U.S. moves to restore cooperation with Mali

Washington is nearing an understanding with Bamako that would allow American surveillance aircraft and drones to operate over Malian territory again. The primary objective would be to monitor jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda, particularly Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which has significantly expanded its presence across the Sahel. In February, the United States took an initial political step toward this arrangement by lifting sanctions on several senior Malian officials, including the defense minister, who had previously been accused of maintaining ties with Russian mercenary networks.

Rebuilding U.S. influence after the Sahelian coups

In the Sahel’s vast terrain, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are of particular operational importance. Armed groups routinely move across porous borders and remote areas where government presence is limited. Persistent aerial surveillance, therefore, plays a key role in identifying militant networks, tracking movements between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and supporting targeted counterterrorism operations.

Additionally, the renewed interest in intelligence operations poses a more immediate operational dimension. U.S. authorities are searching for an American pilot who was kidnapped in neighboring Niger while working with a Christian missionary organization. Intelligence assessments suggest he may now be held in Mali by militants linked to JNIM. Resuming intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights could therefore support both counterterrorism objectives and efforts to locate the kidnapped American citizen.

The initiative also reflects a broader attempt by Washington to rebuild relations with Sahelian governments after several years of deteriorating ties. Military coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso strained relations with Western partners, while regional governments increasingly turned to Russian security support. At the same time, American pressure on democratic reforms was often perceived locally as intrusive, contributing to diplomatic tensions and the eventual loss of the U.S. drone base in Agadez, Niger, in 2024.

Even if an agreement with Mali is finalized, it would not represent a full restoration of the U.S. military footprint in the Sahel. Rather, it would signal a more pragmatic approach focused on intelligence cooperation and limited operational access. In an increasingly contested region, maintaining situational awareness may prove more valuable for Washington than attempting to rebuild the large-scale military presence that once underpinned Western counterterrorism efforts in West Africa.

At the same time, Washington appears to be cautiously reopening dialogue with other Sahelian governments. Senior Bureau Official for African Affairs Nick Checker is currently traveling to Ouagadougou to meet with officials in Burkina Faso, where discussions are expected to focus on reaffirming U.S. respect for national sovereignty and exploring renewed cooperation on security and economic issues.

A contested security environment: Russia and China in the Sahel

The potential arrangement would also coexist in a security landscape increasingly shaped by Russian and Chinese influence. Following the withdrawal of French forces and the deterioration of relations with Western partners, Mali turned to Russian security assistance, including personnel linked to the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group).

At the same time, China has expanded its economic footprint across the Sahel through infrastructure investments, mining projects, and broader engagement under the Belt and Road Initiative. As a consequence, any renewed American intelligence presence would operate alongside Russian-supported security structures and a wider economic environment where Beijing plays a growing role, opening avenues for both competition and limited coordination among external actors.

A shift toward a more flexible U.S. counterterrorism strategy

Importantly, the trajectory of the Sahel has implications beyond the immediate region. Continued instability risks turning the area into one of the world’s largest zones of jihadist activity, with potential spillover toward coastal West Africa and increased migration and security pressures for Europe.

The initiative reflects a shift toward a more flexible counterterrorism posture. Instead of maintaining large permanent deployments, Washington increasingly relies on intelligence cooperation, limited basing arrangements, and partnerships with local governments to sustain situational awareness in regions where the political environment has become less receptive to a large Western military presence.

In our assessment, this diplomatic engagement may signal the beginning of a broader effort to gradually normalize relations across the Sahel — including with Niger — as the United States seeks to rebuild channels of cooperation after the political ruptures that followed the recent military coups in the region.

Authors: Karolina Kisiel and dr Aleksander Olech