The role of the KGB in the Belarusian power architecture

At the same time, as Intelligence Online notes, over time Tertel ceased to be merely a domestic executor of security policy. He became an important player in back-channel communications between Russia, Ukraine and Western states. This duality — an internal pillar of repression and an external intermediary — came to define his actions: repression and diplomatic gestures began functioning as mutually linked instruments of state policy.

From Polish Roots to KGB

Iwan Tertel, whose real name is Jan Stanisław Cierciel, is of Polish origin. He was born on 8 September 1966 in Przewałka, a Polish village near Grodno. In the past he used the name Jan. His parents, Stanisław and Anastazja, were Catholics. He spent his childhood on the Belarus–Lithuania border, which proved significant for his later work in border protection structures.

He began his military service in 1984. In 1989 he graduated from the prestigious Higher School of Airborne Forces in Ryazan, and in 1994 from the KGB of Belarus’s Institute of National Security. In 1996 he obtained a diploma from Yanka Kupala State University in Grodno, and in 2017 he completed studies at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Belarus. He began his career in the border troops, where he was responsible for counterintelligence and border protection.

Between 2007 and 2013 he rose through successive positions in the KGB, reaching the post of deputy director. He supervised, among other things, the fight against corruption and economic crime. In June 2020 he was appointed head of the State Control Committee, and in September of the same year he took over leadership of the KGB at the peak of the political crisis. His operational and administrative experience made him a natural candidate to implement a „hard-hand” policy and to conduct complex logistical and negotiation operations.

Tertel’s brother, Jerzy, followed an almost identical career path: he graduated from the Ryazan school, served in the border troops, and currently heads the Operational Search Department in the KGB.

The KGB under Tertel: Escalation of Repression and Operational Activity

After Tertel’s appointment KGB activity increased significantly. According to BelTA, in 2025 alone the services detained 14 people accused of espionage and treason. These arrests were publicized as proof of the vigilance and effectiveness of the security apparatus. A narrative of external threat served to legitimize hardline domestic actions and to expand the KGB’s competencies.

A spectacular example of operational activity was the discovery of warehouses containing explosive materials. As reported by Soyuz.by, dozens of kilograms of TNT, plastic explosives and remote-detonation devices were found there. According to Tertel, those connected to the warehouses had been trained abroad and were planning attacks in Belarus. Such successes reinforced the image of the KGB as a guardian of security and were widely used in state propaganda.

At the same time, information and psychological operations were conducted. As Reuters reported, on 26 April 2024 Tertel publicly identified the addresses of two Kyiv hospitals as places allegedly hiding „fighters,” which led to their evacuation. Observers judged this an example of informational pressure and an attempt at destabilization through disinformation. These actions showed that the KGB’s repertoire includes not only classical intelligence but also elements of information warfare.

Cooperation with Russia

From the beginning of his tenure Tertel was emphasizing cooperation with Russia. As Soyuz.by reported, in April 2025 he met in Minsk with the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, Sergei Narishkin. Both stressed „trusted cooperation” and the need to respond jointly to threats from the West. These meetings take place regularly, practically every quarter.

In an interview for the magazine „National Defence” in September 2023, Narishkin spoke of a „strategic partnership” and an exceptional level of interaction between the SVR and the Belarusian KGB.

The result of this cooperation has been foreign operations conducted by the KGB under Tertel’s leadership, particularly in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. Lithuanian services report that recruitment methods include the use of compromising material (kompromat), staged accidents and the abuse of visa procedures. The KGB also organized provocations against Polish diplomats, and since 2021 has run Operation „Floodgate” whose aim was to provoke a migration crisis at the Polish border. Such activities have a hybrid character: from espionage to influence and destabilization operations.

Oppositon and Diaspora: Infiltrated by the KGB

The KGB under Tertel did not limit itself to activities inside Belarus. The services actively penetrated émigré and opposition environments abroad. The most high-profile example was the case of Daria Ostapenko, also known as Rita Martin, an activist operating in Poland within opposition structures. She was sentenced in Poland to 2 years and 8 months in prison for spying on behalf of the KGB. As revealed by Current Time TV and Mediazona, posing as a pro-democracy activist she collected information about emigrants and Belarusian oppositionists, which she then passed to the services in Minsk.

