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Poland in NB8? A chance to redefine Northern Policy and strengthen NATO’s North-Eastern Flank

Photo. Freepik.com

Should Poland aim for permanent participation in the NB8 format, which brings together the Nordic and Baltic states? In today’s shifting European security landscape, this is no longer an abstract question. It represents a tangible geostrategic choice, one that could reposition Polish diplomacy from a primarily Central European focus to a fully-fledged role within the northern security architecture.

Lieutenant General (ret.) Dr Jarosław Gromadziński, President, Defence Institute\Dr Michał Zgórzak, COO, Defence Institute, Dr Aleksander Olech, Expert, Defence Institute

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Introduction: The Origins of the NB8 Format

The NB8 (Nordic-Baltic Eight) was established in the 1990s, when the Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—began deepening cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. After 2004, the format gained cohesion and strategic significance, particularly following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale war in 2022.

Experts have noted that the countries in the region are naturally predisposed to cooperate in areas such as security, energy, and emerging technologies, and view the NB8 as a laboratory for integration that has produced one of Europe’s most effective models of regional cooperation.

Poland has long engaged in NB8 through the „NB8+” framework, attending ministerial meetings, political consultations, and sectoral initiatives. Since 2022, these interactions have intensified, particularly in the areas of Baltic security and coordination of responses to Russian threats.

NB8 in the New European Security Architecture

With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Northern region now falls entirely under the Alliance’s protective umbrella. Analysts highlight that the Baltic Sea has become one of NATO’s most strategic waters, with the full Alliance present along all its shores, closing a major regional security gap from the Arctic to the Carpathians.

Poland, as the largest military power in this part of Europe, has emerged as a key pillar of the new north-eastern flank, effectively serving as the primary strategic operator on NATO’s eastern flank and a natural link between the Baltic and Central Europe. From this perspective, Poland’s permanent participation in NB8 would not be revolutionary but rather a logical response to evolving geopolitical realities.

Military Benefits: Collective Defence of Air, Sea, and Critical Infrastructur

1. Integrated Air Defence and Command of Air Operations

The Nordic states have developed the most advanced regional air defence network in Northern Europe, featuring long- and medium-range radars capable of detecting aircraft, ballistic missiles, and drones over 600 km, integrated surface-to-air missile systems, Air Operations Centres coordinating real-time air movements, and airborne ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) platforms, with all data centralised in command centres.

This sophisticated architecture ensures full interoperability with NORDEFCO and NATO systems, allowing for immediate responses to aerial or hybrid threats. Real-time data sharing encompasses information on detected air and maritime targets, warnings of potential missile or hybrid attacks, intelligence and analytic data from multiple sources, and coordination during exercises and threat simulations.

For Poland, joining NB8 would integrate national systems such as Pilica, Narew, and Patriot into this regional network. Acting as the southern hub, Poland could connect the Baltic with Central Europe, generating a shared regional situational map, reducing reaction times to aerial attacks to mere minutes, and enhancing protection of military bases, ports, and critical infrastructure. Analysts estimate that such integration increases detectability of aerial targets by 50–60% and enables faster responses to both military and hybrid threats.

2. Baltic Sea Security

The Baltic region hosts critical energy and telecommunications infrastructure. In 2022 and 2023, a series of unexplained damages affected undersea cables linking Finland, Estonia, and Sweden, prompting investigations by regional security agencies and NATO into potential foreign submarine activity. These incidents underscored the need to treat underwater infrastructure security with the same priority as territorial defence.

Polish ports, handling over 130 million tonnes of cargo annually, are vital NATO logistics hubs. Joint NB8 efforts could establish a maritime infrastructure protection system, incorporating sonar patrols, data sharing, exercises, and fleet coordination.

3. NATO Planning Cohesion and Regional Command Responsibility

Under NATO’s New Force Model, NB8 states and Poland exist within a single operational corridor, but the Baltic Sea’s division between two Joint Force Commands—Norfolk and Brunssum—creates coordination challenges. Some Baltic states report to Norfolk, others to Brunssum, leading to redundancy and slower decision-making in critical situations.

