"Back to its Core". Apache in the New US Army Structure

Defence24.pl: As we have discussed Apache Guardian during Defence24 Days, we have learnt US Army has decided to reduce the number of Apache Delta battalions. What is the reason and what is the objective force structure of Apaches in Army Aviation? How many helicopters will be withdrawn, and how many will stay in the structure?

Terry Jamison, Director, Boeing Attack Helicopters: That is another one of those nuances in verbiage, that if you don’t understand fully a history of Army Aviation, it’s easy to jump to that conclusion that you just presented. The reality is that the U.S. Army is not cutting or deactivating any attack battalions.

The US Army is actually following through with their plan to pull the Apache out of the Air Cavalry Squadrons. They are doing it by deactivating those Air Cavalry Squadrons instead of replacing them. There’s a distinct difference between an Air Cavalry Squadron and an Attack Battalion. The Air Cavalry Squadrons were those squadrons that used to have OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and were focused on the Reconnaissance mission.

FARA, Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, which was canceled, was supposed to fill those Air Cavalry Squadrons, replacing the OH-58D Kiowa. The Apache was placed in the Air Cavalry Squadrons as a temporary solution when the OH-58D Kiowa was retired in anticipation of FARA. Once FARA was canceled, then the Army had to make a decision on what to do with the Air Cavalry squadrons, because Apache was never supposed to fulfil that role.

And what was the Army decision?

The decision was made to move that reconnaissance mission to the family systems, drones that will operate at the Brigade Combat Team, as well as at the divisional level.

There is also a benefit for the Army.  Now thanks to deactivation of the Air Cavalry Squadrons they can harvest experienced crews and maintainers and plus-up the attack battalion. It also allows gives the Army an option to place additional aircraft into the attack battalion which is to my understanding a course of action currently being looked at, which would increase lethality of those attack battalions.

So right now, an attack battalion is 24 Apaches. The options exist if the Army chooses to adjust force structure of the attack battalions to a 30-ship battalion of three companies of 10, or even a 32-ship battalion of four companies of eight.

Prior to the Army getting so heavily committed to Iraq and Afghanistan they used to maintain an Operational Readiness Fleet – ORF. ORF is a number of aircraft to be determined that would be held at the division or corps level for battle damage replacement or crash damage. Whenever a unit needs to be plused up, they request use of the operational reserve fleet.

What will be the effect of the overall number of Apaches, and the modernization

The number of modernized Apaches, the Echo models, is actually going to continue to rise for a while. What they are doing is getting rid of all the older Delta models. Not only could it allow an increase in aircraft within the attack battalion, but also it takes the Army to a pure fleet of all Echo models. For sustainment, training, maintenance, interchangeability, interoperability, it is more difficult to maintain a mixed fleet of D model and E model aircraft. By going to a pure Echo Model fleet, it’s going to be a more efficient way to fight and it’s going to help streamline sustainment.

The Army Transformation Initiative memo ensures the modernization of Apache will continue. The next step in modernization for the Apache is the version 6.5.  Version 6.5 brings the open system interface (OSI) which allows the rapid integration of 3^rd party capabilities.  Some of these new capabilities are already developed, some are under development, and it allows for future capabilities that we may not even know that we need yet. Some key capabilities such as counter-UAS and Launched Effects – will be able to be integrate thanks to version 6.5 OSI.

The other thing that version 6.5 does, is it extends the range of the fire control radar and makes Link 16 much more user-friendly. V6.5 also replaces the turret assembly to give it a much more stable turret for the PNVS and MTADs sensor/designators. This will also provide the 30mm cannon with a more a stable line of sight reticle for target engagements.

To say that the Army is walking away from Apache is an incorrect statement. They’re actually doubling down by potentially increasing the attack battalion sizes and bringing the Apache back to its core mission of lethality. Apache absolutely can do reconnaissance but it was primarily designed for lethality on the battlefield.

Having talked about modernization, what are key directions of development of Army Aviation Apache force, including within the „Transformation in contact” initiative, where not only armored and infantry brigades but also Army Aviation brigades cooperate?

