changes in Syria could increase sectarian tensions within radical Islamic circles, potentially benefiting Hezbollah, which may seek to reclaim its lost status as the defender of Lebanese sovereignty against external threats.

Erdogan’s African Policy in 2024

This year was marked by the Republic of Turkey’s active foreign policy under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Africa became a particularly important area of focus for Ankara, with relations having been developed for many years. In 2024, Turkey’s policy on the continent gained momentum, focusing on strengthening economic, political, and cultural ties with African states. Turkey’s growing interest in the continent is reflected in the increase in the number of embassies, which rose from 12 in 2002 to 44. These efforts are part of a broader strategy aimed at enhancing Turkey’s global position as a power in Africa. It is already evident that Turkey is fulfilling this role.

Turkish companies, especially those in the construction sector, have been active in projects in countries such as Senegal, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia. For instance, in Somalia, the Turkish company Albayrak Group manages the port in Mogadishu, significantly improving its efficiency. Ankara is also investing in road and bridge construction in Ethiopia, supporting the development of transport infrastructure.

Furthermore, Turkey is expanding trade cooperation, aiming to increase the value of trade exchanges with the continent, which has grown dynamically in recent years. Over the past two decades, trade between Turkey and Africa has increased from 5.4 billion dollars to over 40 billion dollars, with a target of 45 billion dollars by 2025/2026.

The strengthening of economic ties with African countries in 2024 resulted in numerous economic forums and trade missions organized by Turkey, such as the Turkey-Africa Economic Forum in Istanbul. This platform provides opportunities to deepen relations with regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Soft power is a key element of Erdoğan’s African policy. In 2024, Turkey continued its educational and cultural activities on the continent. Institutions such as Türkiye Maarif Vakfi (Turkish Education Foundation) and TÜRKIYE Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Religious Foundation) played an important role in promoting the Turkish education system and Islamic cultural-religious communities. In Senegal and Sudan, many Turkish schools attract thousands of students by offering scholarships and the opportunity to study in Turkey. In this context, it is worth mentioning the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), which implements aid projects in numerous African countries. In 2024, these initiatives were carried out in Nigeria, Gambia, and Guinea.

Amid rising global tensions, Turkey also aims to strengthen military cooperation with African nations. In 2024, Ankara intensified exports of modern weaponry, including Bayraktar TB2 combat drones, to countries such as Niger, Chad, and Somalia. For example, Niamey purchased these weapons from Turkey to combat Islamist militants operating in the Sahel. Buyers include members of the AES alliance (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger).

Ankara also supports the training of African armed forces through military cooperation programs. In Somalia, Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu serves as the primary training center for the Somali army, playing a crucial role in stabilizing the region. In Libya, Turkey supports the Government of National Unity by providing weapons and training for forces loyal to the Tripoli-based government, helping Ankara secure its strategic interests in the Mediterranean region.

Analyst Aleksandra Maria Spancerska from the Polish Institute of International Affairs highlights Turkey’s comprehensive approach to the African continent. She notes that due to economic ties with Ethiopia and security agreements with Somalia, Turkey has become an increasingly important player in the Horn of Africa in recent years. In 2024, Turkish policymakers contributed to resolving tensions in Somali-Ethiopian relations regarding access to the sea. Turkey initiated the Ankara Process, which resulted in an agreement brokered by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This year was also symbolically significant for Turkish-Egyptian relations, as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Ankara for the first time since 2013. The two sides signed 17 cooperation agreements, although they failed to resolve differences regarding the Libyan conflict and the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Turkey’s influence is not limited to North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The country is striving to strengthen its presence in the Sahel region, where it is gaining popularity compared to former colonial powers.

Africa is a field of competition among global players, including China, Russia, the United States, and France. Erdoğan’s policy in 2024 aligns with Turkey’s broader efforts to reduce dependence on the West and solidify an independent position in global politics. Cooperation with Africa enables Ankara to build alliances within the United Nations and strengthen its standing in relations with global powers. Turkey presents itself as an alternative partner for Africa, offering mutually beneficial cooperation without the historical burdens of colonialism.

This narrative is reinforced by Turkey’s emphasis on partnerships, avoiding the patronizing approach often criticized in Western policies. Ankara positions itself as an ideal partner in the geopolitical competition between Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and Paris.

