Greece builds the Achilles Shield

The Greek Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence approved armament programmes worth a total of €4.2 billion. More than €3 billion will be allocated to the Achilles Shield, which is intended to become the new foundation of Greek air and missile defence.

Athens plans to acquire three complementary Israeli systems. Spyder AiO will be responsible for short-range threats, Barak MX will cover the intermediate layer, while David’s Sling will provide protection against longer-range missiles. The entire structure is to be connected through a new command-and-control system supported by artificial intelligence and modern radars.

The importance of this decision lies not only in the systems themselves. Greece wants to connect sensors, interceptors and command structures into one architecture capable of collecting information, analysing threats and selecting the appropriate response. In modern warfare, the effectiveness of air defence depends not only on the missile, but also on how quickly the entire system can detect and engage the target.

There is also a practical reason for the purchase. Greece still operates Russian-made Tor-M1 and Osa-AK systems, but their maintenance has become increasingly difficult since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Access to spare parts has been limited, cooperation with Moscow has effectively ended, and the existing systems are ageing. Athens therefore had to make a decision, and it chose Israeli solutions.

From PULS to the Achilles Shield

The new programme should be viewed together with the agreement signed in April for the acquisition of the PULS rocket artillery system. The contract, worth approximately €656 million, includes precision-guided missiles and loitering munitions. Some of the launchers are expected to be deployed on Greek islands in the Aegean, which Türkiye has for years demanded should be demilitarised.

PULS gives Greece a stronger long-range strike capability, while Achilles Shield is intended to provide the defensive layer. Athens wants to intercept incoming drones and missiles, but also retain the ability to strike launchers, command posts and logistical facilities at greater distances. This is no longer the purchase of separate platforms. Greece is building a system.

Cooperation with Israel is therefore structural, not transactional. The two countries are deepening military ties, conducting joint exercises and developing industrial programmes. Israel is also involved in the training of Greek pilots at Kalamata. In addition, Greece, Cyprus and Israel are discussing the establishment of a rapid-reaction unit intended to protect sensitive infrastructure, including offshore gas installations.

Israeli systems are attractive to Athens because they have been tested in combat, can probably be delivered more quickly and may be cheaper than some European alternatives. On the other hand, reliance on Israel also creates dependence on foreign technology, ammunition and technical support. This must be taken into account, particularly at a time when Israeli industry is already under pressure from growing demand and continuing military operations.

Türkiye remains part of the calculation

Greece officially argues that its cooperation with Israel is not directed against any third country. However, Türkiye remains an obvious element of the calculation. Ankara is rapidly expanding its missile, drone and defence-industrial capabilities, while disputes over maritime boundaries, Cyprus and the militarisation of Greek islands have not disappeared.

The rapprochement between Greece and Israel accelerated after the 2019 agreement between Türkiye and Libya, which Athens regarded as a direct challenge to Greek interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since then, cooperation with Israel has increasingly become part of the Greek response to the growth of Turkish military power.

This does not mean that every Greek acquisition should be interpreted only through rivalry with Ankara. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated that European states need stronger protection against drones, cruise missiles and ballistic threats. Nevertheless, in the Greek case, the development of Turkish capabilities clearly accelerates decisions that might otherwise have taken much longer.

There is also a risk of a regional arms race. A stronger Greek air-defence shield may increase deterrence, but it may also encourage Türkiye to develop new systems intended to penetrate it. Ankara is already investing heavily in ballistic missiles, unmanned aircraft and long-range precision weapons. One side’s defensive modernisation can therefore become the justification for the other side’s offensive expansion.

The Achilles Shield is only one part of a much broader programme. Greece has also approved the purchase of three C-390 Millennium transport aircraft, Hellfire missiles for Apache helicopters and sonar systems for frigates. Overall, Athens plans to spend nearly €28 billion on military modernisation by 2036 and currently allocates around 3.5% of GDP to defence.

We do see that Greece is not preparing only for a traditional conflict involving aircraft, ships and armoured units. It is preparing for a high-intensity battlefield in which drones, missiles, electronic warfare and the speed of data processing will determine the effectiveness of the armed forces. The PULS agreement was the offensive element of this transformation.