If Ukraine loses the fight against corruption, it will lose the war

Subsequent Ukrainian presidents were not free of similar stories. Viktor Yushcjenko had to answer for the affair of „expensive friends” — privileged businessmen from the elite of the Orange Revolution. Viktor Yanukovych built a system of kleptocracy that ended with his flight from the country in 2014 and the seizure of his Mezhikhirya residence, a material symbol of the plundering of the state. Petro Poroszenko, for his part, struggled with the „Svinarchuk affair” — a scandal over corruption in the defense industry — as well as accusations of nepotism in the military and state companies.  

Zelensky — the promise to break with the "old system"

Against that background, Volodymyr Zelensky’s election in 2019 was supposed to be a radical break with the past. As LIGA.net recalls, the comedian and producer from Kvartal 95 entered politics as an outsider, „a man from outside the old system,” who promised to „break the oligarchic cartel” and introduce transparency into state structures. The electorate believed that someone without years in state administration and business would not be entangled in old dependencies.   However — as Ukrainska Pravda notes — reality quickly tested those hopes.

Today Zelensky himself faces the biggest reputational crisis of his presidency: the scandal around his long-time acquaintance, businessman Timur Mindych, co-owner of Kvartal 95. Ukrainian media increasingly call it „Mindychgate,” and Zaxid.net writes bluntly: every Ukrainian president had his „Mindych,” but no one had one like Zelensky — and at such a moment. According to reports in Zaxid.net and Ukrainska Pravda, Mindych remained for years in the shadows but always close to the center. Even during the 2019 campaign Zelensky used an armored car belonging to Mindych, and the president himself admitted that he celebrated his January 2021 birthday in a friend’s apartment, where — as he described it — he had been „unexpectedly invited, a few floors up.” Zaxid.net adds that Mindych held no official state position but had the status of a man with „access”: he could enter Bankova without excessive protocol and was seen as an informal intermediary between business and the presidential administration. After 2022, Mindych also appeared in connection with diamond companies in Luxembourg and Russia involved in producing large synthetic type-IIa diamonds. In 2025 his name was linked to former owners of the company New Diamond Technology, although formally he no longer appeared in the registers.   

"Operation Midas" — a corrupt scheme in Energoatom

It is from this background that the thread now called „Operation Midas” grew. On November 11, 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) announced the dismantling of an organized criminal group operating inside the state energy giant Energoatom. According to the investigation, detailed by the Kyiv Post and RBC-Ukraine, the company operated a system of illegal „commissions,” called „Shlyaban”: every firm that wanted to receive a contract from Energoatom had to pay 10–15 percent of the contract value. Otherwise, it risked payment blockages, loss of supplier status, and — according to accounts cited by NV.ua — even threats of mobilization against the management of „resistant” firms.

Investigators estimated the scale of the scheme at over $100 million.   As NABU materials cited by RBC-Ukraine and Zaxid.net show, these funds were „laundered” in a special office in downtown Kyiv linked to former MP Andriy Derkach.  For years Derkach has been associated in Ukrainian and Western media with Russian intelligence services and is on the U.S. sanctions list, and his Kyiv office allegedly served as a hub of „black accounting” and legitimization of money from state contracts.

Documents and recordings contained nicknames straight out of a gangster movie. Ukrainska Pravda and Zaxid.net report that „Carlson,” according to investigators and statements by MP Jaroslaw Zheleznyak, is Timur Mindych — co-owner of Kvartal 95 and a close friend of Zelensky. „Professor” refers to Herman Halushchenko, the minister of energy at the time (now minister of justice). „Rocket” is Ihor Myroniuk, a former adviser to Halushchenko and long-time associate of Andriy Derkach. „Tenor” is Dmytro Basov, Energoatom’s security director and a former security-services officer. „Ginger” \[Ryzha\] denotes Svitlana Hrynchuk, the current minister of energy, described in the materials as a technical and „manageable” person. Zaxid.net writes plainly that this group created in the energy sector something like an „alternative government” that controlled key contracts, financial flows, and investment decisions.    

Voices from the wiretaps — money instead of the front line

What shocked public opinion most were not the dry numbers but the voices of the participants themselves. Argument.ua and NV.ua, citing transcripts published by NABU, report that while Russian missiles destroyed Ukrainian energy infrastructure, people from this network discussed how to „raise the margin from 10 to 15 percent” in constructing new nuclear blocks at Khmelnytskyi. In one recording, an accountant nicknamed „Ryoshik” says, „carrying 1.6 million is such a pleasure,” describing the physical transport of cash. In other fragments, participants discuss how to hide stolen money in Dubai, the Seychelles, or Mauritius by transferring assets to wives and children.