The Deteriorating Security Situation in the Sahel States

In recent years, the Sahel region, which includes countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, has become the focus of global attention due to the dramatically worsening security situation. In 2024, the situation in the region became critical because of escalating violence by armed groups, humanitarian crises, and political unrest that undermine the stability of the Sahel and the broader sub-Saharan region.

The Sahel has become a battleground for jihadist armed groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin (JNIM). These organizations exploit the weakness of state military and administrative structures to expand their influence in rural areas, where central governments have limited control. In 2024, the number of attacks on civilians and government forces dramatically increased, and in countries like Burkina Faso and Mali, entire regions remain outside government control.

For example, in Mali, following the withdrawal of the French anti-terrorist mission „Barkhane” and the UN contingent (MINUSMA), there was a surge in jihadist attacks against government forces and civilians. In Burkina Faso in 2024, most of the country’s territory was declared beyond effective government control, forcing thousands of people to flee in search of safety.

The Sahel is also a region where political instability has become the norm. In recent years, countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have experienced military coups, further weakening their state structures. In 2024, the political situation in Niger, where a military junta took power in 2023, remains tense. International sanctions and diplomatic isolation have hindered effective governance, exacerbating Niger’s economic and security crises. Currently, juntas in these three countries control no more than 60% of their territories.

Rising conflicts in the Sahel have caused mass displacement. It is estimated that more than 5 million people were forced to leave their homes due to violence in 2024. Refugee camps in neighboring countries, such as Mauritania and Chad, are overcrowded, and humanitarian organizations struggle with resource shortages to provide basic aid. This crisis is further worsened by climate change. The Sahel is one of the regions most vulnerable to global warming, leading to desertification and declining agricultural productivity. Food and water shortages increase tensions between communities, particularly between herders and farmers, creating additional flashpoints for local conflicts.

The international community is making efforts to address the crisis in the Sahel, but responses have often proven inadequate. The withdrawal of France and other European countries has weakened counter-terrorism capabilities, leaving a vacuum that countries like Russia, through the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, are trying to fill. Russian mercenaries operating in Mali and Burkina Faso, however, face accusations of human rights violations and ineffectiveness in combating terrorism.

The Turkish private military company (PMC) Sadat also operates in the Sahel, competing with weakened Russian mercenaries who face logistical challenges following the collapse of Syria’s state structures, which once supported Russian supply lines to Africa. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as an important ally of Sudan and Chad, where France has scaled down its presence, and Hungary has stepped in.

Jędrzej Czerep from the Polish Institute of International Affairs concludes that while the pro-Russian juntas in the Sahel continue to distance themselves from ECOWAS, their political future remains uncertain. Niger’s interests likely favor normalizing relations with Benin, Nigeria, and Algeria rather than remaining isolated. After Russia’s setback in Syria, which the juntas avoided commenting on, they are expected to diversify their security partnerships—benefiting countries such as Turkey and the UAE. Burkina Faso faces the highest risk of collapse under jihadist pressure, which is also spreading into Benin, Togo, and Ghana, fueled by ethnic policy failures in these countries.

What Did the Forced Presidential Elections in Iran and Masud Pezeszkian’s Victory Change?

The past year was exceptionally intense for Iran. Domestically, attention focused on the return of reformists and centrists to the political arena and debates surrounding legislation regulating women’s dress codes and public morality. Internationally, events were dominated by setbacks for the „Axis of Resistance” and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

The year began positively for Tehran, as Iran formally joined the BRICS group. However, it was also marked by a terrorist attack in Kerman and increased unrest, particularly in the Sistan and Baluchestan province. Iran also launched missile strikes against targets in Iraq, exchanged fire with Pakistan, and continued attacks on ships linked to Israeli operators, while maintaining support for key regional allies—Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

In the March parliamentary elections, conservatives secured a majority, but the early presidential elections saw the victory of Masud Pezeszkian, a moderate reformist.

Domestic developments took a backseat following Iran’s direct and official attack on Israeli territory, which prompted retaliation from Tel Aviv. From that point, Iran’s regional policies suffered reputational and strategic setbacks—most notably, the death of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Pezeszkian’s inauguration day and the subsequent death of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah. Additionally, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime weakened the Axis of Resistance.