Experts recommend consolidating the entire Baltic under a single command, ideally JFC Brunssum, which would allow faster responses to incidents, unified defence planning for the Baltic states and Poland, and improved interoperability with NORDEFCO forces and Polish land and air units.

Economic Benefits: Innovation, Energy, Logistics

1. Poland in the Nordic Innovation Sphere

NB8 economies collectively exceed $2 trillion. Analysts emphasize that the region combines high innovation with resilient economic structures, ranking consistently among global innovation leaders. Poland already benefits from Nordic investment, with over PLN 25 billion in investment value, employment for 150,000 people by Nordic firms, and annual technology investment growth of 8–12%.

2. Energy and Climate Transition

Poland collaborates with Norway on gas infrastructure and with Finland and Sweden on nuclear and offshore energy projects. With renewable energy shares in Sweden and Finland reaching 40–55%, the region serves as a benchmark for Poland’s own energy transition. Analysts highlight that the Nordic region functions as a stabiliser for Europe’s energy supply, offering Poland diversification and reliability.

3. Infrastructure and Logistics

Trade with Nordic and Baltic states is growing at approximately 9% per year, with Gdańsk emerging as one of Europe’s fastest-growing ports. NB8 as a platform for economic cooperation could accelerate development of Rail Baltica, Via Baltica, maritime connections with Finland and Sweden, and cooperation among Baltic ports.

Political Benefits: A New Direction for Polish Diplomacy

1. Joining the EU’s Most Cohesive Bloc

NB8 represents a group of states with highly aligned interests in energy, digitalisation, defence, Baltic security, and resilience. Within the EU, NB8 collectively holds 26 votes—more than the Visegrád Group—and is regarded as a stable and predictable bloc. Poland has the potential to become an equal partner to these Nordic states, requiring only a strategic reorientation toward Northern Europe.

2. Strengthening Policy Towards Russia

The NB8 environment has consistently provided warnings against Russian militarism. Northern European experts emphasise that, in the region, hard capabilities and collective deterrence are valued over political illusions regarding Russia. Deepening Poland’s cooperation with NB8 would reinforce its standing in the EU as a competent security actor on the eastern flank.

3. Repositioning Poland in the Region

Permanent NB8 participation would shift Poland’s foreign policy focus from Central to Northern Europe, aligning it with stable, innovative, and strategically oriented states and strengthening its diplomatic and security profile in the wider region.

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Bibliography

Documents and Reports

  1. NB8 Wise Men Report. (2010).The Nordic-Baltic region in the EU 2020.
  2. NATO. (2023).Annual report 2023. NATO.
  3. Nordic Council of Ministers. (2022).Annual report 2022. Nordic Council of Ministers.
  4. Baltic Assembly. (2023).Annual report 2023. Baltic Assembly.
  5. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). (2022).Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. FOI.
  6. Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). (2023).Northern European security after 2022. FIIA.
  7. Institute for Defence and Security Studies (ICDS) Tallinn. (2023).The security of the Baltic Sea region. ICDS.
  8. RAND Corporation. (2022).Reinforcing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. RAND Corporation.
  9. German Marshall Fund (GMF). (2023).Poland in a new European security architecture. GMF.
  10. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). (2022–2024).Analyses. OSW.

Press and Media

  1. Rzeczpospolita. (2016–2024). Analyses on Nordic and Baltic policy.Rzeczpospolita;
  2. The Economist. (2023).The new Northern power axis. The Economist;
  3. Financial Times. (2022–2024). Articles on submarine infrastructure.Financial Times;
  4. Foreign Affairs. (2022).The rise of the Northern flank.Foreign Affairs;
  5. Politico Europe. (2023–2024). Analyses.Politico Europe.

Books and Literature

  1. Wivel, A., & Olesen, P. (2017).The Nordic countries and the European security architecture. Oxford University Press;
  2. Jakobsen, M. (2020).Nordic-Baltic security in the 21st century. Copenhagen: Copenhagen University Press;
  3. Rostoks, T., & Sprūds, A. (Eds.). (2018).The Nordic-Baltic region in the EU. Riga: University of Latvia Press.
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