Belarus: Between Washington and Moscow

For Warsaw, the room for maneuver is narrowing to three courses of action. First, a selective opening to contact with Minsk, using mediation offered by US presidential envoys while maintaining strict conditions: releases, humanitarian access, and a reduction of border pressure. Second, a redefinition of relations with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s camp: a clearer specification of political and operational expectations toward émigré structures that have their own agenda. Third, diversification of channels of contact with other Belarusian circles, including the diaspora in EU member states, which would reduce the risk of monopolizing representation. Inaction becomes costly when Washington is probing the possibility of a partial „rehabilitation” of Minsk. The April release of Andrzej Poczobut strengthens the hypothesis that a thaw in dialogue is being tested, although its durability and scope remain uncertain.

Belarus’s relations with the West are cyclical in nature: repression and falsified elections lead to sanctions and a freeze in contacts, while targeted gestures — prisoner releases and controlled liberalization — lead to partial normalization.

Washington has followed this rhythm. After sanctions imposed following the 2006 and 2010 elections, partial normalization came in 2014–2015, when Minsk signaled greater autonomy from Moscow. During Donald Trump’s first term, détente accelerated; its symbol was Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit in 2020.  

That process collapsed after the brutal suppression of protests following the 2020 election. The US reaction, however, was more restrained than the EU’s position, revealing a difference in perceptions of the Belarusian factor’s significance. The Joe Biden administration adopted a tougher course: support for the opposition and broad sanctions. Subsequent incidents — the hijacking of a plane and the arrest of Raman Pratasevich, the instrumentalization of migration against NATO’s eastern flank states, and then complicity in the aggression against Ukraine — consolidated the transatlantic consensus on isolation and support for the United Transitional Cabinet led by Tsikhanouskaya.

Washington breaks with the policy of isolating Minsk

Lukashenko’s decisions after 2020 and the resulting political, economic, informational, and logistical isolation from the West maximized Belarus’s dependence on Russia. The Kremlin supported the regime during the post-election crisis, receiving in return deeper penetration of state institutions and expanded control over key sectors of the economy.

The deployment of Russian armed forces on Belarusian territory has encouraged Moscow to treat the country as a „unified military space” — a rear base for operations against Ukraine and hybrid operations against NATO’s eastern flank states. As a result, Minsk’s sovereignty has been significantly curtailed; the real scope of Lukashenko’s autonomy remains unclear, undermining the possibility of his pursuing a foreign policy independent of the Kremlin.

In this context, the new Donald Trump administration is moving away from the previous policy of isolation and testing a scenario of partial reset with Minsk. The first signals appeared in January, when the US Department of State quietly removed from its website a statement refusing to recognize the results of the 2020 presidential election. Lukashenko, seeing the possibility of transactional dialogue with Washington, released US citizen Anastassia Nuhfer at the end of the month.

The tactic, developed over more than three decades of Lukashenko’s rule, of using political prisoners as an „asset” in diplomatic bargaining initiated a series of contacts with Washington that in practice led to a partial break in Minsk’s isolation. In February, Belarus was visited by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe Christopher W. Smith, and in June Lukashenko received US Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg. A significant shift occurred in August, when Donald Trump held the first-ever telephone conversation between a sitting US president and Lukashenko, shortly before his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. In a later post on Truth Social, he described Lukashenko as the „highly respected president of Belarus,” thanked him for releasing prisoners, and declared his readiness for a personal meeting. 

In September, there was another wave of releases — 52 people regained their freedom. John Coale, the envoy for Belarus, assessed relations as „good” and announced the possibility of reopening the US embassy in Minsk. The United States also accepted an invitation to send observers to the Zapad 2025 exercises. Similar contact was maintained in December. In exchange for the partial lifting of sanctions, including those affecting the potash sector, another 123 people were released. Among them were Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, 2020 protest leader Maryia Kalesnikava, and former presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka.    

In March 2026, another meeting took place between Lukashenko and the American envoy, after which the largest amnesty of political prisoners to date was announced. A total of 250 people were released — 235 remained in the country, while 15 were deported to Lithuania. This group included, among others, Belsat journalist Katsiaryna Andreyeva and activists from the Viasna Human Rights Centre: Marfa Rabkova and Valiantsin Stefanovich. In exchange, the United States lifted sanctions on selected financial institutions — Belinvestbank, the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus, and the Ministry of Finance — and fully lifted them on two key entities in the potash sector: the Belarusian Potash Company and Belaruskali.   

