U.S. Troops from Germany to Poland: Now or never [OPINION]

After President Donald Trump declared that he was “considering” reducing the number of troops in Germany, the Pentagon quickly issued a statement announcing the withdrawal of 5,000 soldiers. Media reports, including from Reuters, suggest this may involve the withdrawal of one U.S. Army brigade combat team, numbering around 4,000 soldiers, as well as the suspension of the planned deployment to the United States of other units, including a strike battalion equipped with Tomahawk missile launchers and hypersonic weapons.

It is not entirely clear which Army brigade would be withdrawn. There are two possibilities. One would be halting the rotation of armored brigades, conducted since 2022 on the basis of continuous presence — similar rotations have been conducted in Poland since 2017. The other would be the withdrawal of the permanently stationed 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Vilseck, Bavaria. That unit is equipped with upgraded Stryker armored vehicles and provides most, though not all, of the rotations for battalion battle groups in Poland.   

As for the U.S. military presence in Poland, shortly before the Defence24 Days conference began, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz told Defence24 in the first episode of the program “Behind the Scenes of Power. Politics”: “For months I have been working on an even larger U.S. military contingent in Poland. That is my goal. Poland began working earlier on increasing the presence of American troops in Poland.” He thus confirmed that Poland has guarantees regarding the maintenance of the U.S. military presence and is working on options to expand it.    

But what could such an increase look like in practice? Contrary to appearances, from a purely operational perspective there are at least several factors indicating that it is possible.

The Chief of the General Staff, General Wiesław Kukuła, spoke to Defence24.pl about what form an increased U.S. presence might take. The general recalled that Poland makes a substantial financial contribution to providing infrastructure for U.S. forces, something viewed favorably by the U.S. authorities and by the president himself. He said that the American presence had been based mainly on rotational activities by “a large group of forces.” 

These people, these American soldiers, come to Poland the way we go on a mission. I think the time has seriously come for us to begin building the conditions and capabilities for U.S. forces to settle here permanently. — Chief of the General Staff, General Wiesław Kukuła, speaking to Defence24

U.S. Forces in Poland — Permanent or Rotational?

There are, of course, certain permanent NATO and U.S. military installations in Poland, including those launched in recent years, such as the Army Prepositioned Stock facility in Powidz, the forward headquarters of V Corps, and the base in Redzikowo. Most units, however, including combat formations — especially armored brigades with Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and supporting equipment in the Żagań area, Army aviation brigades with Apache, Black Hawk, and Chinook helicopters, and, in recent years, infantry brigades — are rotational.

Continuous rotational presence has strengthened the defence potential of Poland and NATO, but it also has drawbacks. In short, it places a heavy burden on the forces involved. It is assumed that fielding one brigade in practice places a burden on three: one is in the area of operations at any given time, one is preparing for the next rotation, and one is restoring readiness. There is little time left for scheduled training, modernization, or even soldiers’ rest with their families after deployments. This negatively affects readiness. In some respects — with many differences regarding the nature of the missions, to the disadvantage of Polish troops — it is somewhat similar to the situation of Polish soldiers who remain continuously engaged, despite a radical decrease in the number of incidents, on the border with Belarus. But that is a subject for another article.     

In the case of the United States, the burden of continuous presence particularly affects armored brigades. There are several reasons for this. First, the Americans are currently rotating as many as three such units on a continuous basis: two to Europe — one to Poland since 2017 and one to Germany since 2022 — and one to the Middle East. In total, the active U.S. Army has eleven armored brigades, while the National Guard has another five. It is clear that, de facto, most of NATO’s armored forces are constantly involved in rotations. Second, this is compounded by the specific nature of armored brigades. Their deployment takes relatively long, increasing the need to commit soldiers.     

U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Ryan C. Van Wie wrote about the details in an article recently published by Army University Press. The author argued for ending armored brigade rotations to Europe and forming one permanently stationed brigade — either in Poland or Germany. It is obvious that, from our perspective, permanent deployment in Poland would be the better solution. 

