Ukraine changes its information war strategy

The National Security and Defence Council is increasingly treating information resilience as a direct element of national security. The Ukrainian approach assumes that Russian propaganda does not function separately from military pressure, cyber operations or activities against journalists. It is part of the same system designed to weaken public confidence, create an alternative version of events and influence both Ukrainian society and audiences abroad.

An important change concerns coordination. Ukraine already has a permanent inter-agency mechanism bringing together the security and defence sector, government institutions, experts and other organisations. The system operates on a continuous basis, with regular meetings, real-time exchange of information and coordination of communication. The next step is to institutionalise this cooperation so that the state does not respond separately to every Russian operation, but is able to identify priorities and prepare its response in advance.

Kyiv is also putting greater emphasis on its own information activity. Sanctions against propagandists will continue, but the Ukrainian position is that restrictions alone are not enough. Russia produces enormous volumes of content designed to blur facts, historical events and responsibility for the war. Ukraine therefore wants not only to block hostile narratives, but also to create and distribute its own content more effectively, including outside the country.

This is particularly important because Russian information operations increasingly target Ukraine’s partner countries. The objective is not always to convince Western societies that Moscow is right. Often it is enough to increase uncertainty, strengthen political divisions, undermine support for Ukraine or create the impression that continued assistance is too expensive. Countering these activities abroad is therefore becoming as important as protecting the domestic information space.

The most important element will therefore be activity outside Ukraine itself. Russia conducts information operations in partner countries through networks of pseudo-journalists, pseudo-experts and its own channels of content distribution. Kyiv wants not only to respond to individual narratives, but also to limit their spread, disrupt the mechanisms of influence and increase its own information activity abroad. A separate direction remains communication towards Russian society and exposing the way Putin’s regime operates.

Find out more about the initiative here