By year’s end, Tehran’s position appeared decidedly negative. Hamas was struggling to survive, Hezbollah had been decimated, Iran’s missile capabilities failed to guarantee territorial security, and Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election added unpredictability. This outlook was summarized by Iran expert and former Polish consul in Kabul, Marcin Krzyżanowski (Jagiellonian University).

Iran, already burdened by long-standing economic sanctions and inflation reaching several dozen percent annually, required immediate economic reforms. Masud Pezeszkian promised economic recovery by reducing reliance on oil exports and developing new sectors such as renewable energy, information technology, and agriculture. An example of this approach was the April 2024 agreement with China to expand transport infrastructure and develop railway networks. At the same time, Pezeszkian initiated talks with the European Union to ease certain sanctions in exchange for limiting Iran’s nuclear program and gradually unfreezing Iranian assets abroad.

Pezeszkian’s victory marked a shift in Iran’s foreign policy. The reformist president expressed a desire to ease tensions with the West, particularly with the United States and its regional allies. In May 2024, Pezeszkian proposed resuming negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program under the JCPOA framework, which was welcomed by the European Union but met with a cautious response from Washington.

A significant aspect of Iran’s international relations was Pezeszkian’s effort to reconcile with Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that there was „no room for hostility” between Riyadh and Tehran. However, he did not attend the Arab and Islamic summit in the Saudi capital, citing an overwhelming workload.

Notably, Iran-Poland relations have never been strained, and the two nations have maintained diplomatic ties for decades. The main challenge remains Iran’s cooperation with the Kremlin and its supply of weapons to Russia for the war against Ukraine. If relations were normalized in the future, opportunities for cooperation with Tehran could emerge. However, the outcome ultimately depends on Iran and its people.

Rivalry in the Horn of Africa

The year 2024 in the Horn of Africa has brought new tensions and continued competition for influence in one of the most strategic regions of the world. This part of Africa, which includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and parts of Sudan, has long been a geopolitical focal point due to its location along vital maritime routes, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and its wealth of natural resources.

Over the past 12 months, regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have intensified their activities in the Horn of Africa. Egypt has focused primarily on the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, built by Ethiopia. Cairo’s diplomatic efforts, supported by Riyadh, aim to pressure Addis Ababa to secure Egypt’s water access interests.

The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, has continued its investment policies in seaports and logistics infrastructure in Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea. An example is the expansion of DP World’s operations in the port of Berbera in Somaliland, which the UAE views as a critical trade hub. This move strengthens its economic influence in the region but also creates tensions with China, which is pursuing similar projects.

The Horn of Africa is also a stage for global rivalry. In 2024, China increased its military and economic presence in the region. In Djibouti, where China already has a military base, joint training exercises with local armed forces continue. Beijing also provides favorable loans to Ethiopia, aiming to deepen ties with Addis Ababa, a key ally in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, has sought to counter Chinese influence by increasing military aid to Somalia and supporting efforts against Al-Shabaab. Facing global competition with China, the U.S. has worked to strengthen alliances with Horn of Africa nations while offering assistance for infrastructure reconstruction—evident during Kenyan President William Ruto’s visit to the White House this year.

Russia has also engaged in the region, albeit more modestly. Eritrea serves as Moscow’s stronghold in East Africa, evidenced by an agreement granting Russia access to the port of Assab. Russia’s involvement aims not only to expand influence but also to disrupt U.S. and allied operations.

Somalia in 2024 remains one of the most unstable countries in the region but also a key area of competition. The government in Mogadishu, supported by the U.S. and the African Union, is working to rebuild the state and defeat Al-Shabaab, which continues to control large swathes of territory. Meanwhile, Turkey, a long-term investor in Somalia, has expanded its presence through the development of TURKSOM, a military base in Mogadishu, and assistance in training local forces. Ankara views Somalia as a vital element of its East Africa strategy.

