A new Low Earth Orbit regime must be grounded in geopolitics, not detached from it

LEO: growing congestion, competition, and loss of control

The orbit is becoming increasingly crowded, yet we still struggle to grasp the pace and scale of this growth. Today, nearly 15,000 active satellites operate in orbit. By 2030, that number could approach 100,000, and a decade later, rise to half a million.

Commercial firms and states alike are racing to secure their own slice of the orbital pie, aware of the immense financial and geopolitical advantages of moving first, before the best places are still available and space „tightens” too much. That is why they keep unveiling new plans for even larger mega-constellations, seeking to „land-grab” available orbits and reserve rights to them in advance. The past few months have offered some of the boldest examples yet: from SpaceX’s bid for a one-million-satellite data center constellation to Chinese filings for up to 200,000 high-speed internet satellites.

If all of these announcements eventually materialize, low Earth orbit will be populated by well over a million satellites. Undoubtedly, this would give our societies, economies, and armies breakthrough capabilities. But if nothing changes, it could also carry the seeds of its own destruction. The reason is simple: today, we still lack a coherent and effective regime to govern what is becoming an increasingly messy orbital environment.

Although mathematical models suggest that LEO could theoretically accommodate up to 12 million satellites, this will not be feasible under the way satellites are currently deployed. Launching a satellite into LEO today requires little more than notifying the UN and obtaining the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) approval for the requested radio frequency at the international level. Orbital placement itself, however, is authorized by national agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), with limited, if any, meaningful coordination between them.

This uncoordinated approach results in a highly suboptimal use of orbital space; it resembles a parking lot without marked lines or an attendant to guide the cars. In such a chaotic and largely ungoverned environment, space becomes unnecessarily crowded and, as a result, far more susceptible to incidents.

This is now becoming dangerously true in low Earth orbit. As early as 2021, Starlink satellites alone were involved in around 1,600 close encounters within less than one kilometre between two spacecraft every week, according to Hugh Lewis, a top space-debris expert at the University of Southampton. By 2025, SpaceX had to conduct around 300,000 collision-avoidance manoeuvres, and if current trends continue, this figure could soon rise into the millions. As Lewis commented: „In just five years, we have gone from perhaps hundreds of risk mitigation manoeuvres annually, across all active satellites, to hundreds of thousands. If that’s not a sign of a problem, I don’t know what is.”

Proposed solutions: desirable, but unrealistic

What solutions are being proposed? At first glance, they appear both reasonable and desirable: the establishment of an international committee to define orbital carrying capacity and, on that basis, determine the number of available slots. This would be followed by the creation of a UN-mandated agency tasked with allocating those slots to states, monitoring orbital activity, and resolving potential disputes.

Here, the existing geosynchronous orbit (GSO) slot regime is often cited as a guiding example of how a comparable system for LEO could work in practice. In the GSO case, the ITU allocates not only predefined radio frequencies but also roughly 1,800 orbital „parking spots” on a first-come, first-served basis (typically for 15 years, with the possibility of extension) in order to limit both radio-frequency interference and the risk of physical collision.

Yet this regime was created back in 1963, when there were only two meaningful space actors and space was still seen as a limited domain with modest use and potential. Today, we are dealing with a strategic, congested, and economically vital orbital environment of high-velocity and dynamic, unlike the relatively static and comparatively empty GSO. More importantly, LEO involves a far wider set of stakeholders, from private companies and international organisations to nation states, all operating in an intensely competitive international setting.

A LEO regime grounded in geopolitical and orbital realities

These realities make establishing any LEO regime along the old way of doing business increasingly difficult, if not impossible. In an age of weakening multilateralism, eroding international institutions and law, and ever more competitive and sometimes openly adversarial great powers obstructing global cooperation on issues such as climate change or AI, it is futile to expect that LEO will defy this broader trend.

The above is not to say that we should give up efforts to create the regime that LEO so desperately needs. Rather, it is to say that, if we want effectiveness, we must adjust our approach and expectations. Any attempt to build a feasible, working, and lasting LEO regime has to start from a realistic recognition of today’s geopolitical realities and the nature of the orbital environment, rather than from denying them. And these are as follows:

a)    Competition in outer space is inevitable in the foreseeable future because of the structure of the current international system.

b)    Dominating LEO is nearly impossible, and even if achieved it can be easily lost, given its susceptibility to debris congestion resulting from both intentional and unintentional actions.

Therefore, competing orbital actors face an environment they increasingly depend on but cannot dominate, and whose access can be effectively restricted for all of them at once. This strategic situation creates incentives to:

a)    Embed competition within a minimal set of rules that sustains LEO’s long-term operability and preserves the freedom to use the orbit.

b)    Accept other actors« access to and presence in LEO, rather than trying to exclude them.

Interests first, wishes second

Of course, these are incentives, not obligations. It remains highly uncertain whether such an outlook will prevail, especially among today’s most dominant space actors. They may be particularly prone to myopia, seeking to maximise immediate gains and secure privileged positions for the future. From their perspective, a LEO regime could mean reduced orbital freedom, slower permitting processes, and greater opportunities for competitors to catch up. The central question is whether they will recognise the potential costs of continuing on the current trajectory, with themselves as the most likely and most exposed victims.

On the other side are emerging space powers and non-spacefaring nations, mainly from the Global South, which have a clear interest in securing a share of orbital slots for the future and preventing LEO from being dominated by established actors.

The EU sits on the fence. It remains a space power, but one that is increasingly lagging behind in the orbital space race. This should make it particularly interested in pushing for a workable regime, especially in cooperation with Global South countries, both to secure its interests and to elevate its normative power and reputation. A joint proposal for a LEO allocation system, or even efforts to implement one without the United States and China, would present a difficult dilemma for both: ignore a regime backed by the Global South and absorb the reputational costs, or join it with less leverage to shape the rules.

That is only one of many possible starting points. Given the state of the world and the current international debate, a workable approach cannot rest primarily on appeals to international justice, equality, or sustainability, however important they are. It has to engage actors« national and non-national, particularistic interests, and look for points of convergence. If we do that, we may find that different motivations can still lead to the same desired outcomes.

Would the result be a regime based on a fair and equal allocation of slots? No. Would it at least make it possible to determine the number of slots, their location, and an allocation that reflects the existing balance of power, favouring stronger actors while still allowing weaker ones to participate? Not necessarily impossible.

In this way, the minimal interests of all parties could be safeguarded. For major space powers, this would mean protection against losing access to orbit or seeing it dominated by another actor. For emerging states, it would offer a realistic prospect of access to orbital resources. Only by recognizing mutual vulnerability in a space-based tragedy of the commons can a realistic and durable LEO regime emerge.