A secret Chinese-Russian plan to destroy Starlink

The Insider, Der Spiegel, and Le Monde obtained access to four classified presentations and a 2023 protocol, revealing the inner workings of Moscow and Beijing’s military cooperation. The documents show that this cooperation is particularly advanced in the areas of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, air and missile defense, loitering munitions, armored vehicles, and aviation.

Starlink as a "Space Blockade"

One of the presentations, most likely prepared by the Chinese side, is entirely dedicated to countering the Starlink constellation owned by SpaceX. It has long been known that this system is one of the biggest ”game changers” on the Ukrainian battlefield. In the slides, the Chinese emphasize its exceptional effectiveness, which is said to provide Ukraine with an asymmetric intelligence and operational advantage.

Starlink’s distributed architecture is perceived as its greatest strength. Thousands of satellites and an even greater number of mobile terminals mean that neutralizing only a portion of them does not necessarily lead to the paralysis of the entire decentralized system.

The number of satellites is not only the foundation of the constellation’s resilience but, according to the presentation, also the source of its offensive, even provocative, nature. Their growing presence in orbit is said to de facto constitute a form of ”space blockade,” making it difficult for others to use both occupied orbits and key electromagnetic spectrum bands. Based on this, the authors conclude that an attack on Musk’s constellation could be considered an act of self-defense to preserve the ability to use low Earth orbit (LEO).

A three-stage plan to counter Starlink

The strategy proposed by the Chinese to counter Starlink is based on a three-stage escalation ladder. The first rung consists primarily of diplomatic and political tools. According to the authors, China and Russia should build an international coalition to advocate for regulations limiting the further growth of Musk’s satellite numbers.

The second level involves more direct deterrent actions. Under this framework, both states would work in close coordination to occupy key orbital slots and frequencies within organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). This type of ”space reservation,” intended to block the further expansion of competing systems, is already taking place. Evidence of this includes a Chinese application to the ITU covering 200,000 satellites from December 2025. Furthermore, both countries would jointly develop electromagnetic jamming systems to effectively restrict access to Starlink in selected geographic areas.

At the final rung of the ladder are strictly military measures with the greatest and most obvious escalatory potential. The authors make a significant distinction here between non-kinetic actions in the cyber and electromagnetic domains and the physical destruction of satellites. The first, less escalatory variant, would essentially be an intensification of the ongoing hybrid war in space, utilizing viruses and malware on a larger scale.

A kinetic attack would be far more consequential. The authors of the presentation conclude that the key to its success is breaking the resilience of the entire system. This would involve eliminating satellites faster and more cheaply than SpaceX could replace the losses. Various types of anti-satellite weapons could be used for this purpose, including both direct-ascent and co-orbital systems, which both countries are intensively developing. The Insider publication also mentions the concept of placing a dense cloud of debris or swarm ASAT satellites in orbit, which would destroy everything in their path.

What does Moscow and Beijing's space cooperation mean for the West?

The documents leave no doubt about the deepened strategic coordination between the two countries in the space domain, potentially including joint operational planning and the development of advanced military systems. The latter element seems particularly likely, as similar technological and industrial cooperation is already occurring in the areas of air and missile defense as well as loitering munitions.

These reports should have serious consequences for the shaping of Western security strategy in space. They provide further evidence that the actions of either hostile state in this domain may be coordinated with the other. The focus on Starlink itself—arguably the most important Western system in orbit—also shows that theoretically private space infrastructure is perceived as a legitimate, and even primary, military target.