“Transnistria in the EU.” Reintegration or war? [ANALYSIS]

Nicușor Dan, the President of Romania, said that “it can be done with Transnistria, with a status similar to Gagauzia, which enjoys relative autonomy. Transnistria, within an agreed system, may have the same. The EU border will run with these two autonomous regions.“ His words were cited by Ukrainska Pravda. Dan added that the most important development was the parliamentary victory of the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), because had the pro-Russian option won, “it would have ended up like in Georgia – the accession process would have been frozen.“ He also stated that the Russian contingent in Transnistria poses a threat to Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania.

On September 28, parliamentary elections were held in Moldova. In the end, the pro-European PAS secured over 50 percent and will govern alone, winning more than 50 seats in the 100-seat parliament. A surprise came from the Romanian nationalist party Democracy at Home, which seeks Moldova’s unification with its motherland. Second place went to the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP) of former president Igor Dodon – 24.2 percent of the vote. Third place was taken by the “chameleon“ party – declaring itself pro-European while simultaneously pro-Russian – the Political Bloc Alternative (8 percent of the vote).   

Also entering parliament was the anti-European Our Party, winning 6.2 percent. Russian influence networks attempted to undermine support for PAS. The Russian disinformation campaign – according to the Centre for Eastern Studies – cost around 300 million euros. For this reason, some pro-Russian groups were barred from the election. Interestingly, the Kremlin suffered a double defeat: Moldova is suffering economically due to Moscow’s actions via Transnistria. Critical infrastructure remains in the hands of pro-Russian separatists, leading to an “energy punishment“ for Moldova’s pro-European course. Household gas prices quadrupled – from 4.5 to about 16.74 lei. Yet higher living costs did not stop Moldovans from voting against Moscow.      

With President Maia Sandu, a pro-European leader, now in a stable position to continue her country’s EU accession process, and with Moldova avoiding falling into Russia’s sphere of influence, very serious questions arise about Transnistria’s future. We must remember that it is an integral part of Moldova. This means that the country’s potential EU accession includes Transnistria (unless, through armed action, separatists prevent it). This separatist republic plays the same role as other Kremlin-installed entities: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or the former so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. 

Since February 24, 2022, media frequently have raised the question: will pro-Russian forces in Transnistria strike Moldova and open another front near Ukraine? But first, let us ask – what exactly is Transnistria? The so-called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic is a para-state with its capital in Tiraspol, encompassing territories on the left bank of the Dniester and the right-bank city of Bender. It is home to over 400,000 people. 

Transnistria broke away from Moldova on September 2, 1990, declaring its wish to remain within the collapsing Soviet Union. Moldova had left several months earlier, on June 23. It declared independence on December 5, 1990. Internationally, Transnistria is recognized as an autonomous region of Moldova, an integral part of the country. Separatist authorities consider it an independent state, though it is not recognized as such. They also organize sham referenda and elections that are not recognized internationally.    

The current situation stems from the now-forgotten armed conflict that lasted from December 1991 to July 1992. At that time, the government in Chișinău, refusing to accept separatist actions in Transnistria, attempted to restore territorial integrity. The key battles of the 1992 war were over Dubăsari and Bender – but Moldova failed to defeat Transnistrian forces. The separatists were ultimately saved by the intervention of the 14th Soviet Army – later Russian. The ceasefire was dictated by Russia in July 1992. Several hundred people were killed in the fighting. The Transnistrian project is deeply tied to an older generation of Soviet-Russian elites linked to the military and industry, unwilling to accept the geopolitical and systemic changes in Eastern Europe. They went to war against the Moldovan elite seeking independence. In Soviet times, Moscow distrusted Moldovans, staffing key positions with Russian-speaking communists. The Transnistrian project mirrors other Kremlin proxy conflicts, where separatist enclaves were used to block countries in the former Soviet sphere from joining Western structures. 

Ties to Russia and nostalgia for Soviet times are the very foundation of Transnistria. This is visible even on its flag, dominated by red and still bearing the hammer and sickle.

Moldovan War?

Transnistria’s military potential would be crushed in a Moldovan-Ukrainian coalition. However, the pro-European government does not speak of military steps but of peaceful reintegration. Still, let us consider the scenario of a military provocation from Transnistria. Do they have the capacity? The Transnistrian Armed Forces are estimated at 5,000 soldiers. The separatist republic is said to have 20,000 reservists. The military falls under the Ministry of Defense. The separatist forces were formally created on September 6, 1991, when the so-called Supreme Council of Transnistria passed a resolution calling for the creation of a Transnistrian military unit. This led to the formation of the Transnistrian Republican Guard – modeled on Moldova’s Republican Guard. This unit pushed back Moldovan forces at Dubăsari. A People’s Militia was also formed, armed and supported by the Russian army.         