A scheme of similar nature was observed and detected in Lithuania. In September 2024 the Vilnius Regional Court sentenced lawyer Mantas Danielius to 9 years in prison for spying for the Belarusian KGB. According to findings by Lithuania’s VSD, Danielius collected information on opposition figures and refugees and passed it to the KGB via Belarusian propagandist Ksenia Lebedeva. This case showed that Minsk systematically infiltrates opposition circles and maps diaspora structures.

KGB’s Mistakes, Blunders, and Failures

Despite its offensive activity, the KGB has not avoided spectacular failures. In 2021 the Belarusian hacker group Cyber-Partisans carried out a successful attack on the networks of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As the Associated Press reported, data on more than 8,600 KGB officers was revealed: their personal details, service numbers and positions. This was a serious blow to the service’s image as an impenetrable institution.

In September 2025 a spy scandal erupted in Central Europe. According to Eurojust, a network linked to the KGB was dismantled, in which former Moldovan intelligence deputy Alexandru Bălan played a key role. Investigators say that in 2024–2025 he repeatedly met in Budapest with KGB officers, passing information in exchange for money.

Humanitarian Gestures and Transactional Logic

Since 2022 Belarus, with the participation of the KGB under Tertel, has been involved in exchanges of prisoners and civilians between Russia and Ukraine. According to Belarus.by, a total of 38 such operations have been carried out since September 2022. The official narrative presented them as humanitarian acts, though independent observers emphasized their political character.

At the same time the state implemented selective pardons of political prisoners. In June 2025 the authorities released a group of oppositionists who were deported to Lithuania, and in September — Reuters and AP reported — 52 people were freed. According to Amnesty International and OSW, these actions were coercive in nature: many of the released were forced to leave the country, and more than a thousand prisoners remain in Belarusian penal institutions.

In practice the Belarusian authorities« humanitarian gestures were part of a political game: a signal to the West while repression at home continued. According to iSANS, Tertel himself presented these actions as expressions of „humanitarianism,” but their true aim was political transaction.

Diplomatic Middleman

Tertel’s role as an intermediary was confirmed by his participation in diplomatic meetings. BelTA reports that he took part, among others, in the conversation between Alexander Lukashenko and U.S. envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg. According to official statements, he spoke at the time about the reasons for pardoning prisoners and the aims of a „good-neighbour” policy.

Experts at iSANS believe Tertel is seen as a useful partner not only by Belarusian authorities but also by Western states seeking pragmatic channels of contact with Minsk. This allowed the regime to hold technical talks without the need for full normalization of relations.

Tertel: A True Architect of Minsk’s Future Strategy

Iwan Tertel’s appointment as head of the KGB was a turning point that led both to an escalation of internal repression and to an expansion of foreign activity. The incorporation of the KGB into mechanisms of international policy meant that prisoner exchanges and pardons began to serve as transactional instruments vis-à-vis the West.

The effect was a shift in Belarus’s international position. It started to act as a technical intermediary in matters related to the war in Ukraine. Tertel himself, because of his role as coordinator and narrator, became not only an executor of operations but also a behind-the-scenes negotiator and calculator of political gains.

According to Amnesty International, the most likely scenario for the coming years is a continuation of the „dual-track” policy — combining internal repression with selective concessions to the West. This diagnosis is confirmed by other sources. Human Rights Watch has pointed out that Minsk is attempting to „mask repression” with selective pardons, and the Viasna human rights group, quoted by Euronews, noted that releases of political prisoners have gone hand in hand with further waves of detentions. The Clingendael think tank wrote that Minsk uses „pragmatic gestures” toward the West while maintaining a hard line at home.

In this context analysts at the AP and The Guardian warn that, after the so-called Budapest affair, further counterintelligence scandals should be expected in the European Union, which will further complicate Minsk’s prospects for normalization. According to Intelligence Online, if the combination of repression and gestures proves effective, Tertel will continue to consolidate his position as a trusted head of the security apparatus and a key intermediary in diplomatic communication channels.