Ukraine expands in Africa despite Russia’s war

RBC-Ukraine described how difficult the African market remains for Ukrainian exporters. In 2025, Ukraine exported agricultural products worth $22.6 billion, but almost half of that went to the EU, about $10.7 billion. Africa accounted for only 12.3% of Ukrainian agricultural exports, and most of that was concentrated in Egypt and Algeria (close military partner to Russia). Egypt alone imported $1.44 billion worth of Ukrainian food products, while the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa received less than 4% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports. This is the gap Kyiv is trying to close.

The problem is not lack of demand. Africa needs food, but the market punishes weak preparation. Ukrainian companies face port blackmail, blocked letters of credit, arbitrary quality inspections, legal chaos and piracy. RBC-Ukraine described one case in which a Ukrainian exporter lost about $9 million after a wheat shipment was forced into a fraudulent barter deal involving worthless timber. In 2025, more than 35 official attacks on commercial vessels were recorded in the Gulf of Guinea and off Somalia, while maritime analysts believe the real number was higher.

Kyiv’s response is to move from emergency grain diplomacy to a broader African strategy. The earlier Grain from Ukraine programme delivered more than 335,000 metric tonnes of food to 19 countries suffering from acute food crises, with donor contributions exceeding $381 million. The newer Food from Ukraine approach is more ambitious. It aims not only to ship raw grain, but to export finished products, technologies, training, agricultural mechanisation and processing capacity. Ukraine has already opened an agri-food hub in Ghana, while talks on similar hubs are under way with the UAE, Egypt, Lebanon and Oman.

This economic push is matched by diplomacy. Since 2022, Ukraine has doubled the number of its embassies in Africa. That matters because embassies are not only symbols. They help exporters, organise political access, support certification, build contacts with African elites and counter Russian narratives. With EU support, Ukraine has also held events in Africa for politicians, experts and media figures focused on Russian disinformation. Moscow has spent years telling African audiences that Ukraine and the West use food as a weapon, while Russia presents itself as a reliable supplier of grain, fertilisers and security.

Ukraine is also entering the African conversation through security. Kyiv is increasingly open to drone cooperation with African states, and this may become one of its strongest offers after the war. African governments are dealing with insurgencies, border insecurity, attacks on infrastructure and weak surveillance capacity. Ukraine can bring experience in drones, reconnaissance, counter-drone adaptation, battlefield software, targeting support and information resilience. These are not theoretical lessons. They come from daily war against Russia.

Russia will resist this because its special services, military structures and influence networks are already present in the Sahel and other parts of the continent. Moscow uses security cooperation, mercenaries, food exports, fertilisers, propaganda and links with military elites to protect its position. That is why Ukraine’s African policy is part of the wider war with Russia. It is about markets, food security, diplomatic votes, logistics, military technology and the ability to prevent Moscow from monopolising influence in countries that Europe neglected for too long.

Kyiv should be expected to expand further in Africa. The direction is visible in diplomacy, trade, food security, defence technology, anti-disinformation work and agricultural hubs. Ukraine understands that after the war it will need more than reconstruction money from Europe. It will need markets, partners and political influence in regions where Russia has been working for years. Africa is one of those regions, and Ukraine is no longer entering it only with grain. It is entering with embassies, technology, wartime experience and a clear need to compete with Moscow.