By the end of 1992, all major structures of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff were created, including units, government agencies, and services. On March 14, 1993, Transnistrian troops swore allegiance to the separatist para-state.

Transnistrian forces are equipped with Soviet-era hardware. Infantry fighting vehicles include BMP-1s and BMP-2s, which have been in service for decades. Armored personnel carriers include BTRs, as well as over 70 vehicles such as MT-LBs. Trucks are Soviet-era Ural-375s, GAZ-66s, and ZIL-131s. Following the Soviet-Russian model, rocket artillery plays an important role, compensating for limited conventional artillery. Rocket systems include the Grad, some mounted on ZIL-131 trucks. Transnistria even has a domestic rocket launcher industry, producing Pribor-1 and Pribor-2 systems, both 122 mm. Since 2019, Transnistria has had a small drone industry producing reconnaissance UAVs for the army. These were used together with Pribor-2 rocket systems in exercises that improved strike accuracy using drones. Interestingly, Transnistria possesses a dozen T-64BV tanks and Mi-8 Mi-17 helicopters.         

Russian troops are also stationed in Transnistria. Moldova protests this, viewing the Russian mission as an illegal violation of its territory. Russian soldiers are based in Cobasna. Around 2,000 are believed to be stationed there (though estimates vary).  

The armed forces of Transnistria are formally commanded by the president of the unrecognized entity, elected in falsified elections, who also serves as commander-in-chief. The defense minister and chief of the general staff hold senior military posts. 

Transnistria’s forces include: the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Brigade in Tiraspol, the 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade in Bender, and the 3rd and 4th Motor Rifle Brigades in Rîbnița and Dubăsari. They also have a tank battalion, artillery regiment, air defense regiment, special forces battalion, counterintelligence battalion, intelligence service, and their own airborne unit. Representational functions are performed by the Honor Guard and the General Staff band. Transnistria places great emphasis on youth militarization, not only through the Military Institute of National Defense cadet program but also through numerous military-propaganda activities in schools.   

Talk of a possible strike from Transnistria grew louder when Russian defeats near Kyiv and Mykolaiv led to speculation about a diversionary attack to distract Ukrainian and Western forces – creating a war on NATO’s eastern flank involving Ukraine and Moldova. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova are estimated at 7,000 soldiers, with the capacity to mobilize 70,000 reservists. Numbers alone show that a Transnistrian strike would be madness. Moldova has set its course westward, cooperating closely with NATO. Thus, on a micro scale, behind Ukraine’s defensive front, a geopolitical conflict unfolds – one scripted by Russia. This means unusually high Russian activity in Transnistria.   

Vadym Skibitsky, a representative of Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR), stated in 2022: „Thirty years ago, the Russian Federation occupied the territory of Transnistria. Every year, mobilization exercises are held there with the Russian operational group stationed on this territory. The maneuvers train defensive and counter-offensive actions using ammunition from depots in Cobasna. Some ammunition is used for training, some, according to Ukrainian intelligence, for smuggling. A serious struggle is now taking place in Transnistria between state officials and Russia’s special services, which are very active. The terrorist acts committed on the territory of the »Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic« were meant to force local authorities to agree to an expanded Russian military presence and (…) to signal the leaders of the Republic of Moldova to abandon pro-European policies. (…) According to our data, everything happening now in Transnistria is under FSB control.”    

Reintegration?

Between April 25 and 27, 2022, incidents occurred in the region. The Ministry of Security in Tiraspol was shelled, and two radio masts were blown up. These mysterious explosions are linked to Russia’s attempts to provoke escalation. Transnistria is ruled by a nomenklatura rooted in the special services, engaging in smuggling and the grey economy – including illegal arms trafficking.  

For the Russian Federation to directly transfer troops into Transnistria, it would need to break through a land corridor beyond the Dnieper (which failed in 2022), or attempt a suicidal airborne raid akin to the Homiel landing. What does this mean? That Transnistria is weakening. Militarily, it is isolated and would stand no chance in a real war. This should sober up the pro-Russian clique ruling the enclave: reintegration offers a chance at normalization.   

„We have already prepared a plan on how to integrate this region, how to start paying salaries there, and they know about this plan. It is a government project we are now discussing. It is called the »Plan for the Reintegration of the Transnistrian Region.« We understand that reintegrating Transnistria into Moldova will be very costly, so we must calculate these expenses and determine the sources of funding. But if all goes well in the elections, changes in the Transnistrian region will happen very quickly,” said PAS deputy Ina Kosher in an interview with Ukrainian media.