Various hypotheses may be formulated regarding Washington’s objectives, but their common denominator is a shift away from a normative approach toward short-term calculation. The resumption of dialogue with Minsk fits into a broader trend of softening the line toward Russia and an attempt to influence the divergent positions of the parties to the war in Ukraine. In this interpretation, Belarus may be treated as a tool of indirect influence. At the same time, Trump is using this track to demonstrate agency vis-à-vis Europe, challenging the paradigm of isolating authoritarian regimes and strengthening the logic of bilateral arrangements at the expense of multilateralism. De facto, this means recognizing the permanence of Lukashenko’s rule — after first neutralizing the opposition as a real political actor — and accepting the limited effectiveness of sanctions. As a consequence, controlled détente appears to be a potentially more useful instrument than continued pressure.    

The second dimension of this policy is geostrategic and economic. Washington may seek gradually to „pull” Belarus away from Russia and China by creating an alternative field of maneuver, particularly in raw-material sectors. Sanctions after 2020 deepened Minsk’s dependence on Moscow and Beijing, especially in potash exports and logistics. Their partial lifting opens space for the return of Western — including American — actors and for the diversification of trade routes for raw materials regarded in the United States as strategic. In this context, speculation is emerging about possible capital entries into the Belarusian potash sector and the reconstruction of trade channels, which would limit the dominance of Russia and China. Such a strategy combines an economic component with political objectives: selective normalization would be intended to transform Belarus from a Russian asset into a space of competing influences.    

European strategy undermined

The US-Belarusian rapprochement forces a response from the European Union, especially from states directly bordering the regime: Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Despite Washington’s change of course, EU member states are maintaining their policy of isolating the authorities in Minsk and remain the main support base for the Belarusian democratic opposition, concentrated primarily in Poland and Lithuania around Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s circle. Brussels continues its sanctions policy, including tightening it; in February of this year, it decided to extend the existing restrictions for another year. 

In this context, US actions undermine the West’s efforts to date by strengthening Lukashenko’s international legitimization and giving the regime breathing space after years of operating under political and economic pressure.

The divergences have become especially visible in the aviation sector. After the release of some political prisoners, Washington partially eased restrictions on the national carrier Belavia, restoring access to selected spare parts and technical services. At the same time, EU sanctions still fully exclude such cooperation, forcing European companies to reject it. This case demonstrates the growing asymmetry between the American approach — based on pragmatism and selective transactions — and the European one, rooted in normative logic and consistent enforcement of standards. For Brussels, this entails the risk of eroding Western cohesion and reducing the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.   

It should also be noted that this shift follows a visible decline in the effectiveness of the existing isolation strategy. Lukashenko’s regime remains internally stable and more strongly tied to Moscow than before 2020. Consequently, EU policy today is marked by limited coordination with the United States and little ability to generate tangible political results.

The essence of the „Belarusian dilemma” comes down to the hierarchy of priorities. The first option assumes keeping Belarus at a relative distance from Russia by allowing Lukashenko to continue balancing — at the cost of tolerating human rights violations. The second envisages consistent isolation and sanctioning of the regime, while risking the further deepening of its dependence on the Kremlin. Until now, the European Union has leaned toward the second approach, prioritizing democratic standards and human rights over short-term geopolitical calculation.  

After Lukashenko’s March meeting with U.S. envoy Coale, some sanctions affecting the Belarusian potash sector were lifted. As a consequence, the United States called on Lithuania to unfreeze relations with Minsk. In the American view, fertilizer exports should be restored via Lithuanian territory, which would open access for Belarusian products to European and then American markets. For the Donald Trump administration, this has a political and economic dimension: destabilization of the fertilizer market, linked among other things to the war with Iran, led to sharp price increases, directly affecting the Republican electoral base. In this arrangement, the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda plays a key role; before 2020, it was the main transit hub for Belarusian goods, with significant capital involvement by entities from Minsk.   

The Lithuanian side responded to the American signal with cautious openness. Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė did not rule out talks with Lukashenko, but made them conditional on three requirements: an end to the use of balloons for smuggling into Lithuanian territory, the free return of detained trucks without additional charges, and a halt to migration pressure orchestrated by Belarusian and Russian services.

At the current stage, all these conditions may be considered to have been met to a significant extent. This opens space for a gradual normalization of contacts, while also signaling that in the coming months the Belarusian direction will gain importance in regional policy — not only for Lithuania, but more broadly across the eastern flank.

