Venezuela between the great powers

In the second half of October 2025, the Venezuelan regime made a strategic, unprecedented decision in modern Latin American history, one with far-reaching consequences for regional stability and the global balance of power. President Nicolás Maduro officially appealed to Russia, China, and Iran for urgent military and technological support. This request should be interpreted not as a plea for standard assistance but as a strategic move provoked by the intensified U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean region. In its appeal, Venezuela specified concrete needs, including the overhaul of Su-30MK2 fighter jets, deliveries of precision weaponry, modernization of radar systems, and the acquisition of drone and electronic warfare technologies, aiming to create a deterrence system based on the support of allies from outside the Western Hemisphere.    At the same time, Washington strengthened its naval and air presence in the Caribbean basin under the pretext of expanding its counter-narcotics operations. However, a strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, reconnaissance units, and a component capable of precision strikes appeared in the region. From the perspective of Caracas, as well as Moscow and Tehran, this balance of forces was not seen as routine patrol activity but as preparation for a possible military operation targeting key Venezuelan infrastructure. The Maduro regime’s response (carrying significant political risk) was aimed at achieving strategic deterrence. Its message was based on the assumption that any armed intervention in Venezuela could potentially lead to direct confrontation with Russian, Chinese, and Iranian forces, thereby increasing the cost and risk of such an operation for the United States.   

The Internal Crisis as a Key Decision-Making Factor

To understand the decision of the authorities in Caracas, one must go back to the internal dimension of the Venezuelan crisis. Since the mid-2010s, the country has been in a state of lasting economic and political collapse. The oil-based model built by Hugo Chávez collapsed under the weight of falling commodity prices, sanctions, and mismanagement of the state energy sector. Production in PDVSA plummeted, and foreign currency revenues almost disappeared. Hyperinflation, energy shortages, and the collapse of the healthcare and education systems plunged society into a humanitarian crisis. Over the past decade, more than seven million citizens have left the country, which represents not only a social tragedy but also a real weakening of the state’s potential, including the armed forces, which have lost a significant portion of trained personnel and technical capacity.      Faced with the collapse of civilian institutions, Nicolás Maduro’s regime tightened control over the military, turning it into the foundation of the political system. The army, instead of serving as an instrument of national defense, became the guarantor of authoritarian rule. Senior officers assumed leadership positions in the economy and administration, receiving access to lucrative sectors in exchange for loyalty. Security services such as SEBIN (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional) and DGCIM (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar) were subordinated to strictly political tasks, and repression against the opposition and media led to the de facto dismantling of civil society. Thus, Venezuela became a state in which national security was equated with regime security. Every external threat, military or diplomatic,serves to consolidate the security apparatus and legitimize further repression. In such a structure, decisions concerning foreign and defense policy stem not from national interest but from the logic of regime survival. It is precisely this authoritarian system, dependent on the military and isolated from society, that holds the key to understanding why Caracas is now actively seeking security guarantees from decision-makers in Russia, China, and Iran.     

Washington's Goals in the Caribbean

From Washington’s perspective, the concentration of forces in the Caribbean Sea area served three main purposes. First, to increase the cost of Caracas’s continued cooperation with sanctioned entities, especially Russian and Iranian energy firms and Chinese technology corporations. The American presence was meant to demonstrate that sanctions could also be enforced militarily. Second, it was an attempt to test the ability to rapidly deploy a strike group in a region that had long remained outside the Pentagon’s main focus. The operation allowed testing of logistics, interoperability, and responsiveness to hybrid threats, from smuggling to infrastructure sabotage.  Third, it carried a political message. The Trump administration wanted to clearly demonstrate that, in practice, the Monroe Doctrine was once again in effect and that there was no room in the Western Hemisphere for a permanent military presence of countries such as Russia, China, or Iran. The problem was that Caracas interpreted these actions as a prelude to armed intervention, a potential precision strike on key infrastructure and a blockade of ports. For the Maduro regime, deprived of defensive capabilities and technical backing, such a scenario would have meant the need to seek immediate external support.  

Russia, China, Iran, and Their Differentiated Roles in the Policy of the Venezuelan Regime

It is worth emphasizing that Venezuela’s request does not place Russia, China, and Iran on an equal footing, since each of these states plays a different strategic role in the emerging defense architecture of Venezuela. The Russian Federation is the only partner capable of realistically and quickly enhancing Caracas’s military capabilities in terms of equipment and technical support. Since Hugo Chávez’s rule, Moscow has supplied key equipment, trained personnel, and maintained systems without which Venezuela’s air force and air defense, based on Su-30 fighters and surface-to-air missile systems, would have collapsed due to a lack of parts and servicing. Today, despite the burden of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia can send teams of highly qualified technicians and military advisors, essential components for maintaining the fighter fleet, advanced electronic warfare systems, and, in a political scenario, even a symbolic naval contingent. From the standpoint of deterrence, it is not the size of the contingent that matters but its status. The potential presence of Russian soldiers or advisors changes the nature of any attack, as it involves the risk of direct confrontation with Russia, a nuclear-armed state. 

