Anti-corruption as an element of strategic state resilience

Anti-corruption reforms have become not only part of the process of modernizing the state, but also one of the key conditions for obtaining Western financial support, maintaining the domestic and international credibility of the authorities, and deepening integration with the EU and NATO.

Yet information of „spectacular” arrests and dismissals at the highest levels of government continue to surface - as if personnel reshuffles had become a new form of political theatre. Behind these headlines, however, questions of corruption and private interests often lurk, reminding us that the appearance of reform does not always translate into genuine transparency. So, what is left of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agenda?

From oligarchic routine to anti-corruption imperative

Even before Russia’s aggression and the annexation of Crimea and other territories in 2014, Ukraine was widely perceived as a state whose public institutions were only as functional as could be expected in a system where clientelism operated almost as an informal branch of the administration. Corruption in Ukraine was by no means a minor inconvenience or an administrative „problem to solve.” It was an integral part of the political and economic architecture. In practice, this meant that for many years the Ukrainian state functioned under conditions of largely symbolic law enforcement capacity and equally symbolic control over the relationship between political authorities and business elites.

The turning point came with the events of the Maidan Revolution. It not only shifted the country’s geopolitical orientation but also triggered a deep transformation process. Suddenly, anti-corruption reforms could be more than a slogan in international reports - they began to be presented as one of the foundations of building a modern state, one that - at least in theory - aspired to Western integration.

After the full-scale war began in 2022, the issue gained even greater significance. Anti-corruption ceased to be a neat addition to public administration modernization; it became a condition of state survival during wartime. Institutional transparency was no longer merely a moral virtue but a practical necessity. It underpins both the acquisition of financial support from Western partners and the maintenance of public legitimacy, as well as the continuation of integration processes with institutions such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In other words, the fight against corruption ceased to be a reputational concern and became, quite literally, strategic.

New institutions for old problems

One of the most striking elements of Ukraine’s institutional transformation after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas was the reconstruction of state institutions and the creation of a new architecture for fighting corruption. It was decided that since existing institutions had long shown limited enthusiasm for prosecuting corruption, the most sensible solution was to create new, specialized structures tasked precisely with doing what the old ones could not - or would not - do.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) was assigned a central role in this system, conducting investigations into high-level officials and members of the political-business elite. Designed as an independent investigative body outside the traditional law enforcement hierarchy, NABU aimed to create a space where inquiries into influential figures would not automatically get lost in the administrative maze.

The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) handles prosecutions based on NABU investigations. Separating investigative and prosecutorial functions was intended to professionalize proceedings and, at least in theory, reduce the risk of political interference in inherently political cases.

The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) adjudicates serious corruption cases. Its creation was meant to prevent anti-corruption cases from languishing in the traditional judicial system until their political and social relevance faded.

In practice, Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture extends beyond state institutions. Civil society organizations play an informal monitoring role and exert pressure to maintain reform momentum. Notably, the Anti-Corruption Action Centre (AntAC) actively analyses public policy, monitors state institutions, and supports legislative initiatives aimed at reducing corruption. Transparency International Ukraine also plays a crucial role, focusing on public sector transparency, public procurement oversight, and the development of tools to enhance administrative accountability.

In the defence sector, the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission on Defence (NAKO) specializes in monitoring procurement transparency, analysing Ministry of Defence budgets, and identifying institutional loopholes that enable financial abuse. During wartime, when defence spending has surged to unprecedented levels, the role of these organizations becomes even more critical.

Thus, Ukraine’s anti-corruption system functions not only as a formal institutional structure spanning investigation, prosecution, and specialized courts but also encompasses state institutions, civil society, and international partners. Its performance is continuously monitored by foreign stakeholders, including the EU and the IMF, meaning Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is scrutinized not just in Kyiv but across Western capitals.

If the institutional architecture is so extensive, why does corruption remain one of the most frequently cited challenges - even in wartime? Does the number of anti-corruption institutions reflect reform effectiveness, or merely the scale of challenges the Ukrainian state still faces?

War as an unplanned test of state resilience

Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 created near-laboratory conditions for testing state institutions. The sudden surge in defence spending, accelerated procurement, inflows of foreign financial and material aid, and expanded classified information created an environment hardly conducive to transparency. In classic risk analyses, these are precisely the conditions most conducive to abuse: speed is prioritized over procedural rigor.

Yet anti-corruption institutions continued to function, albeit in ways far from standard, as the state fought a defensive war. War thus became a test not only of military capacity but of institutional resilience. Anti-corruption efforts - at least in rhetoric - were not suspended even when the state’s primary focus became survival.

War - the unappointed minister of reform

One of the most striking phenomena in Ukraine post-2022 is the so-called „wartime institutional acceleration.” Existential threat proved far more effective at driving reform than years of expert debates, government strategies, and modernization programs. Suddenly, money appeared - and, crucially, the political will to implement change.