Rivalry in the Horn of Africa is unfolding against a backdrop of worsening humanitarian crises and security issues. In 2024, the UN warned that the number of people at risk of hunger in Somalia and South Sudan had sharply risen due to climate change, armed conflicts, and political instability. Ethiopia continues to face renewed tensions in the Tigray region. Despite the end of the war, the area remains volatile, with the risk of further clashes looming. International aid programs, such as the World Food Programme, are hampered by insecurity and limited financial resources.

Dr. Michał Lipa (Jagiellonian University) summarizes the regional rivalry as follows: „The Horn of Africa is a stage for geopolitical competition among key Middle Eastern actors, such as Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Tensions over natural resources (particularly the Nile’s water resources), control of strategic ports and transportation routes, and securing the favor of local political elites are the primary motives for Middle Eastern involvement in this area. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile (which supplies most of the water to the »main« Nile) is one of the key flashpoints. For Egypt, the Nile is a strategic resource determining economic stability, agricultural development, and food security, making any threats to unrestricted access to drinking and irrigation water from this river existential issues. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, by building the dam, aims to strengthen its regional position by increasing energy capacity, reducing reliance on foreign energy suppliers, and stimulating economic development. To bolster its position, Ethiopia signed an important agreement with the unrecognized Somaliland at the beginning of 2024, which, in turn, pushed Somalia closer to Egypt, at least temporarily. Ethiopia has struggled for years with limitations resulting from its lack of direct access to the sea, making its exports and imports dependent on the port of Djibouti. The agreement with Somaliland, particularly regarding access to the port of Berbera, offered new opportunities for Addis Ababa but raised concerns in Mogadishu, where the government prioritizes territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Egypt, responding to Ethiopia’s growing ties with Somaliland, intensified its activities in Somalia by supplying weapons and supporting the development of Somali military infrastructure. In this way, Cairo sought to create a buffer of states aligned with its position and limit Ethiopia’s potential benefits from its presence in Somaliland. However, the situation became more complex following an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024, held in Ankara. After months of tensions regarding Ethiopia’s plans to access Somaliland’s ports, the two countries agreed to cooperate, ensuring Ethiopia access to Somali ports.

Through mediation in such disputes, Turkey seeks to counter the UAE’s influence in Somalia (and partly in Somaliland and Eritrea) as well as Saudi Arabia’s influence in Djibouti, both of which aim to control strategic transportation routes. Turkey, which has a military presence in Somalia, has thus enabled Somalia to become more independent from Egypt, reducing Cairo’s maneuvering space in the Horn of Africa. In a broader context, this development gives Turkey an advantage and strengthens Ethiopia’s position. As for the policies of other Middle Eastern actors, particular attention should be paid to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE invested in the expansion of strategic infrastructure in Eritrea and Somaliland but later became involved in a project to build a military base in Somalia to increase its operational capabilities along Africa’s eastern coast. One goal of such activities may be to reduce the Horn of Africa’s dependence on Turkey—an objective shared by Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, in turn, is expanding its base in Djibouti, likely aiming to counter Turkish and Iranian influence, including neutralizing the pro-Iranian Houthi movement in Yemen, which poses a destabilizing threat near the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Overall, the Horn of Africa is witnessing significant activity from Middle Eastern actors, focused on power projection, control of strategic ports and transport routes, and, in Egypt’s case, ensuring unrestricted access to the Nile’s water resources. At the center of these maneuvers is Somalia, whose strategic location along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden makes it a state that key players from the Middle East and beyond are striving to win over.”

The Horn of Africa in 2024 remains a theater of intense competition, where regional and global powers« interests intersect. While investments in infrastructure and military assistance bring economic and strategic benefits, tensions among competing actors and unresolved humanitarian crises deepen the region’s instability. The future of the Horn of Africa is no longer shaped solely by local governments but increasingly by the actions of external powers, especially from the Middle East.

The State of Democracy in Africa – Elections Held and Those That Were „Ignored”

Democracy in Africa has always been a complex topic. The past year was no exception. While some countries successfully conducted elections, others regressed into authoritarianism or political chaos, denying citizens the right to vote. The year 2024 saw both success stories and setbacks, casting uncertainty over the future of democracy on the continent.

In 2024, South Africa, one of the most stable democracies in Africa, held parliamentary elections. The electoral process was conducted as planned and deemed free and fair by both domestic and international observers, although allegations of irregularities in voter registration emerged. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) retained power but with declining support, reflecting growing frustration over issues like internal corruption, youth unemployment exceeding 60%, and economic inequality.

