Spy in the Polish Ministry of Defence

 As it turned out, the suspect was a middle-level employee of a key unit – the Department of Strategy and Defence Planning. This department is responsible for creating the strategic and most important documents for national security, such as the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, the Political-Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland or Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland.

The civil servant had been under surveillance by Polish counterintelligence services for several months, during which time investigators gathered evidence suggesting involvement in espionage activities. Currently this case is being handled by the Military Counterintelligence Service - SKW (Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego) which cooperated with the Military Department of the National Prosecutor’s Office and the Military Police during the arrest. As for now this man is being questioned by the eighth military department of the District Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw.

On Tuesday, he was charged under Article 130(2) of the Criminal Code which concerns espionage for a foreign intelligence service. Prosecutors have also filed a motion requesting that the suspect be held in custody for three months. Most details of the investigation remain classified. This offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of between eight years and life.

The court has ordered three months« pre-trial detention for the Ministry of National Defence employee suspected of cooperating with foreign intelligence services. He was detained on February 3 on the order of the prosecutor’s office following actions and findings by the Military Counterintelligence Service.

Undoubtedly, the discovery of a spy in such a crucial ministry is an unparalleled event, however, it is not entirely without precedent. Worth to mention the case of Tomasz L. from the Registry Office (Urząd Stanu Cywilnego) who from around 2017 to 2022, collaborated with Russian intelligence services, using his access to official documents.

It was also reported that suspect spent his recent holiday in Belarus which creates the additional security concerns especially taking into consideration the fact that civilian employees from Ministry of Defence do not have to notify the ministry about their travel destinations in advance.

The presence of an alleged spy within a ministry critical to national security clearly demonstrates the need for robust counterintelligence capabilities in Poland. These efforts should encompass not only senior officials, but also civil servants at all levels, including management personnel and decision‑makers with access to information sensitive to state security.

In recent time Russia changed its modus operandi to hybrid attacks in Poland. This shift involves reducing the use of professional intelligence officers – often operating under diplomatic cover – in favour of „proxy” or „disposable” agents. These individuals frequently have criminal backgrounds and are primarily motivated by financial gain, even when the compensation offered is relatively modes.