Under normal conditions - not only in Ukraine - public institutions tend to be characterized by considerable inertia. Reforms encounter political, administrative, and social resistance, while the legislative process can drag on for years, often ending in compromises so cautious that they are difficult to regard as genuine change. War, however, alters this dynamic quite radically. When the very existence of the state is at stake, the political costs of reform suddenly decline, and social acceptance of structural change increases at a pace that, in more peaceful times, would be considered unlikely.

In this sense, war (or the threat of it) has functioned as a kind of institutional accelerator around the world. Existential pressure speeds up reforms in the security sector, public finances, and anti-corruption systems. This process is typically reinforced by three factors: the concentration of political decision-making, social mobilization, and international pressure.

It is unfortunate that, with regard to the concentration of political decision-making, we do not observe - for example in Poland - spectacular successes. Decisions are dispersed among various bodies with differing preferences and approaches to policy, and the principle of „defence above political divisions” does not function in practice. Yet applying such a principle could significantly shorten legislative and administrative procedures, thereby accelerating the introduction of institutional reforms.

At the same time, a high level of social mobilization increases pressure for transparency in public institutions and for limiting abuses in the state sector - especially in situations where a substantial share of national resources is directed toward the defence sector.

International pressure is the third element. Much public spending relies on foreign support, which is conditioned on institutional reforms and strengthened oversight. Financial assistance thus becomes a potent motivator for accelerating change.

Paradoxically, war does not erode institutional systems; in many areas, it acts as a modernization impulse, accelerating reforms that might have lingered in prolonged peacetime debate.

Defence sector - between secrecy and accountability

The defence sector is a peculiar theatre where „strict secrecy” somehow collides with „public financial transparency” - as if fire and water were to be reconciled. Wartime procurement suddenly becomes express, with much information disappearing into the black box of „citizen ignorance,” all supposedly „for the good of the state.”

Ukraine has developed a complex, multi-layered system that attempts to combine institutional oversight, digital tools, international pressure, and civil vigilance - represented by actors such as NAKO - waving the flag of hope that someone might actually see what’s happening. The Prozorro platform strives to inject transparency into procurement, which otherwise risks remaining a magical ritual accessible only to insiders.

Elsewhere, conditions may not be much better. For example, in Poland, electronic procurement systems or „urgent operational needs” can similarly undermine rational decision-making. In practice, under the guise of urgency, standard oversight and transparency procedures are bypassed, turning mechanisms designed for openness into mere illusions, while rushed decisions increase risks of errors, misuse, and delays.

Should the defence sector - even in peacetime - remain a place where secrecy and transparency meet only to celebrate contradictions? Must key information vanish into an impenetrable fog „for national security”? While confidentiality is understandable, informing citizens about how their taxes are spent often resembles juggling magic or an adult cabaret, where everyone pretends to act seriously while the audience wonders whether to laugh, cry, or believe it all. Probably better if no one sees, no one asks, and everyone remains content.

Civil society as a multiplier of resilience

Civil society has become a key element of Ukraine’s oversight model in the defence sector. NAKO monitors defence procurement, analyses Ministry of Defence budgets, and identifies systemic corruption risks in the arms sector. Though lacking formal investigative powers, it exerts pressure on state institutions through expert analysis, reports, and advisory actions, enhancing transparency and accountability.

In wartime, when some procedures operate in emergency mode, the role of expert organizations is to bridge the gap between operational secrecy and public accountability. Civil society thus participates as a guardian of defence sector integrity alongside state institutions.

Anti-corruption as resilience and a condition of stability

During the war, Ukraine has depended heavily on foreign financial support, with aid and loans conditioned on continued anti-corruption reforms and institutional independence. Institutional integrity has therefore become a condition of state stability. Loss of trust in transparent public spending could reduce foreign aid, weakening the state’s defence capabilities.

Before 2022, corruption was one tool of Russian influence on Ukrainian politics. The question of whether this kind of Russian influence occurred exclusively in Ukraine is essentially rhetorical, as the tentacles of Russian influence extended into many regions of the world. Limiting it reduced political elites« vulnerability to blackmail and hindered external penetration of the defence sector. Anti-corruption thus became a component of hybrid resilience, enhancing Ukraine’s credibility with international partners and strengthening its position in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

Ukraine’s experience shows that state resilience in modern conflicts depends not only on military capacity but also on the quality of public institutions. War can catalyse reform if institutional integrity is recognized as a condition for survival.

Ukraine as a "Laboratory of State Resilience"

Ukraine demonstrates that an effective anti-corruption system in the defence sector is not merely a tool against economic crime. It is part of national security architecture, improving defence spending efficiency, strengthening trust with international partners, and reducing vulnerability to destabilizing influences.

Anti-corruption efforts and civil society activity thus constitute a pillar of 21st-century state resilience - but one hopes it does not become a bizarre theatre where „everyone watches everything, but no one actually sees anything.”

Dr Andrzej Fałkowski, Lieutenant General (retired), former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces; NAKO Advisory Commission member.