For the first time since 1994, ANC failed to secure over 50% of the vote but remained the largest party. This led to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), comprising the ANC and the Democratic Alliance. President Cyril Ramaphosa was re-elected in the National Assembly vote.

Senegal, considered one of West Africa’s most stable democracies, held both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024. The pre-election period was marked by intense debate, especially after former President Macky Sall announced he would not seek a third term—an act widely praised domestically and internationally. However, Sall’s administration faced criticism for politically motivated accusations of corruption against opposition leaders, some of whom were barred from running, raising concerns about the fairness of the process.

The presidential election took place peacefully, with high voter turnout reflecting public engagement. The candidate of the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Fraternity (PASTEF), Bassirou Diomaye Faye, won with 54.28% of the vote. His victory symbolized a desire for change, particularly among Senegal’s youth—75% of the population is under 35. Faye aims to reduce Senegal’s dependence on France and pursue partnerships with China and Russia while restoring dialogue with military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

In stark contrast, Mali experienced significant political difficulties in 2024. The military government, which promised elections to restore civilian rule, once again postponed the vote. Officials cited security concerns, but many observers viewed it as a tactic to retain power. Escalating violence, the government’s unwillingness to stabilize the country, and strengthened ties with Russia have further complicated Mali’s path to democratic governance.

Burkina Faso faces similar challenges. Political instability and security threats have led to the extension of the transition period by another five years. Rising armed group activities and the lack of a clear plan for elections under the interim government, led by Captain Ibrahim Traore, have alarmed the international community. Burkina Faso, like Mali, has aligned itself with Russia, relying on Kremlin support to maintain its junta-led government. Armed terrorist groups effectively control large areas, making governance difficult.

The situation mirrors Niger, where ousted President Mohamed Bazoum remains detained. The ruling junta expelled Western troops and initiated talks with Russia, further distancing itself from democratic reforms.

Sudan remains engulfed in civil war following a coup, while Chad’s situation is highly uncertain. Parliamentary elections, scheduled for December 29, 2024, were initially planned for 2021 but postponed multiple times due to political instability and organizational challenges. These elections are seen as crucial for restoring constitutional order after the death of President Idriss Déby in 2021. Chad is currently governed by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, the late president’s son.

Africa’s democratic landscape in 2024 illustrates both progress and regression. While countries like South Africa and Senegal showed signs of stability, others like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sudan face severe crises. The continent’s democratic future depends on addressing security challenges, ensuring free and fair elections, and breaking patterns of military rule and foreign influence.

Escalation in Syria – Why Did the Conflict Intensify and What Does It Mean for the Region?

The Assad dynasty had ruled Syria unchallenged for over 50 years. Neither the Arab-Israeli wars, the rise to power of the young Bashar al-Assad, the Arab Spring, nor prolonged international isolation managed to bring down the regime. However, events of the past month have turned the civil war—ongoing since mid-2012—into a decisive blow for Assad’s Syria.

Following an offensive launched on November 27 by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and escalating military confrontations within Syria, the country’s political order collapsed rapidly. Major urban centers such as Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus fell to the advancing forces. On December 8, HTS fighters declared the „liberation of Syria from Assad’s regime,” while Bashar al-Assad fled the country, seeking asylum with his long-time guarantor and ally, Vladimir Putin.

Commenting on the Syrian situation, Jacek Małecki, a Syria expert and doctoral candidate at the University of Łódź, stated that the „conflict has entered a new phase. By 2020, Syrian government forces, supported by Russia and Iran, had regained control over most areas previously held by opposition groups. However, the events of November and December this year exposed the weaknesses of the regime and the inability of Russia and Iran to provide effective support. Facing abandonment by Moscow and Tehran, President Bashar al-Assad fled the country, ending his 24-year rule.”

Nevertheless, the collapse of the Assad regime has not ended the conflict. In northern Syria, Turkish-backed armed groups intensified attacks on the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), aiming to seize control over the eastern part of the country. Meanwhile, Israel, despite benefiting from the weakening of Iranian influence in Syria, grew concerned about the rise of HTS—an Islamist group ideologically aligned with Hamas. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded with a series of intense airstrikes, dismantling most of Syria’s remaining defensive capabilities.