Even more outrage was sparked by a sentence — reported by Ukrainska Pravda and Argument.ua — allegedly heard in connection with transfers through „Derkach’s office”: „The girl will leave, she’ll be in Moscow in a week and a half.” Framed within a full-scale war — when Russia is destroying Ukraine’s energy system — the mere suggestion that funds from the energy sector might flow through channels leading to Moscow sounds like an accusation of something beyond ordinary corruption. For a large part of public opinion — as Argument.ua writes — this is no longer „another scandal” but a „moral verdict” on part of the elite.     

The climax of this tragicomedy was the main character’s escape. On 10th November, 2025, NABU conducted simultaneous searches at 70 locations across the country, including Mindych’s home and offices in Kyiv. As Ukrainska Pravda established, citing sources in political circles, Mindych left Ukraine several hours before the operation began — he is said to have departed during the night just before NABU officers entered. Zaxid.net and ZN.UA describe a journalistic investigation that pointed to a possible „leak” from the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office itself: the deputy head of SAPO, Andriy Syniuk, allegedly maintained „social relations” with lawyer Oleksiy Meniov, who, according to the media, was a frequent guest at Mindych’s residence on Hrushevsky Street. NV.ua calls this thread a „scandal within a scandal” because if it is confirmed that the warning came from the heart of an institution set up to fight corruption, it would strike at the very idea of NABU’s and SAPO’s independence.   

At the same time, Ukrainska Pravda published a statement from the Press Office of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine that it had conducted its own internal investigation into the circumstances of Mindych’s border crossing and concluded that „the crossing of the border by this citizen (Mindych — ed.) occurred legally. At one of the border checkpoints he was issued permission to leave Ukraine in accordance with applicable regulations. All documents authorizing his border crossing during martial law were present,” officials reported. It is worth noting that at that time Mindych was not subject to any restrictions forbidding him from leaving Ukraine.

War, loss of resources, and dependence on the West

In this context, the broader war situation gains importance. Zaxid.net emphasizes that Zelensky’s situation is unprecedented: most of his term has taken place during a full-scale war. The state has lost full control of the sea as an economic resource, lost the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, parts of hydroelectric infrastructure and strategic metallurgical plants in Mariupol, and the budget — and this is openly stated — relies largely on Western financial support. Zaxid.net writes plainly: imagine what the hryvnia exchange rate would be and how supermarket shelves would look even in the west of the country had the budget not been „sustained” by foreign donors.

 In this light, the Mindych affair becomes more than another story about „one of their people.” It is a test of the entire model of power that Zelensky has built since 2019.    LIGA.net notes that this system was from the outset based on personal loyalty — on a „team of friends” from show business, marketing, and film production meant to be an alternative to old oligarchic networks. That model had one advantage in the early months of the war: decisions were made quickly, by phone, without bureaucratic paralysis. But — as Dzerkalo Tyzhnia writes — a wartime state needs procedures, not sentiments; where decisions are made at a coffee table, there is always room for an envelope. 

A series of alarms around the president

Ukrainian media recall that „Mindychgate” is not the first alarm in Zelensky’s circle. In 2023, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia revealed a scandal in the Ministry of Defence over food purchases for the army at inflated prices — symbolized by eggs bought at 17 hryvnias each when they were many times cheaper on the market. The contracts were overseen by a deputy minister regarded as close to the Presidential Office. The scandal ended with the dismissal of several officials but did not reach the highest levels of power.

In 2024 NABU and SAPO launched proceedings against then-Vice Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, whom media — including Ukrainska Pravda — portrayed as a protégé of Timur Mindych, recommended by him for cooperation with Zelensky. At the same time, Ukrainska Pravda’s investigations revealed irregularities in awarding contracts for infrastructure reconstruction, where companies connected to former Kvartal 95 people appeared. In each of these cases the response from Bankova was limited: statements about „abuses by individual officials” and appeals not to „undermine unity during the war.”  

Internal tension translates into international consequences. NV.ua reports that the biggest global outlets — including Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, The New York Times, and agencies like Bloomberg and Reuters — have already written about „Operation Midas,” which on one hand highlights NABU’s and SAPO’s role as evidence of real control mechanisms, and on the other asks how ready political power really is to allow these institutions to go „right up to Bankova.”  In this sense the Mindych case becomes a test not only for Zelensky himself but for the credibility of the Ukrainian state before partners who finance the war and support the budget.

At the same time Western backing is no longer unconditional. NV.ua describes that in discussions in Washington and Brussels the theme of „anti-corruption conditionality” — linking further tranches of aid to progress in prosecuting abuses, especially where people close to the president are involved — appears more and more often.  Corruption scandals, widely covered by Ukrainian media, are readily seized upon by Russian propaganda: as NV.ua notes, the Kremlin does not need to invent lies — it is enough to cite Ukrainian articles about corruption to undermine Kyiv’s moral legitimacy.

