Universal service: building reserves to defend Poland

February 24, 2022, marks the day of a radical shift in the geopolitical situation in Europe due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. On this day, the international legal order was undermined, leading to a fundamental change in the European security architecture.

For Poland—a country bordering both Ukraine and Belarus—this aggression represents a direct threat to national security. It is important to emphasize that there has been a significant change in how Poland perceives the threat from Russia: no longer as a potential danger, but as a direct threat to our sovereignty and independence.

As a result, the first systemic response to the newly perceived aggressive Russian policy was the Polish government’s decision to enhance our defence capabilities by increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP. This significantly accelerated the modernization of the Armed Forces. Another factor boosting this modernization was Poland’s transfer of large quantities of post-Soviet military equipment to Ukraine during a critical phase of its defensive war.

In replenishing the transferred equipment, Poland made a significant qualitative and quantitative leap in upgrading the military. By acquiring, among other things, Abrams and K2 tanks, 155 mm artillery systems (such as Krab and K9), and long-range rocket launchers like the M142 HIMARS and K239 Chunmoo (with a range of up to 300 km), we have substantially increased our deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression.

Analyses of the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate that Ukraine had to rely solely on its own defence resources at the outset. International aid only began arriving three days after the aggression started, although it increased significantly in the following days.

It is crucial to point out that Ukraine was in a completely different political and military situation than Poland is today. Our strength and security guarantees lie in NATO, the EU, and strategic cooperation with the United States. Nonetheless, we must ask ourselves whether we should also prepare for a scenario in which Poland must independently conduct the initial phase of a potential Russian aggression—what is referred to as aNational Defensive Operation.

Preparing for such a scenario requires different planning and equipping of our Armed Forces, particularly ensuring sufficient material reserves (ammunition, fuel, spare parts, etc.), equipment reserves (especially for reserve units), and personnel reserves (active reserves, trained reserves, and untrained reserves).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made many countries in our region realize the need to develop their own defence resources, particularly the rebuilding of personnel reserves capable of repelling full-scale aggression. For example, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have reinstated compulsory military service.

In Poland, compulsory military service was suspended in 2009. However, in 2022, a new form of military service was introduced—voluntary basic military service. It is aimed at volunteers who wish to undergo military training and then potentially continue serving in operational units. Still, even with the most optimistic outlook, building a personnel reserve of one million trained soldiers is currently an unachievable goal.

Therefore, learning from the war in Ukraine, we must consider how to systemically prepare personnel reserves with the goal of training one million soldiers (including professional troops and reserves) out of a population of 38 million citizens.

In my opinion, this is not an unrealistic goal. Consider the example of Finland, which is in a similar geopolitical situation to Poland. With a population of around 5 million, Finland plans to mobilize a one-million-strong army in the event of conflict. This is possible in Finland because it has a well-organized system of compulsory military service, which enjoys broad public support and understanding of the need to serve the country.

In the current geostrategic climate and light of the visible signs of a genuine threat posed by Russia, the reintroduction of conscription in Poland should be seriously considered. Given the societal changes that have already taken place in our country, compulsory military service must be redefined in a modernised form.

Therefore, I propose that the issue of human reserves be approached more broadly than merely from the standpoint of military needs. Lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine demonstrate that personnel reserves are equally critical for other state services such as the police, fire brigade, civil defence, and healthcare. It must be emphasised that while the army fights battles, wars are waged by entire states. Consequently, a new form of national service should be advocated, one that allows conscripts to choose the specific area in which they will serve their country.

It should also be acknowledged that it is not feasible to train the entirety of a single age cohort. Thus, adopting the so-called Scandinavian model, whereby approximately 20-25% of the population undergoes training, appears to be a realistic and achievable objective. Under this model, priority would be given to volunteers, with the remaining quota being filled by individuals who possess skills and qualifications relevant to the current needs of the armed forces or other state services.

For such a project to succeed, efforts must be focused on establishing an efficient system for the registration of conscripts and an effective training structure for reserves. This system should be based not only on dedicated reserve training centres but also on existing military units, particularly those located along the so-called western wall, where personnel levels are currently low. These units could serve, in peacetime, as specialist training centres.

Moreover, the process of building a human reserve must include the formation of an entire reserve corps, structured on the assumption that the battalion will serve as the fundamental combat module. It would be prudent to establish a dedicated command, or at the very least an inspectorate for the reserve army, within the General Command of the Armed Forces, to ensure coordinated reserve training across all branches of the military.

Under the proposed system, reservists should first and foremost be assigned mobilisation posts within existing combat units stationed on the eastern flank, as part of a high-readiness reserve. A second group of reservists would be directed to understrength units that, during peacetime, act as training centres for the reserve. These units could then swiftly reach combat readiness in times of heightened threat.

These two categories of combat units, staffed with active reserves, would guarantee a rapid response to potential aggression and serve as a significant deterrent against hostile actions.

The most crucial proposal is that the majority of trained reservists be assigned to serve within dedicated reserve units formed as part of the broader reserve corps, not limited to land forces. These reserve units should be composed of combat modules that, upon activation and refresher training, could be swiftly deployed in operations to strengthen national defence capabilities.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally altered Poland’s security environment. On the one hand, it has undeniably heightened the risk of both military and hybrid threats. On the other hand, it has strengthened Poland’s standing within NATO and the broader region, accelerated the modernisation of the armed forces, and increased public awareness of the importance of national security. Poland has a genuine opportunity to emerge from this crisis stronger, provided that it maintains current levels of investment in defence and fosters a societal understanding of the necessity of national service.

Author: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Dr. Jarosław Gromadziński (MBA) – President of Academy 24, with 35 years of experience in the Polish Armed Forces, covering all levels of command from battalion to the Eurocorps in Strasbourg.