The United States has remained largely passive, maintaining only a small military contingent of approximately 900 troops to support Kurdish forces in combating the remnants of the Islamic State.

Current developments in Syria highlight the growing multipolarity of power dynamics in the Middle East, with regional players like Turkey and Israel increasing their involvement in the competition for influence. The conflict is far from over, and its trajectory in 2025 will be crucial for the future of Syria and the broader, unstable Middle East.

Where Does Israel Stand One Year After the War with Hamas?

One year after the outbreak of war with Hamas, Israel finds itself facing contradictions and challenges spanning security, domestic politics, and international relations. What began as a military conflict has left a profound impact on Israel’s social, political, and economic landscape. While the Israeli government claims successes against Hamas, the reality is far more complex.

From a military standpoint, Israel achieved significant victories, eliminating many Hamas leaders, destroying underground tunnels, and crippling the group’s missile capabilities. Over the past year, rocket attacks on Israeli territory have decreased. However, this relative calm is deceptive. Despite its losses, Hamas is rebuilding its infrastructure in Gaza with financial and logistical support from Iran and other sources. Additionally, the war has fueled the rise of more radical factions among Palestinian youth, increasing tensions in the West Bank.

The war also reshaped Israel’s political scene. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who initially gained public support for his decisive actions during the conflict, now faces a political crisis. Judicial reforms proposed by his government triggered the largest protests in Israel’s history, further weakening national unity. Critics accuse Netanyahu of exploiting the war to distract from internal problems.

Social cohesion in Israel has been severely tested. Divisions between Orthodox and secular Jews, right- and left-wing factions, and Arabs and Jews have deepened, complicating efforts to build a stable future. One year later, the question remains whether Israel is more united or divided than ever before.

The economic costs of the war are also evident. Prolonged tensions have discouraged foreign investors. Residents of areas near Gaza continue to suffer economic impacts, including job losses and population displacement to safer regions.

The tourism sector has also stagnated. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is no longer a concern, fears of renewed violence keep many tourists away, and visitor numbers remain below pre-war levels. Meanwhile, countries like Saudi Arabia have benefited from diverted tourism flows.

The war with Hamas has strained Israel’s international relations. While the country retains U.S. support, the Biden administration has increased pressure on Netanyahu to take steps toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, such as the UAE and Bahrain, have voiced growing concern over the scale of Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Israeli analyst Michał Wojnarowicz (Polish Institute of International Affairs) provided an assessment of 2024 and projections for 2025. According to Wojnarowicz, „Israel has transformed significantly over the past year. On one hand, it successfully weakened its primary strategic adversary, Iran’s »Axis of Resistance.« On the other hand, it remains entangled in Gaza, unable to secure the release of hostages or force Hamas to surrender. Its wartime methods have drawn the harshest accusations. Domestically, it faced immense political turmoil, yet Netanyahu has managed to retain power. His chances of losing office soon appear slim. In 2025, Israel will likely seek to leverage Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency to pursue plans such as the annexation of Jewish settlements.”

Israel’s position a year after the war reflects both military success and deep societal fractures. Its future depends on navigating internal divisions, addressing Gaza’s instability, and managing shifting global alliances.

French Withdrawal from Africa

France’s withdrawal from Africa in 2024 marks one of the most significant geopolitical shifts in recent years, reflecting evolving relationships between former colonial powers and African nations. This process stems from growing political tensions, rising anti-French sentiment, and changes in regional and global dynamics.

Paris decided to reduce its military presence across Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, following a series of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. After initially scaling back Operation Barkhane, which once involved over 5,000 troops, France proceeded with further reductions. By the end of 2024, the number of French troops had decreased from 2,300 to approximately 600, focusing on training missions spread across several West African nations rather than direct combat roles.

The French military drawdown was primarily a response to mounting anti-French protests and ultimatums from new military regimes in the Sahel. In Niger, for example, mass protests and demands from the junta compelled France to evacuate its troops from bases in Niamey and other strategic locations.

