NATO's Nuclear Deterrence Against Russia [Interview]

The nuclear policies of major powers have been widely discussed in recent months, highlighting the growing importance of NATO’s strategy in the face of modern competition. While the Alliance remains committed to pursuing a world without nuclear weapons, the current security environment compels it to maintain and reinforce deterrence to counter the ambitions of Russia, China, and other states expanding their nuclear arsenals. NATO also opposes the weaponization of outer space, warning against the destabilizing effects such actions could have on global security. Despite Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal and attempts to use coercion and nuclear blackmail, NATO continues to strengthen its defensive capabilities.

Aleksander Olech: Is NATO’s nuclear deterrence still viable when considering the threat posed by Russia?

Jim Stokes, NATO’s Director of Nuclear Policy: I would argue „yes.” Earlier this year, NATO celebrated its 75^th anniversary as an Alliance, which also means 75 years of NATO as a nuclear Alliance. And throughout its history, NATO has deterred aggression by any state, from the Soviet Union of the past to Russia today. Of course, this does not mean that deterrence is absolute. We have to maintain it, and improve it, and also understand that ultimately, deterrence is dependent on the adversary’s perspective. We have to examine our deterrence through the eyes of Russia, to judge whether deterrence holds, and if not, how to restore deterrence.

Russia embarked on a nuclear modernisation programme over 20 years ago, and has used the past two decades to evolve its nuclear strategy and doctrine, integrate its nuclear and conventional capabilities, and exercise its nuclear forces. Moscow relies on its nuclear forces to deter a strategic nuclear attack, but also seeks to benefit from nuclear coercion and blackmail, by threatening to use its nuclear weapons to attempt to delay or deter NATO Allied support to Ukraine and disrupt NATO unity. While this nuclear sabre-rattling may make headlines in the media, it has not shaken our steadfast support to Ukraine or to each other. We pay attention to what Moscow says, but also watch what it does, especially with its nuclear forces.

NATO keeps watch on the security environment, on Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine as well as its destabilising behaviour elsewhere in Europe. We also closely monitor the support China, North Korea, and Iran provide to Russia to aid its continuing illegal and unjust war. We have also observed the steady erosion of the international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regime by Russia. China has no interest in arms control and is on pace to triple its nuclear arsenal by 2035. And North Korea and Iran continue to pursue their nuclear ambitions and develop their long-range missile programmes.

This is a complex, multi-polar nuclear world, and the Allies are taking steps to address it. To maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, Allies made commitments years ago to modernise their nuclear forces. The United States, United Kingdom, and France are spending billions to modernise their strategic nuclear forces. The United States has upgraded its forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. And NATO’s nuclear forces – Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) provided by several Allies – are beginning to transition to the F-35A, the world’s first 5^th generation fighter aircraft. The Netherlands completed this transition earlier this year, and other Allies will transition in the near future. These efforts are yielding significant increases in NATO’s nuclear capability, which strengthens deterrence. We also will adapt NATO’s nuclear posture, as necessary.

Modernisation of strategic and theatre nuclear forces are underpinned by significant investments in conventional capabilities. NATO Allies, and specifically Poland, are buying capabilities we need for collective defence, in support of SACEUR’s new plans. This is a massive political, financial, and military commitment – all which strengthens deterrence.  NATO’s nuclear deterrence relies on conventional airpower to support a DCA mission, and Allied investments in deep precision-strike and missile defence capabilities complement NATO’s nuclear forces.

Militarily effective capabilities are necessary, but insufficient, for credible deterrence. As such, we continue to update our „nuclear software” – our policies and plans, our strategic thinking, and our consultation and decision-making processes. Earlier this year, the Defence Ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group approved an update to NATO’s core nuclear policy document, which reflects the security environment and provides political guidance for NATO’s nuclear forces. As stated at the Washington Summit, NATO is „strengthening its nuclear planning capability.” SACEUR is responsible for producing coherent plans for deterrence and defence. And these military plans support Allied political decision-making, to ensure we can effectively consult with each other, assess a situation, and make consensus decisions, even on nuclear issues.

Lastly, we use strategic communications, both statements and actions, to communicate Allied resolve, unity, and strength. Our deterrence communications demonstrate our effective military capabilities, including in NATO exercises, and reinforce the message that Allies have the political will to use their capabilities if needed. This is how we affect the decision calculus of an adversary and maintain deterrence. But we also must message to Allied publics, to reassure them that NATO is taking prudent measures to maintain deterrence and strengthen defence against any threat.

Given NATO’s commitment to deterrence how does it ensure that nuclear escalation risks are minimized in high-stakes crisis?

NATO Allies have decades of experience in crisis management, including a robust consultation process within the Alliance. One of our greatest strengths is our diversity. 32 Nations providing unique insights, based on historical experience and a clear understanding of the challenges we face today.

Today’s security environment faces an array of challenges and threats, none more significant than the threat of Russia’s nuclear weapons. For 75 years, the Alliance has deterred aggression by another state, including one armed with nuclear weapons. But Russia today is not like the Soviet Union of the past. It has different ambitions, as a revisionist power. And its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, now 10 years old, demonstrates the depths of its imperialistic goals. We are not going back to the Cold War, nor can we approach Russia as we did the Soviet Union.

With the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, Russia brandishes these capabilities in an attempt to coerce Ukraine, as well as NATO Allies. Moscow seeks to undermine the West’s support to Ukraine, including the material support provided by NATO Allies for Ukraine’s defence. Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, its employment of dual-capable missiles against Ukraine, out-of-cycle nuclear exercises, its nuclear doctrine, and development of novel nuclear-armed delivery systems, all create potential pathways for nuclear escalation.