China, in turn, provides Venezuela with key financial, technological, and infrastructural support. Beijing, as Caracas’s main creditor, has repeatedly granted loans to be repaid with oil shipments, allowing the government to survive the hardest years of sanctions. Chinese enterprises have participated in the modernization of ports, energy and telecommunications networks, as well as in the development of surveillance and cybersecurity systems that strengthened the regime’s control over society and critical infrastructure. In a situation where the United States is applying simultaneous economic and military pressure, the PRC acts as a stabilizing force, providing spare parts, software, and communications systems beyond the reach of Western export restrictions. It does not need to engage militarily, its influence on key sectors of the economy and administration makes the Maduro state significantly more resilient to external pressure and hinders its complete isolation.   

As for Iran, it focuses on strengthening Venezuela’s defense potential through asymmetric means. As a country long under sanctions, it has extensive experience in developing and operating relatively inexpensive, effective military solutions. It supplies Caracas with unmanned systems, loitering munitions, and devices for communications jamming and electronic reconnaissance, as well as technical personnel to support their integration. These elements fit into a multi-layered defense concept. Instead of building a costly conventional air defense system, Venezuela can raise the entry threshold for an adversary by deploying capabilities that complicate remote operations and increase the risk of losses. The presence of Iranian experts and technologies means that any U.S. action would require more complex planning and a higher level of operational risk.

Regional and Global Consequences

From the perspective of regional stability, the militarization of the Caribbean, the simultaneous presence of significant U.S. forces, Venezuelan units in a heightened state of readiness, and Russian and Iranian advisors, significantly increases the risk of an unintended armed incident at sea or in the airspace. In a region with high levels of civilian traffic, even a minor error in identification or communication could lead to escalation. Any potential military operation against Venezuela would immediately trigger another wave of migration, posing a serious challenge not only for Colombia or Trinidad and Tobago but also for smaller Caribbean states, whose capacity to accept refugees is significantly limited. Brazil and Colombia, despite their clear opposition to the Maduro regime, would likely seek de-escalation, fearing the spread of conflict into their own territories. Such a stance would make it more difficult for the United States to build a broader regional coalition against Caracas.  Globally, Venezuela’s actions primarily benefit Russia and Iran, as they increase pressure on Washington in its own neighborhood. Maintaining simultaneous engagement in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and Latin America disperses U.S. resources and strategic attention. For NATO countries, including Poland, it is significant that Russia still has the ability to generate tension in regions far from Europe, which, in the event of a crisis, could limit the United States« capacity to respond quickly on the Alliance’s eastern flank.

The "Maximum Pressure" Strategy and Its Effects

In recent years, U.S. policy toward Venezuela has been based on the assumption that economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military pressure would lead to the collapse of Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The goal was to force a change of government without direct military intervention and to restore a pro-American administration in Caracas. In practice, however, the „maximum pressure” strategy failed to achieve its intended political objective. Instead of weakening the regime, it led to its stronger alignment with revisionist states that provided Caracas with capital, technology, and political cover. Nicolás Maduro’s request for military support from Russia, China, and Iran confirms that the Venezuelan system has found a way to bypass U.S. isolation, building its own security guarantees based on Eastern partners.

In the long term, this move symbolizes the erosion of the traditional spheres of influence of the United States in Latin America and sets a precedent for other countries in the region that may, in the future, seek alternative security guarantees outside pan-American structures. The transfer of great-power rivalry to the Caribbean forces Washington to undertake a costly reallocation of military and political resources that could otherwise be used in priority regions such as Eastern Europe or the Indo-Pacific. Russia and China, through limited means, have achieved a significant strategic effect by forcing the United States to respond in an area it traditionally dominated. As a result, the Maduro regime’s position is solidified, the sense of insecurity in the region increases, and divisions deepen between the United States and its key regional partners, such as Brazil and Colombia, which under current conditions are focused on maintaining stability and avoiding open conflict. Thus, the Venezuelan military crisis becomes a measure of the effectiveness of anti-Western states« strategies and their ability to challenge the existing security order in the Western Hemisphere.