In Senegal and Chad, France’s role also shifted. While Senegal maintained relatively stable relations with Paris, rising dissatisfaction over perceived neo-colonial ties fueled protests advocating for greater economic independence and closer ties with China and Turkey, which have invested heavily in infrastructure. In Chad, the closure of France’s military base in N’Djamena symbolized the end of decades-long military dominance. The Chadian government has since sought cooperation with Russia, Hungary, and neighboring African countries.

The French withdrawal has also affected economic relations. In Mali and Niger, longstanding French economic dominance—exemplified by companies like TotalEnergies and Areva (now Orano)—began to wane. Chinese and Russian firms stepped in, particularly in Niger’s uranium sector, where contracts with French companies were renegotiated, reducing their influence.

The withdrawal also carried cultural and symbolic implications. Many African nations, including Burkina Faso and Mali, initiated steps to phase out the French language in education and public life. Programs promoting local languages, such as Bambara, reflect broader efforts toward cultural decolonization.

France’s retreat is part of a larger trend toward increased political and economic independence among African nations, which are turning to new international partners. However, Paris is working to redefine its role in Africa, emphasizing economic and cultural cooperation over military dominance. Despite these efforts, 2024 represents a turning point, signaling the end of an era in Franco-African relations.

It is important to dispel the myth of France fleeing Africa and Russia emerging victorious. The Sahel is not the entirety of Africa. At the same time, Paris has recognized that military bases alone are insufficient to maintain influence. With troop numbers reduced to around 600—or possibly fewer—France has shifted its focus to training and advisory roles, marking the end of its era of direct military oversight and the beginning of a new phase centered on partnerships.

Wagner Group vs. Ukraine in Africa

In 2024, the rivalry between Wagner Group and Ukrainian intelligence services (mainly HUR) in Africa became a clearly noticeable element of global struggles for influence on the continent. Both sides intensified their activities, using political, military, economic, and propaganda tools, highlighting Africa’s growing importance in global geopolitics.

International relations expert Wojciech Kozioł (Defence24) emphasized the scale of this rivalry, stating, „Ukrainian activities outside its borders, and even outside the European continent, have been highly characteristic since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These efforts intensified over time, with Ukrainian forces operating in Africa and the Middle East. In Africa, the most widely publicized clashes involved Wagner Group and pro-Russian militants. Kyiv Independent confirmed in 2023 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) were actively operating in Sudan, with further missions conducted in the Sahel region, including Mali.

Such actions may initially appear illogical, as the primary battle against Russians is on Ukrainian soil. However, they must be viewed in a broader context. For Russia, contacts and influence in Africa are crucial due to mercenaries and natural resources. These Ukrainian activities demonstrate that Russia cannot feel secure, and every failure—even a minor one—undermines its position.”

Although formally weakened after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in 2023, Wagner Group continues to play a vital role in Russia’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa. In 2024, its focus shifted to maintaining and expanding contracts with authoritarian regimes and exploiting natural resources. A key example was its presence in the Central African Republic, where Wagner mercenaries provided security to the government in exchange for gold and diamond mining concessions.

Reserve officer and former soldier of the 6th Airborne Brigade, Stanisław Sadkiewicz, highlighted the Ukrainian presence in Africa after the July battle near Tin Zaoutine in Mali. Near this small village on the Algerian border, Tuareg rebels from the separatist Azawad region, in cooperation with the jihadist group JNIM, defeated Wagner Group and Malian forces in a three-day battle. It was one of Wagner Group’s biggest defeats, with Ukraine’s HUR contributing by providing Tuaregs with instructors and intelligence data. Sadkiewicz concluded, „The authorities in Kyiv understand that the Global South is one of the fronts in the confrontation between Russia and the broader West. Despite the exhausting war at home, Ukraine is trying to disrupt the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions on other continents.”

Wagner also focuses on promoting its image as a crucial partner for stabilizing conflict zones. In Mali, the group collaborated with local forces, offering military training and support against rebels. However, its presence often escalated conflicts and increased repression against civilians. For instance, in Mali, Wagner Group was accused of multiple human rights violations during operations against armed groups in the Mopti region.