 In such a climate Argument.ua delivers a stark diagnosis: „the country has ultimately split into two Ukraines — one that fights and dies, and another that counts percentages.” The first comprises soldiers at Bakhmut and Kharkiv, volunteers, and energy workers repairing lines under fire. The second is those who at the same time negotiate „commissions,” shuttle suitcases of cash, and talk about how to hide money on exotic islands. This is not a metaphor: every delayed equipment delivery caused by corrupt conflicts of interest, every sham tender in energy or defense, is a concrete human life that cannot be recovered by a press conference.

The war on corruption as a condition for the state's survival

The Mindych scandal is therefore not just a matter of money. It is a test of the resilience of a system that for years functioned on loyalty rather than institutions. Ukrainska Pravda quotes one interlocutor who says, „Ukraine will withstand Russian rockets, but will not survive successive Mindyches.” That phrase captures the core problem well: you cannot win a war if the state is losing to its own habits. This is why „Mindychgate” shows there is no such thing as a „bad moment” to fight corruption. Delaying accountability in the name of „unity during wartime” effectively consents to parts of the elite waging their private war over contracts and kickbacks parallel to the war for the state’s survival.      If Ukraine asks the world for weapons, funds, and trust, it must prove that no private bond, no personal name, and no sentiment from before entering politics is stronger than the state interest. That is why this case is not an episode that can be covered up by the next information assault from the front. It is a systemic mirror. On the one hand it shows a state that — as LIGA.net writes — has indeed built unprecedented anti-corruption institutions capable of reaching people very close to power. On the other, it shows a structure where „trust has become a currency more important than competence,” and where informal „curators” of economic sectors can operate in the shadows for years until someone happens to switch the light on.   

Although there is no publicly confirmed evidence of direct ties between Mindych and Russia, the mere possibility that financial flows from state contracts could have passed through infrastructure associated with Andriy Derkach — a politician burdened with ties to Russian services — constitutes a national security problem. Corruption ceases to be an „internal affair” — it becomes a tool the enemy can use to weaken the state from within.

Ukraine in 2025 lives on Western aid, including significant support from Poland. Every dollar given for energy, defense, or reconstruction requires legitimization of trust. If, in the background of those funds, appears the name of a friend of the president who flees the country hours before searches, it hits not only Zelensky but the whole image of the country as a credible partner. Ukrainska Pravda and NV.ua note that the „Mindych case” may become a convenient argument for those in the U.S. and Europe who want to limit aid to Ukraine, citing the „lack of progress in the fight against corruption.”

Inside the Ukrainian establishment the domino effect is already visible. Ukrainska Pravda writes that „Midas” may deepen divisions between factions in the presidential camp: between the Bankova team, which for years relied on personal relations, and politicians and officials who favor strengthening independent institutions. RBC-Ukraine quotes anonymous advisers to Zelensky who say the president will have to choose: either support NABU and SAPO to investigate „to the end,” or try to „save his people,” which would mean an open conflict with the anti-corruption infrastructure built after both Maidans.  

Ukrainian media recall that „Mindychgate” is yet another case in which people from Zelensky’s circle have been at the center of anti-corruption probes. The Ministry of Defence scandal (January 2023), the Oleksiy Chernyshov case (2024), and the scandal around the „Reconstruction Service” (2024) revealed the same patterns — a lack of systemic presidential reaction and the conviction that schemes can be „covered by the war.”

The crisis around NABU and SAPO — protests and Zelensky's turnaround

In this context, the crisis in July 2025 was particularly telling, when Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law subordinating NABU and SAPO to the Prosecutor General’s Office. It was the most controversial move of his wartime presidency and a real blow to the anti-corruption architecture built after the Revolution of Dignity.

The decision immediately provoked public opposition: thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in 17 cities despite the ongoing war, carrying banners such as „We Are Not Russia,” „Leave NABU Alone,” and „Corruption Takes a Bow.” It was the largest anti-government protest since February 2022, and it drew a Western response — particularly from the U.S. and the EU — warning that undermining NABU’s and SAPO’s independence threatens the trust on which all military and financial assistance to Ukraine is based.  

Under social and international pressure Zelensky made an abrupt U-turn: he fast-tracked draft law No. 13533, restoring and strengthening all guarantees of independence for NABU and SAPO and limiting the Prosecutor General’s influence. The project, co-drafted by NABU and SAPO, was also supported by 48 deputies from various factions. Nevertheless, political analysts note that the stain on the president’s image will remain — because it showed that at a critical moment Zelensky was ready to violate the pillars of the state’s anti-corruption system while the state is fighting for its existence.

The "team of friends" versus the state of institutions

Zelensky’s system — „a team of friends, not institutions,” as some commentators maliciously put it — has reached a critical point. If he opts for a real, not cosmetic, disentangling of his „people” from influence over state contracts, he has a chance to prove that his political project is more than another chapter of Ukrainian „normality.” If he tries to ride it out, hoping the war will cover the scandals, he risks „Mindychgate” entering history not just as a corruption scandal but as the moment when the war for independence began to lose to the war over percentages.

The question therefore arises: will Ukrainian soldiers be willing to die for a country ruled by corrupt oligarchs?