Given these escalation risks, what can NATO do to minimise them? NATO is a responsible nuclear Alliance, and behaves accordingly. NATO does not hold out-of-cycle nuclear exercises, as Russia did preceding its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. NATO’s annual nuclear exercise, STEADFAST NOON, is conducted routinely, with advance notification to the public, and without any threatening behaviour toward any state. NATO also promotes transparency in its communications, to avoid miscalculation by Russia or misperception by Allied publics.

To prepare for a potential crisis, NATO and its Allies reduce escalation risks by ensuring we have a comprehensive and strategic understanding of the security environment. We are deepening our understanding of Russia, its nuclear strategy, doctrine, and capabilities. We are learning from Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine, and about escalation dynamics. And we are ensuring coherence in our own strategy, plans, and capabilities across conventional and nuclear domains. Lastly, at the political and military levels, we use wargames and exercises to enhance our crisis decision-making and ensure the Allies can gain agreement on how to respond to crisis or conflict.  

What is NATO’s position on modernizing nuclear forces while simultaneously advocating for arms control? How does NATO reconcile modernization with disarmament goals?

As stated in the 2022 Strategic Concept, „the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.” Furthermore, „NATO’s goal is a safer world for all; we seek to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons.”

But today’s security environment is not conducive to disarmament, in light of the nuclear and missile modernisation by Russia, China, and North Korea, and the potential for a nuclear-armed Iran. Coupled with revisionist aims and a determination by adversaries to use – or threaten to use – force to achieve those aims, NATO Allies and Partners face a deteriorating security environment, in which nuclear coercion is an integral component of these states« broader political-military strategies. And it may go beyond coercion, to include outright aggression and nuclear warfighting, given the capabilities they are pursuing.

Allied nuclear modernisation began over a decade ago, and some modernisation programmes are coming to fruition. The United States has transitioned to a modernised B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, which is forward-deployed in Europe. Several Allies that provide Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) for NATO’s nuclear mission are transitioning to the F-35A, the world’s most capable fighter, and the Netherlands has completed that transition in 2024. And the three Nuclear Weapons States of the Alliance (the U.S., UK, and France) all are modernising their strategic nuclear forces.

It is important to stress that NATO’s approach to nuclear modernisation is different from that of Russia, China, or North Korea. NATO Allies primarily are modernising legacy nuclear systems, and not increasing their nuclear weapons stockpile. These modernisation efforts are intended to ensure the continued safety, security and effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

In contrast, Russia has not only modernised its nuclear forces, but also diversified them. It is developing new and novel dual-capable delivery systems, which pose escalation risks, and has employed some of these weapons in its war against Ukraine. Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty years ago supported its massive build-up of dual-capable missiles, which can threaten all of Europe. We saw this most recently with Russia’s employment of the SS-X-28 IRBM against Ukraine on 21 November. Russia also has suspended its participation in the New START Treaty, removing one of the last constraints on its nuclear arsenal, and has threatened to resume nuclear testing, following its „de-ratification” of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTBT) Treaty. And of great concern to NATO Allies are the thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons Russia maintains, which are subject to no arms control treaty, and could be used to threaten, coerce, or attack NATO in a crisis or conflict.

China has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal, and now has the world’s largest inventory of missiles. Its current nuclear weapons production could field over 1,500 warheads by 2035, a breathtaking pace with an unknown trajectory. China also has diversified its missile delivery systems, to include theatre nuclear forces that could have a warfighting function. China has no interest in arms control, a dogged opacity when discussing its nuclear expansion and apparent disdain for disarmament, and little interest in meaningful, constructive dialogue on risk reduction. North Korea, remains an international pariah, having long ago withdrawn from the NPT, developed, expanded, and diversified its nuclear arsenal, and engaged in threatening rhetoric and destabilising actions. And now we see North Korean ballistic missiles being used by Russia against Ukraine, and North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia.

A world where the states that challenge the rules-based international order have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world. As such, we have to highlight the unique, fundamental, and legitimate role that nuclear deterrence has within the Alliance’s overall mutual security guarantee and commitment to collective defence. The current security environment demonstrates that now is not the time for disarmament. NATO Allies are focused on maintaining deterrence and strengthening defence, while remaining open to arms control and disarmament measures if other states – Russia and China in particular – decide it is also in their interest to seek strategic stability and discontinue arms racing.

What are NATO’s views on the weaponization of space and its implications for nuclear deterrence and arms control agreements?

NATO Allies agree that space, as an operational domain should not be weaponised. NATO takes the threat of the weaponisation of space, particularly with nuclear capabilities, very seriously. As stated in the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, Russia has violated, selectively implemented, and walked away from longstanding arms control obligations and commitments, thereby undermining the global arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation architecture. Widely reported in the media, Russia potentially may be developing a nuclear-armed counterspace capability, which would be a violation of Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and is yet another reminder that Russia is a revisionist power intent on upsetting the rules-based international order through complete disregard for global norms and laws.

If such a capability were to be deployed to outer space, this could present a highly destabilising situation which would have global security and economic impacts. Russia has long developed counterspace capabilities, which can be used to attack Allied space systems, with somewhat of a localised effect. However, a nuclear-armed counterspace capability, if detonated, would destroy or degrade most space assets – satellites, space stations, etc – within a certain orbit. It would fundamentally change life on Earth, disrupting global commerce and communications, and could take years to redress. NATO Allies, NATO Partners (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia), and even China and India have space programmes which would be affected negatively, setting back years of progress and trillions in investment. Almost every person on Earth would be impacted, with a loss of satellite communications for GPS and Internet access. Quite understandably, NATO opposes any placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth, which would violate the Outer Space Treaty, and of course any detonation of nuclear weapons in space, which would gravely threaten global security.

Thank you for the conversation.