Ukraine, forced to redefine its strategic priorities after Russia’s 2022 invasion, intensified its diplomatic and economic efforts in Africa in 2024. Kyiv’s primary goal became reducing Russian influence on the continent by promoting alternative cooperation models.

One of Kyiv’s most significant moves was signing trade agreements with Kenya. Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal, Ukraine established new delivery routes through the Danube and the Mediterranean. This cooperation allowed African countries to diversify food supplies, reducing dependence on Russia.

Beyond direct actions, the rivalry between Ukraine and Wagner Group in Africa also plays out through narratives and propaganda. Russia uses state-controlled media to portray Wagner as an indispensable partner in fighting terrorism and stabilizing regions. Disinformation campaigns often depict Ukraine as a Western puppet to discourage African leaders from cooperating with Kyiv.

Ukraine, in turn, gained support from Western media and international organizations to build its image as a defender of sovereignty and international law. Ukrainian ministers« diplomatic visits to African countries emphasized partnerships based on equality and mutual benefits.

The rivalry between Wagner Group and Ukraine in Africa in 2024 reflects the broader conflict between Russia and the West, with Africa becoming one of the key theaters of action. Despite challenging circumstances, Ukraine is attempting—though on a limited scale—to establish its influence in Africa by focusing on infrastructure development, diplomacy, and technological support. Meanwhile, Wagner Group (essentially integrated into the African Corps) continues to serve as a central pillar of Russian policy in Africa, particularly in politically unstable countries.

Future competition is likely to intensify, especially concerning access to natural resources and food security. The key challenge for both sides will be gaining the trust of local leaders and communities, which could determine the long-term success of their strategies in Africa. At present, many countries remain wary of cooperating with Ukraine due to their long-standing ties with Russia and fears of importing the Russian-Ukrainian conflict into their territories. Kyiv’s main objective is to expose Russia’s weaknesses in Africa. Although Ukraine currently lacks the resources and capacity to fully counter Russia, it has taken initial steps that could serve as a springboard for greater influence.

”Peace is a journey, not a destination

In 2024, Africa and the Middle East faced significant challenges. Another chapter of the Lebanese war led to a ceasefire with Hezbollah, though a lasting agreement remains uncertain. In the Sahel region, worsening security, coups, and France’s withdrawal further deepened instability, while Turkey intensified its presence in Africa, building economic and military influence. After forced presidential elections, Iran grappled with internal tensions and the loss of allies in the Middle East. Syria is undergoing (re)construction, Ukraine continues its fight against Russia—including operations in Africa—and all eyes are on the White House and its plans for the African continent and the Middle East.

Migration also remains a critical security issue for Poland. Armed attacks at the border, hybrid warfare, and mass influxes pose daily challenges for Polish services, led by the Border Guard. Klara Sołtan (migration expert, Polish Representative Office in Palestine) highlights, „The past year—regarding illegal migration—showed another phase of the instrumentalization of migration procedures, including asylum processes. This term refers to smugglers incorporating legal migration procedures into stages of their operations. A widely known example is the issuance of »student visas« by Russian and Belarusian consulates, where so-called »students« later appear on illegal migration routes, often passing through Poland.

Another example of the instrumentalization of asylum procedures includes »refugee stories« fabricated by migrants, backed by forged documents and photos stored on phones, all aimed at obtaining international protection, even when it is not legally justified. Additional practices involve entering a country with forged or altered documents (Palestinian and Ukrainian passports are highly valued on the black market) or on tourist visas, despite the real purpose being settlement rather than tourism. Evidence of such practices by smugglers and migrants can be found on forums and migration chats, which are widely available on various messaging platforms and social media. The primary systemic impact of the instrumentalization of migration procedures is the blurring of lines between legal and illegal migration.”

Looking ahead to 2025, nothing can be taken for granted, but terrorism and conflicts remain integral to the contemporary landscape of Africa and the Middle East. Hopefully, the next 12 months will be at least somewhat more peaceful. These regions possess vast natural resources and are seeking partnerships. The potential is there, but it must be effectively harnessed.

For Europe, the opportunities and challenges are numerous, with migration—particularly artificially induced and uncontrolled migration—remaining the top priority.

Authors: Dr. Aleksander Olech, Mieszko Kucharski, Konrad Markiewicz, Gabriela Urbańska