Now or never

For that, however, in addition to a political decision, people, equipment, and infrastructure are needed. Paradoxically, these three elements may be available as never before. The U.S. Army has overcome its recruitment crisis and plans to increase its manpower, so there is a basis for forming a new unit. Moreover, if the 2nd Cavalry Regiment equipped with Stryker armored personnel carriers were withdrawn from Vilseck, an armored brigade could be formed on the basis of its personnel. This would avoid transferring entire existing formations from the United States. The latter option, for economic reasons, would encounter resistance in Congress. It should be added that the defense leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate criticized the very idea of withdrawing troops from Germany, but showed openness to moving some of them eastward.     

It would also be relatively easy to provide equipment for the new brigade. Under the new assumptions of U.S. defence policy, three of the National Guard’s five armored brigades, including the 278th Cavalry Regiment, which currently operates the latest M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, are to be transformed into mobile light infantry units. The new unit could therefore receive equipment from the U.S. Army pool. The same applies to part of the personnel, since not all armored troops may wish to retrain as light infantry. Infrastructure, meanwhile, must be provided by the Polish side. Some foundations already exist, because what has already been built in Poland for rotationally based units would need to be expanded, including family housing, workshops, and storage facilities of the required level. 

The most likely candidate for permanent stationing in Poland is therefore an armored brigade, with around 80 Abrams tanks, around 125 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and support vehicles. This is important because equipment for such a unit is already stored in Powidz. There is therefore the possibility of additionally increasing U.S. armored forces in Poland, should the need arise, without the temporary deployment of troops. Moreover, Poland — specifically the 18th Mechanized Division — is the largest Abrams tank user in NATO outside the United States, which ensures interoperability.   

It is also possible that, in the longer term, an Army aviation brigade could be moved to Poland from Katterbach, Germany. In the new U.S. Army structure, maintaining continuous rotations of Apache helicopter units — conducted to Powidz since 2017 — may prove more difficult than before, and in the long term a permanent presence would be more advantageous. But that is a matter for the future; today, future Polish Apache pilots are training at its base. Similarly, the possible deployment of other forces in Poland, such as a short-range air defense artillery battalion, is also a matter for the future.  

This was addressed in the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, on expanded defense cooperation between Poland and the United States, signed in August 2020, already in its original wording. And again: two air defence units were formed in Germany, respectively in 2018 — the 5-4 battalion — and in 2023 — the 1-57 battalion; part of the 1-57 battalion is also stationed in Italy. If appropriate infrastructure were introduced and a decision were made — preferably alongside the modernization of these units — part of them could be moved. The catalogue of units is therefore not closed. Apart from an armored brigade, it concerns formations usually numbering several hundred soldiers, with the exception of the aforementioned 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and these are generally U.S. Army formations. This is because infrastructure for land forces is already being created and needs “only” — though this is no small matter — to be expanded.      

A possible permanent U.S. military presence in Poland may therefore be more or less indirectly linked to a reduction of their presence in Germany. This primarily concerns combat units, and it will not mean a withdrawal from the territory of our western neighbors, because today most of the approximately 35,000 soldiers there are logistics, support, command, and medical-security elements. The overwhelming majority of these are likely to remain in Germany, because otherwise the Americans would be unable to conduct operations, for example in the Middle East. 

Of course, the relocation of troops is above all a political decision, but there are many circumstances related to the restructuring of the U.S. Army itself that favor it. On the other hand, after a decade of continuous rotational presence, from the perspective of the U.S. Army itself a change in its formula is increasingly desirable, because it is difficult to expect “mission-style” deployments in Poland that burden U.S. Army structures to continue for decades.

So, as the title of the article asks: now or never? Developing a political solution to build a permanent presence in Poland is currently a necessity, because many of the military elements are more available than before. One thing is certain: regardless of transatlantic turbulence, the physical presence of U.S. troops remains one of the key factors deterring aggression against Polish territory and, more broadly, NATO’s eastern flank.