Opportunities, risks, and uncertainties of reopening

The Lukashenko regime is undergoing progressive integration with Russia, while the American „reopening” is already under way. At the same time, Minsk has for some time been signaling readiness for dialogue with European Union states, as confirmed by further releases of prisoners — including EU citizens and an employee of an EU institution. Lukashenko sees a window of opportunity in Trump’s policy, assuming its potential impermanence and the risk that a future U.S. administration may reverse it. This forces action within a short time horizon and explains the pace of the current gestures.  

Arguments for a limited opening exist, as do indications that a „window of opportunity” is emerging. For EU member states — especially those neighboring Belarus — this means the need to carry out a selective cost-benefit assessment under conditions of limited transatlantic coordination.

In the most likely scenario of partial normalization — involving the limited unblocking of diplomatic channels and selective easing of sanctions — Lukashenko would gain greater freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. This would translate into a partial reduction of economic dependence on Russia, especially in logistics and exports. As a result, Minsk could, to a limited extent, return to a multi-vector policy, increasing its agency in relations with the Kremlin. 

At the same time, the experience of recent months points to significant risks in such an approach. One example is the US easing of restrictions on the Belarusian aviation sector as part of a broader political arrangement. The restoration of limited access to Western components — subject to a ban on operations to selected destinations, including Russia and Iran — has limited enforcement credibility. In practice, the high degree of integration of Russia’s and Belarus’s logistics systems and operational space makes it difficult to control flows. This means that the benefits gained by Minsk may indirectly strengthen Russian capabilities, undermining the strategic rationale for partial normalization.   

In the longer term, any EU dialogue with Minsk would be subordinate to de-escalation objectives. The priority remains the durable elimination of migratory pressure on the EU’s borders and the end of incidents involving violations of the airspace of Member States. At the same time, it would be crucial to limit Belarus’s role as an industrial rear base for the Russian war effort — in particular with regard to ammunition production. Achieving these objectives could produce tangible operational effects, including indirectly easing the burden on Ukrainian forces by reducing support for Russia from Belarusian territory, as well as freeing up some military units for more urgent operational directions.

The fundamental threat remains the high — close to certain — risk that any „reopening process” would in fact be engineered and controlled by the Kremlin. In such a scenario, it would bring mainly illusory benefits, strengthening both the propaganda apparatus and the economic capabilities of Minsk and Moscow alike. Belarus could serve as an additional channel for Russia to evade Western sanctions. Concessions to the regime, made cyclically after periods of tactical quieting of its destabilizing activity, would reinforce the image of the West as reactive and lacking a long-term strategy toward Belarus — especially in terms of the desired end-state of the relationship and the tools needed to achieve it.  

Opposition alternatives?

Since the presidential elections of 9 August 2020, Europe — especially Poland and Lithuania — has consistently supported the Belarusian opposition in exile. The main political center took shape around Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenko’s challenger in the second round of the election. After the falsified election and the outbreak of protests, she was forced to leave the country and found refuge in Lithuania, and in 2026 she moved to Warsaw. This milieu aims to change the regime and hold free elections, democratize Belarus, and hold the criminal machinery of power to account. In recent years, Tsikhanouskaya has built an international network of contacts; opposition representatives maintain regular ties with decision-makers and take part in political forums in the West.

At the same time, three fundamental limitations should be noted. First, the activity of the émigré opposition remains structurally dependent on Western state support. Second, this milieu has not obtained formal recognition as the legal representative of the Belarusian state. Third, its agency is limited — both because of the failure of some initiatives (including the „Free Belarus passport” project and accusations of „grant-eating”) and because it has little bearing on the current political and social dynamics inside the country.  

In December 2025, as a result of US diplomatic efforts, one of the largest amnesties of political prisoners took place. Among those released were, among others, Maryia Kalesnikava and Viktar Babaryka, who were granted asylum in Berlin. Like Tsikhanouskaya, Kalesnikava continues opposition activity in exile, but stresses a partly different diagnosis. She points out that maintaining the full isolation of Belarus strategically strengthens Russia. Restricting contacts with the West encourages a reorientation of society — more and more Belarusians choose education and life paths in Russia, which in the longer term deepens their susceptibility to Russian narratives. Under conditions of advanced integration with the Russian Federation, continued isolation may paradoxically accelerate the absorption of the state by Moscow.     

It is important that the main opposition centers are not in conflict. In February 2026, Tsikhanouskaya and her associates met with Kalesnikava and Babaryka, confirming the convergence of their goals: the release of political prisoners, an end to repression, support for civil society, and a drive toward systemic change. Kalesnikava’s statements about the need to resume dialogue with Lukashenko should be interpreted not as an attempt to legitimize the regime, but as an instrument for limiting Russian influence — seen as a direct threat to regional security, including Poland’s. 

