East Front News #84: Allies rethink security as hybrid war intensifies

Poland signals firmer alliance policy in Sikorski foreign policy address

In his annual foreign policy statement, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that Russia poses a multidimensional threat to European security, pointing to cyberattacks, sabotage activity and continued aggression against Ukraine. He stressed that Moscow is testing Western resolve, while Poland has responded through sanctions enforcement, restrictions on Russian diplomats and support for EU measures targeting the shadow fleet and frozen Russian assets. Sikorski reaffirmed support for Kyiv and announced an international reconstruction conference in Gdańsk, arguing that the war demonstrates the collapse of assumptions about stable European security and the return of power politics.

A central theme of the speech was the need to balance loyalty to the United States with greater European responsibility for defence. Sikorski described Washington as Poland’s key ally but emphasised that partnership must be reciprocal, noting Poland’s military purchases, hosting of US forces and contributions to allied operations. At the same time he highlighted cooperation within the EU and NATO as complementary pillars, support for the SAFE defence financing mechanism and expanded regional and Indo-Pacific partnerships. Concluding, he argued Poland will remain committed to alliances but will pursue a more assertive policy safeguarding its own interests.

Author: Michał Górski

Germany considers expanding intelligence powers amid hybrid threats

Germany is debating a major reform of its foreign intelligence service, the BND, in response to growing Russian hybrid activity, including sabotage incidents and disinformation campaigns. Officials argue that existing deterrence has proved insufficient and that Berlin remains overly dependent on allied intelligence. Proposed measures include wider surveillance authorities, access to private communications and tools to disrupt hostile activities such as drone operations or illicit financing networks.

The changes would mark a significant shift from post-war restrictions designed to prevent abuses associated with past surveillance regimes. Policymakers are also considering granting the BND limited active cyber capabilities during special intelligence situations, although strong parliamentary and legal oversight would remain. The debate reflects a broader reassessment of German security policy, balancing civil liberties concerns with pressure to strengthen national resilience against state-backed interference.

Author: Jakub Bielamowicz

France reassesses its role after four years of war in Ukraine

France has gradually transformed its policy towards Ukraine since 2022, shifting from dialogue with Moscow to sustained political and military support for Kyiv. Paris delivered ammunition, missiles, CAESAR artillery systems, air-defence assets and Mirage 2000 aircraft, helping slow Russian operations and strengthening bilateral ties. President Emmanuel Macron also sought a diplomatic role and promoted a broader coalition prepared to offer security guarantees to Ukraine after the war.

Despite continued declarations of solidarity, France is unlikely to expand large-scale weapons transfers due to domestic economic pressures, limited resources and the approaching presidential election. Future involvement will probably centre on EU financial assistance and diplomacy rather than decisive military initiatives. The situation illustrates both Paris’s ambition to shape European security and the limits of its ability to act as the leading power in ending the conflict.

Author: Aleksander Olech

Europe’s counter-drone plan sets direction but faces delivery hurdles

The European Commission’s new action plan on drones and counter-drone security aims to coordinate an EU-wide response across civilian and military domains as unmanned systems become tools of hybrid warfare. It sets out a four-part framework covering preparation, detection, response and defence readiness, alongside funding for research, industrial mapping and closer cooperation with Ukraine. The plan also prioritises protecting critical infrastructure and improving situational awareness, including proposals to use telecom networks and 5G-based sensing to help detect drones and build a shared incident picture across member states.

However, the document also exposes familiar constraints: fragmented national rules, slow procurement and uneven legal authorities for neutralising drones, especially in populated areas. Ambitions such as rapid response teams and harmonised standards will depend on member states sharing sensitive data and aligning regulation, while industry scaling remains difficult without large, sustained orders. The result may be a gradual improvement rather than a fully integrated EU capability, with progress most likely in research and detection tools and slower movement on operational integration and common rules of engagement.