Okay, so Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army fought as Brigade Combat Teams. As we go to large-scale combat operations, the division structure becomes more important. It is more of a division fight now versus a Brigade Combat Team fight.

So that is another reason one attack battalion per division makes sense. It is going to be fought more at the division level. You can grow that attack battalion to give it more aircraft. You’re going to increase its lethality through launched effects and other capabilities all integrated through version 6.5 OSI. I personally believe the Army is still sorting out exactly, what the doctrine will look like exactly.  I know autonomous Mules that could carry launched effects for the Apache is a capability being considered as are many others.

What will be the role of those „mules” and Air Launched Effects?

Mules could in theory carry a number of Air Launched Effects, small, medium, large, with a variety of payloads such as reconnaissance payloads, kinetic payloads, and counter-UAS payloads. Those launched effects will go as far out as 200 to 300 kilometers forward of the fight, securing battlespace or maneuver space for the manned capabilities to operate inside them. What that allows you to do in a very fluid fight under large-scale combat operations, where you’re going to find moments, fleeting moments of opportunities to exploit the enemy’s gaps and seams and weaknesses by having that attack battalion forward and operating in that secured space.

You’ve got a man in the loop forward in the fight. Someone who can recognize opportunities in the fight can take advantage of them. Attack weaknesses as they’re presented. It’s not a fully manned solution, and not fully an unmanned solution. It’s a balance of both manned and unmanned, complementing each other’s strengths. We will have manned capabilities on battlefield for quite some time in our attack helicopters, but they will be augmented by launched effects and autonomous capabilities to increase our survivability and lethality.

And the question is, in this context, especially as Poland is part of the NATO Eastern Flank battlefield region. How can Apache Guardian and the future version engage targets standoff, keeping out of the harms way?

I’m going to talk from the furthest out and to work my way back in. Furthest out will be controlled by Link 16, that provides the common operating picture into the cockpit. Through Link 16, the Apache has access to any of the joint platforms that are Link 16-capable. So that can reach extremely far out there.

Then as we come back in, the next line would be the launched effects. The launch effects are operating either off the Apache or being launched off a Blackhawk, Chinook, or ground vehicles, or the Mules, the autonomous Mules.

Those launch effects are reaching out two to three hundred kilometers finding targets and engaging. As we come back towards the manned aircraft formation, we are looking at LRPM, Long Range Precision Munitions. Today we have Spike NLOS, but eventually that could be replaced. So now we are in the 35 to 60-kilometer range. Even back further, we have JAGM, Hellfire’s replacement, which will be in the 8 to16-kilometer range, and as you pull it in even further, you have 30 mm gun at about 1500 meters.

We’re talking about the current and the future modernization of Apache. My question is what will be the current and future protection against UAVs? We know about electronic warfare and, for example DIRCM system against missiles. How will the modernization work against these threats? What kind of new system will be equipped to counter drones

We’ve always been very good at developing countermeasures, Common Missile Warning System for example against MANPADS. I am confident we will develop effective countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of drones. Right now, industry working with the Army is pursuing multiple paths. One option is a C-UAS payload in a medium class launched effect which could be an electronic warfare capability.

And then for large drones, there is already a Hellfire with proximity fuse capability. The Army is also looking at a 30-millimeter proximity fuse for the smaller class drones. But the key to all of that is a targeting capability.  It doesn’t do you any good to have all that kinetic capability if you don’t have a targeting apparatus, if you can’t see them, you can’t engage them.

The advantage of the Echo model, in particular version 6.5, is that we’ve increased the range of the fire control radar and in an air-to-air mode, so it has the fidelity to pick up a wide variety of drones. Further refinement to the fire control radar is being looked at so it can pick up even the much smaller class one drones.  That helps give you the situational awareness in the drone space so you can develop targeting packages for the drones.

What would be the significance of Link 16 in counter-drone fight?

