America cuts NATO’s airpower?

This is not only about the number of American soldiers in Poland or the future of one specific rotation. The wider issue is much more serious: the United States is reviewing the whole architecture of its military contribution to Europe. If Washington reduces the number of fighters in Europe by as much as one third, while also limiting bombers, naval assets and tankers, then Europe will face a very practical question: who will fill the gaps, how quickly, and with what equipment?

The American logic is clear. The Trump administration wants European NATO members to take primary responsibility for the conventional defence of the continent. This does not mean that the United States is leaving NATO, nor does it mean that the American nuclear umbrella disappears. On the contrary, nuclear deterrence is expected to remain. The change concerns the conventional layer: aircraft, ships, drones, refuelling aircraft, logistics and the forces needed for a long war in Europe.

For Poland and the eastern flank, this is a major warning. American troops and capabilities remain essential for deterring Russia, but Warsaw cannot assume that every American asset currently planned for Europe will stay available in the same form. The United States is increasingly thinking globally: China, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Iran and Europe are all competing for attention, platforms and ammunition. Europe is no longer the only theatre that matters to Washington.

The problem is that many European states have spoken for years about taking greater responsibility, but they still lack the capabilities that the United States provides almost naturally: air-to-air refuelling, strategic lift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, long-range strike, missile defence, command systems and high-end airpower. Buying more tanks or artillery is important, but it does not solve the problem if Europe cannot move forces, protect them from the air and sustain operations over time.

The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara may therefore become one of the most important moments for the future of burden-sharing inside the Alliance. If Washington presents a new model of burden shifting, European allies will have to answer not with declarations, but with concrete capabilities. The deadline mentioned in the reporting — early June for European partners to say what they can offer — shows that the discussion is already operational, not theoretical.

For Poland, the answer should be double. First, maintain the strongest possible American presence, because U.S. forces remain the most important deterrent against Russia on the eastern flank. Second, build European and regional capabilities much faster, especially with countries that understand the Russian threat in practical terms: the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Romania, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Poland cannot choose between America and Europe. It has to work with both, because the direction of U.S. policy is becoming increasingly clear.

The real challenge is that Europe may soon discover that American reduction does not mean abandonment, but it does mean the end of comfort. The United States will remain the most important ally, yet it will expect Europeans to provide far more aircraft, ammunition, air defence, tankers, drones and logistics than before. For NATO, this is not the end of the transatlantic relationship. It is a test of whether Europe can finally become serious about its own defence.