Author: Sylwia Kubica

War in Ukraine enters fifth year amid political and economic strain

Four years after Russia launched its invasion, the conflict continues to impose heavy humanitarian and economic costs. Nearly six million Ukrainians remain refugees abroad and millions more are internally displaced, while reconstruction needs are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars, particularly in housing, energy and transport. Both sides rely not only on regular troops but also volunteers and foreign recruits, highlighting the protracted and manpower-intensive nature of the war.

At the political level, internal challenges in Ukraine and divisions among Western partners complicate the outlook. Disputes within the European Union over sanctions and energy policy, as well as debates on Ukrainian integration with NATO and the EU, weaken a unified response. Meanwhile, preparations for renewed negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States continue, though no breakthrough is expected and Moscow has shown little willingness to end hostilities.

Author: Patryk Jagnieża

History and law shape the balance of power in the Black Sea

Security dynamics in the Black Sea are rooted in centuries of rivalry over access to the Turkish Straits, the only maritime gateway between the Mediterranean and the region. Control of these routes shifted from Ottoman dominance to a regulated system established by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which grants Turkey authority over wartime naval transit. During the Russian–Ukrainian war Ankara used these provisions to restrict the movement of warships, highlighting the legal framework’s continuing strategic importance.

The convention gives coastal states significant advantages while limiting the presence and duration of non-Black Sea navies, shaping naval operations and constraining escalation. Turkey therefore occupies a pivotal position, balancing relations with both Russia and NATO while maintaining its own security interests. The legal control of access to the basin has become as decisive as military capability, making the straits a central factor in the regional balance of power.

Author: Agnieszka Rogozińska

India becomes focal point of global diplomatic competition

A growing number of world leaders have recently visited India, reflecting its rising strategic importance for both Western countries and other global actors. Negotiations on trade and economic cooperation with the European Union and the United States, alongside high-level political visits and technology initiatives such as the AI Impact Summit, demonstrate a broad effort to deepen partnerships with New Delhi. While Russia also maintains ties with India, the country increasingly seeks access to Western technology, investment and markets.

India is using this interest to strengthen its international position by engaging multiple partners simultaneously. European states pursue economic and technological cooperation, while countries such as France also expand defence ties. Although final agreements remain under negotiation, the current diplomatic activity signals the most significant opening of India toward the West in decades and highlights its emerging role as a key balancing power in the global order.

Author: Adam Burakowski

Europe faces sustained pressure from Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy

Latvian intelligence warns that Russia increasingly treats relations with the West as an existential confrontation, using coordinated military, informational, cyber and economic tools below the threshold of open war. Hybrid activities such as sabotage, disinformation, cyberattacks and legal pressure aim to weaken support for Ukraine, erode trust in democratic institutions and create divisions within European societies. Although a direct military attack on NATO states is not considered imminent, Moscow is preparing for a prolonged conflict and has adapted its economy and political system to wartime conditions.

The report suggests that even a future ceasefire in Ukraine would not end the threat, as Russia’s militarised economy and confrontational posture are likely to persist. European states therefore face continuous pressure on critical infrastructure, elections and public opinion, requiring stronger deterrence, cybersecurity and societal resilience. Unity within the EU and NATO, alongside clear response thresholds to hybrid actions, is viewed as essential to countering long-term systemic pressure.

Author: Adam Jawor

Poland treated as key target in Russia’s hybrid campaign, report argues

A new Defence24 report describes Russian hybrid activity against Poland as a sustained, evolving pressure campaign that intensified sharply after February 2022, when Poland became a primary logistics hub for support to Ukraine. It frames recent years as „phase zero” of conflict, marked by a broad mix of tools including sabotage, cyberattacks, intelligence activity and information operations designed to test Polish resilience and disrupt decision-making without triggering open war.

The report systematises incidents from 2020–2025 and adds selected cases from early 2026, arguing that public awareness still underestimates the true scale due to investigative and staffing constraints. It also seeks to answer practical questions raised in domestic debate, including how many perpetrators have been convicted for diversion or espionage, how often foreign nationals are involved, and what policy responses are needed in communication, international cooperation and state preparedness.

Author: Justyna Smoleń, Amelia Wojciechowska