Again – 80 percent of the fight is finding them, seeing them and then getting the kinetic effect, or EW effect on them. LINK-16 by providing access to a multitude of sensors on the battlefield increases the crews SA of the drone picture. 

I go back to the fire control radar and that air-to-air mode, giving the aircraft a situational awareness bubble around it. No other rotary winged manned platform can do that right now, other than the Apache. Industry continues to develop solutions that will refine the fidelity of the radar.

And where will Poland be on the path of Apache modernization?

As far as modernization of Polish Apache Guardian is concerned, there is a potential that Poland could be the first user of version 6.5, dependent on the US Army’s timeline for their aircraft. In other words, Poland is set to receive the newest configuration of Apache right from the start. I know that now some of the attention is on the Delta models to be delivered this year. But for Poland the D Model Apache is only a bridge, to the AH-64E deliveries. Poland will receive 6.5 version Echo, the most modern Apaches ever built.

The other beauty of your version 6.5 is that you’re getting them off the production line. There is a course of action where if you have version 6 aircraft today, like the US Army does, or version 4.5, you could get a version 6.5 software only, which means you’re going to miss out on some of the key upgraded hardware.

But that won’t be the case with Poland because you’re getting the latest, most current model, directly off the production line. You’re going to get the entire version 6.5 software and the version 6.5 hardware that goes along with that package. Poland will be at the tip of the spear for modernization.

In Poland recently the MoD said heavy lift helicopters are a priority, which makes it consider Chinook as it is used by most NATO nations in that role. We have covered the modernization of Apache. Now I would like to ask how Chinook can enhance the capabilities of Apache, the logistics for the Apache and how Chinook could fit in the overall battlefield concept?

So there’s a couple of things. One I already talked about. We could envision Chinook becoming a launched effects platform in support of an Apache. Until or if the mules come online, you need to have a manned air capability to do this.

And the other thing is, you know, the lessons learned from Ukraine is any sort of refueling and rearming point maintenance, sustainment capability that is static and stays in one place too long is going to be targeted. With the Chinook you can utilize it as an air mobile refuel and rearm capability, It can provide fuel and armament to the Apaches in a very mobile „air FARP” – air Forward Aerial and Refueling Point.

It can land, refuel, rearm, reposition to the next point. That’s one area. But it also is very good at providing those sustainment parts, pieces, maintainers, the soldiers that maintain the aircraft. A maintenance support pitch that can fly with the Apache formation. You’ve got it right there, and it’s not stuck in some static assembly area somewhere that could be susceptible to drone attack.

I think that survivability is enhanced by keeping everything moving on the battlefield and as close to the point of need as possible. Point of need being of course the Apaches for the Launched Effects, for the sustainment, rearming and refueling.

It is also important that chinook is used by many European nations, including Spain, Germany in the near future, Netherlands, UK, Italy. In Poland, we don’t have that kind of helicopter. And from this perspective, what is the model of sustainment support for Chinook here in Europe? And how can we capitalize the using common fleets of Chinook, both operationally and logistically?

It is a kind of the same benefit that we have been talking about with regard to Apache. When you have the same platform, that your friends and Allies fighting alongside with you, you get the benefits of interchangeability of parts and components.

But there is also an aspect of having a regional maintenance support facility, located centrally in Europe, that could support not just the Polish Chinooks but also the other located in Europe, from the countries you mentioned, as well as U.S. Army if they rotate in, you know, in time of crisis or time of need. Having that capability there would be significant.

And I think if you look at the industrial support package that we’re partnered with Poland on for Apache, we could model a very similar package to where you bring that sustainment capability into Poland to maintain your own Chinook aircraft, it would be significant. And again, Polish aircraft wouldn’t be the only ones, Poland could support aircraft from NATO customers that use Chinook as well. And I would like to highlight that Chinook has a phased inspection maintenance system, a very similar to the one Apache has, allowing Poland to do this maintenance throughout the life of the platform. This is a very different concept that what you have used here previously in Poland with the Soviet era platforms. 

Thank you for the conversation.