Russia’s energy revenues rise despite sanctions

According to the latest data from CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air), in February 2026 Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues increased by approximately 7% month-on-month, reaching an average of EUR 492 million per day. Notably, this growth was largely driven by higher revenues from seaborne crude oil exports, while export volumes increased only marginally. At the same time, a portion of Russian crude, estimated at around 6.9 million tonnes, remained at sea without a known buyer. This highlights Russia’s ability to sustain exports despite existing restrictions.

Who buys Russian fossil fuels?

The report shows that the structure of buyers of Russian energy commodities remains highly concentrated. China is the largest importer, accounting for more than half of Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues among key buyers. Other major trading partners include Türkiye and India. Despite a decline in India’s imports of Russian crude in February, Russia remains its largest supplier.

The authors also emphasise that tensions in the Strait of Hormuz may paradoxically increase the importance of Russian supplies for some Asian countries. Disruptions to oil flows from Gulf states may push importers, particularly in Asia, to seek alternative sources, which could, to some extent, benefit Russian exports.

At the same time, the report notes that for the European Union, the current energy crisis may serve as an impetus to further accelerate investment in renewable energy and deepen efforts to reduce dependence on Russian resources. If European countries maintain this momentum, current tensions could, in the long term, paradoxically work to Europe’s advantage, despite ongoing turbulence in energy markets.

The "shadow fleet" and what to do about it?

The report also highlights the growing role of the so-called „shadow fleet,” a network of tankers operating outside the sanctions regime. In February 2026, more than half of Russia’s seaborne oil exports were transported by vessels either under sanctions or operating in the grey zone. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of mechanisms such as the G7 price cap, allowing Russia to maintain substantial export volumes and revenues.

But the European countries have tools to exert greater influence over the shadow fleet. First, Europe should make better use of international cooperation and legal frameworks, for instance by forming coalitions capable of monitoring and enforcing sanctions against vessels involved in illicit transport of Russian oil.

International legal instruments such as UNCLOS, as well as conventions like MARPOL and SOLAS, are also critical, as they can provide a basis for inspecting vessels suspected of violating safety or environmental regulations while transiting key maritime chokepoints.

These measures could be complemented by stricter economic sanctions, denial of access to ports and maritime services, and tighter procedures for verifying vessel identity and insurance. In more extreme cases, states may also resort to operational measures, such as vessel interdictions, detention of crews, or even sabotage operations and strikes against infrastructure supporting the shadow fleet.

The limited effectiveness of Western sanctions

The data indicate that despite sanctions, Russia remains capable of generating substantial revenues from energy exports. In practice, this means that Russia’s economy continues to support its war effort. A key issue is that a number of states and private companies continue to purchase Russian energy resources, indirectly sustaining Russia’s wartime economy.

This underscores the limited effectiveness of current sanctions policy. More than four years have passed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, and nearly twelve years since Russia’s aggression in Crimea and Donbas. Despite declared unity among European states and successive sanctions packages, Russia continues to maintain significant levels of energy exports.

In this context, it makes little difference whether Russian energy is imported by public or private actors. In both cases, it perpetuates dependence on Russian fossil fuels and ensures a continued flow of financial resources into the Russian economy. As a result, European sanctions policy remains partially inconsistent and strategically underdeveloped, as restrictions have not translated into a meaningful reduction in demand for Russian energy.

Authors: Karolina Kisiel and Dr. Aleksander Olech