Is Lithuania closing while Poland wants to open?

Lithuania is tightening measures against Belarus after a series of airspace violations. Between 21st and 26th October 2025, airports in Vilnius and Kaunas were temporarily shut down four times after balloons used by Belarus for smuggling were detected. The most serious incident occurred on the night of 25th and 26th October, when around 25 objects forced a complete suspension of air traffic, the cancellation of 30 flights, and disruption for nearly 6,000 passengers. The government in Vilnius treated this as a hybrid action and immediately announced the indefinite closure of the border crossings at Medininkai and Šalčininkai, allowing only diplomatic traffic and the return of EU citizens. The other two points — Lavoriškės and Raigardas — have remained closed since 2023, which means the border with Belarus has in practice been fully sealed off.   

In response, Minsk introduced a ban on Lithuanian carriers transiting through Belarusian territory and seized Lithuanian trucks. Vilnius says that Belarus is holding about 280 vehicles. The release of those trucks and their return to Lithuanian territory is one of Lithuania’s conditions for beginning talks with Lukashenko.

The issue was brought to the EU level. In the European Union statement, Member States condemned Belarus’s persistent and provocative actions. However, due to Hungary’s opposition, the final version of the communiqué removed the wording indicating the regime’s shared responsibility — both direct and resulting from deliberate inaction. This shows that even in the face of fairly ostentatious violations on the eastern flank, Brussels still lacks a unified approach and a single state can block a statement.    

Lithuania closed all remaining border crossings with Belarus „for an indefinite period.” Since then, only the crossings at Medininkai and Šalčininkai have been reopened. At the same time, Poland opened two crossings in November — at Bobrowniki and Kuźnica. 

The view from Warsaw and the eastern flank

The debate on reopening should sound particularly loudly in Poland today. In response to the Zapad 2025 exercises, Warsaw temporarily closed its land border crossings with Belarus, causing significant disruptions to Eurasian supply chains. On 23 September 2025, in accordance with a decision taken even before the incident involving the penetration of Polish airspace by Russian drones, the crossings were reopened. This move confirms that the closure had the character of an ad hoc security measure rather than a permanent blockade.  

Noteworthy are reports that Belarusian services warned Poland about the approaching drones, which enabled a faster and better coordinated response. This gesture can be interpreted as a signal of Minsk’s interest in de-escalation and in maintaining working channels of communication. However, an alternative interpretation cannot be ruled out — namely, a reconnaissance move designed to prompt Warsaw to activate air defense systems near the border and reveal radar parameters and response procedures. In conditions of hybrid confrontation, even seemingly cooperative actions may contain an intelligence component.  

Washington’s current policy toward Minsk is clearly transactional. If political calculations in the White House change — for example, if Donald Trump concludes that rapprochement with Lukashenko does not support the broader goal of dialogue with Moscow — the current thaw could be quickly frozen. The absence of a clearly defined long-term strategy on the US side increases uncertainty and undermines the durability of the process, which justifies a high level of caution on the part of regional states. 

After the 2020 post-election crisis, Poland together with the Baltic states gained significant influence over the shape of EU policy toward Belarus. Any initiatives for limited thaw should emerge from this group and obtain its approval, since these are the states bearing the greatest security costs. Under these conditions, Warsaw faces a strategic choice: maintain a hard line of isolation or cautiously test a path of partial détente. At stake are the stability of the region and the prospect of preserving Belarus’s residual sovereignty.  

Following the diplomatic success of securing the release of Andrzej Poczobut after more than 1,800 days in detention, one of the main political barriers to opening dialogue has been removed. In the short term, a limited revival of contacts is possible, focused on practical issues — transit, border stabilization, and de-escalation — while maintaining a high level of mistrust stemming from experience with hybrid actions and Minsk’s close cooperation with Russia.

Poczobut’s release does not, however, alter the structural conditions: Belarus remains deeply dependent on Moscow, which limits the prospect of full normalization. For Minsk, this is part of a game aimed at easing sanctions and increasing autonomy; for Poland, it is a moment of choice between continuing isolation and testing limited dialogue. Any opening will be controlled and transactional — it will not bring a breakthrough, but it will make it possible to manage tensions and try to curb destabilizing actions.   

The process of talks between Warsaw and Minsk will be complex, but under current conditions it is increasingly likely. The risks are known, the potential benefits limited. Without a coherent long-term strategy, however, Poland remains exposed to a recurring cycle of short-lived thaws and subsequent disappointment with Lukashenko’s policy. 

Written by: dr Aleksander Olech, Patryk Jagnieża, Leon Pińczak