France faces permanent low-intensity war

France is dealing with threats that no longer fit the classic distinction between peace and war. Industrial espionage, drone overflights, sabotage, disinformation, lawfare, recruitment of engineers and pressure on supply chains are all part of the same environment. This is not a temporary consequence of the war in Ukraine. It is a new phase of competition in which hostile actors try to weaken the state without crossing the threshold that would trigger a conventional military response.

The French Defence and Security Intelligence Directorate (Direction du renseignement et de la sécurité de la Défense, DRSD) shows that the French defence industrial and technological base remains under sustained pressure. The problem is no longer limited to cyberattacks against major groups such as Dassault Aviation, Naval Group, Thales or Safran. These companies are usually well protected. The more serious vulnerability lies in small and medium-sized enterprises and mid-sized subcontractors, often responsible for one critical component in the production chain. If this part of the chain is weak, the whole defence industry becomes exposed.

The human factor remains one of the most effective tools used against France. Engineers, researchers, former employees and specialists travelling abroad are targeted through recruitment companies, talent programmes and professional networks. This is less visible than a cyberattack, but often more efficient. An adversary does not always need to break into a classified system. Sometimes it is enough to identify the right person, offer them a job, obtain technical knowledge and map an industrial ecosystem from the inside.

Physical pressure is also increasing. Intrusions into industrial sites, theft of professional equipment, drone flights over sensitive facilities and acts of sabotage show that the threat is no longer only digital. The case of a French defence company targeted by Molotov cocktails and then followed by repeated drone overflights shows the direction of change. This is reconnaissance, intimidation and testing. It is exactly how low-intensity conflict looks before society understands that it is already taking place.

The reputational dimension is equally important. France is learning that its weapons systems can be attacked politically and commercially, not only militarily. Attempts to undermine the image of Rafale after Operation Sindoor show how quickly external actors can exploit a military event to damage French exports. This matters because the defence industry is not only about production. It is also about credibility, trust and the political perception of reliability.

The French intelligence community is adapting, but the scale of the challenge is growing faster than public awareness. The Directorate-General for External Security (Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure, DGSE), the General Directorate for Internal Security (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, DGSI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du renseignement militaire, DRM), the Defence and Security Intelligence Directorate (Direction du renseignement et de la sécurité de la Défense, DRSD), the National Directorate of Intelligence and Customs Investigations (Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières, DNRED), Viginum and other specialised structures are being reorganised, better funded and more closely connected than before. French intelligence is no longer only a supporting instrument for the state. It is becoming one of the central conditions of sovereign decision-making.

This is visible in the internal reforms of the services. The Directorate-General for External Security is developing mission centres. The General Directorate for Internal Security is working through its 2030 strategic project. The National Directorate of Intelligence and Customs Investigations is implementing the Valmy reform. The Defence and Security Intelligence Directorate is expanding prospective analysis and red teaming. The Directorate of Military Intelligence has shifted towards the war in Ukraine, reorganised the link between collection and analysis, and is increasingly using artificial intelligence and big data. The logic of silos is weakening, because the threat itself is no longer divided into neat categories.

The technological dimension is probably the most serious long-term issue. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space systems, encrypted communications and mass data processing are becoming core elements of modern intelligence work. France has real strengths, including military optical observation satellites, space-based electromagnetic intelligence, secure military communications and the PROQCIMA quantum programme, which aims to deliver French-designed 128 logical-qubit prototypes by 2032 with up to €500 million over ten years. But dependence on American software, hardware and digital architecture remains a strategic weakness. Alliances are necessary, but dependence is dangerous.

The debate on encrypted communications shows the political difficulty of the problem. A large share of communications now takes place through end-to-end encrypted messaging. For security services, this creates blind spots. For citizens, it is also a question of privacy and civil liberties. France is therefore trying to find a balance between operational necessity and democratic control. This is not a technical debate only. It is about how a democratic state defends itself without weakening the principles it wants to protect.

International cooperation remains necessary, but France wants to avoid strategic dependence. With more than 250 bilateral and multilateral intelligence partnerships, French services remain valued by allies. At the same time, Paris wants to preserve the ability to form its own judgement, especially at a time when the United States is becoming less predictable. The Polish and Baltic perspective is important here, because partners on NATO’s eastern flank increasingly see France as one of the few European actors capable of offering an autonomous assessment of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

The key conclusion is simple. France is already in a low-intensity war, but this war is not fought only by soldiers or intelligence officers. It is fought in factories, laboratories, recruitment processes, courts, social media platforms, satellite systems and encrypted communications. The adversary does not need to destroy France directly. It can weaken its industry, divide its society, steal its knowledge and limit its freedom of decision. That is why the answer cannot come only from the intelligence services. It must come from the state, industry and society together.