Will wind turbines obscure nuclear tests? What is MASINT

The British Ministry of Defence is said to be reluctant to the construction of new wind turbines in one part of Scotland (the location is important because of the specific legal status of the entire investment), more precisely, in the Borders, as Lucy Jackson indicated in her article.  However, this is not about ecology or the efficiency of these energy sources, but about the potential intelligence capabilities of the state. There are concerns that new wind installations being built in the protective zone of the Eskdalemuir seismic monitoring station (the disputed issue is a 50 km protective zone and a 10 km exclusion) would be too close to important seismic sensors. As emphasized in the Scottish media, which covered the whole affair (its origins span a longer period), we are talking about the United Kingdom’s single installation dedicated to detecting nuclear tests worldwide.

Lucy Jackson also noted (article titledMinistry of Defence objects to wind farm over national security concerns, published 22nd January 2026) that: - in its objection the Ministry of Defence stated that the proposals would have an „uncontrolled impact on the operation and performance of the Eskdalemuir seismological measurement station”, including a „detrimental effect on radar systems used for air traffic management”, as well as on military training and air traffic control tasks (the farm would affect low-altitude flights of British military aircraft operating in the region).

States quietly develop MASINT capabilities

Aside from air traffic control tasks and military training, of course the most interesting issue is the thread concerning the impact of modern wind farms on delicate seismic instruments. Importantly, the base at Eskdalemuir (Eskdalemuir Seismological Array) functions as a kind of ear not only for the United Kingdom itself, but also within the framework of international cooperation. Hence, the siting of new turbines could also strike at international obligations. The investor reportedly does not agree with the critical assessments of the local Ministry of Defence, stressing that, according to its analyses, there will be no impact on the nation’s security. The case itself is currently very interesting because it makes visible the issue of intelligence capabilities based on measurement and scientific sources, i.e. MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence).

For years MASINT has remained somewhat in the shadow of the HUMINT–SIGINT duo, which has become so popular that these concepts have appeared in discourse outside intelligence studies themselves (to say nothing of the debate around contemporary OSINT). Yet it is MASINT that plays a critical role in monitoring, for example, all the challenges arising from the development of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. Let us note that MASINT allows monitoring not only potential nuclear tests, but also analyses related to CBRN factors. We are speaking, for example, about collecting soil, water and air samples for examination. Note that in recent history there have been espionage scandals (even between friendly states) that consisted of counterintelligence detaining people collecting soil or water samples near important nuclear facilities. In the current international reality, states« MASINT capabilities are becoming crucial, for instance in discussions about possible additional states that would be able and willing to break limits in the realm of the prohibition on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as in the context of scenarios assuming a return to nuclear weapons testing by states that already possess them.    

Approaching MASINT systemically, it should be noted that it is a set of capabilities in areas such as: 

• acoustic intelligence/reconnaissance;
• nuclear intelligence/reconnaissance;
• biological and chemical factor intelligence/reconnaissance;
• geophysical intelligence/reconnaissance;
• radar-based intelligence/reconnaissance;
• infrared-based intelligence/reconnaissance and optoelectronic intelligence/reconnaissance beyond the classical IMINT concept, particularly with regard to multispectral technologies.

Science accelerates MASINT capabilities

The literature on the subject shows a great diversity of typologies and approaches to ordering the space collectively referred to as MASINT](https://irp.fas.org/program/masint.htm). This most likely, as FAS pointed out, results from the fact that MASINT technologies are often both immature (presumably due to their dual-use nature and their discovery by intelligence services) and diverse. In any case, we are talking about an integral element supporting the armed forces and intelligence services in a modern state.

The United States« Defense Intelligence Agency has not hidden this; it even made available in open sources a simple diagram of MASINT’s significance MASINT](presentation here. It should be noted that in the case of the U.S. Intelligence Community it is difficult to point unequivocally to a single structure responsible for the entire MASINT spectrum; this also distorts the perception of the importance of these sources in contrast to HUMINT or SIGINT, and even IMINT  MASINT was present during the Cold War on both sides of the rivalry between the two ideological blocs, and today one can argue that it is gaining even more importance due to the natural development of science and analytical tools.

Consider, for example, not only the possibility of expanding networks of sensor bases, but also using mobile elements for this purpose, including unmanned systems. But most importantly, the digital revolution — especially when one thinks of computing power, big data analysis capabilities and the harnessing of broadly understood AI-supported solutions — further underpins many MASINT solutions. It is therefore not surprising that the British side is trying to limit the possibility of interference appearing at Eskdalemuir. Especially since as the British themselves pointed out last year](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-the-ministry-of-defences-approach-to-safeguarding-the-eskdalemuir-seismological-array/consultation-on-the-ministry-of-defences-approach-to-safeguarding-the-eskdalemuir-seismological-array) „it is a seismological monitoring station in the Southern Uplands of Scotland, established in 1962 to detect seismic signals originating from nuclear explosions. Continuous operation and safeguarding of the Array ensure that the United Kingdom fulfils its international obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).”

An important weapon in the hands of states

MASINT therefore constitutes an important weapon in acquiring information both about state targets and for the analysis of certain capabilities of non-state actors. It helps support the intelligence information cycle in political, scientific, technical and military dimensions. Yet MASINT is spoken of least. Presumably this is because it is closely tied to various highly advanced technologies and scientific domains, which cannot readily be packaged for popular culture. Returning to MASINT’s prospects, it is crucial in operations against heavily protected and counterintelligence-secured targets. An example might be the observation of the development of weapons-of-mass-destruction programs in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Due to North Korea’s socio-political specificity, classic agent-based sources on that state’s territory are highly problematic and difficult to maintain. At the same time, precise monitoring and assessment of the yield of nuclear test detonations remains important in the case of this newest nuclear-armed state. Importantly, secret nuclear armament programs are also most often tightly secured in terms of limiting information leakage through SIGINT instruments. Sources associated with MASINT must be applied, for example, with regard to Iran’s nuclear armaments program, which for years has attracted the attention of intelligence services not only from the Middle East region.

MASINT sources are also highly useful in all kinds of activities within international arms control systems and monitoring cases of their violation. Part of the activity using a diverse array of MASINT tools can be well camouflaged through certain possible correlations with the world of research and science. On the one hand, this provides appropriate cover stories; on the other, it offers a real opportunity to use the achievements of one’s own scientists also in the security and defence sphere — from disciplines that do not necessarily evoke, for example, classical defence. It should be stated plainly, however, that MASINT is effective when treated as a systemic element and supported by outputs from other sources. This recalls the importance of balanced investment in a state’s intelligence capabilities in the contemporary world. The wind turbines case in Scotland continues to engage experts and scientists (not to mention lawyers) on both sides of the dispute, but at the same time it forces a moment of reflection on MASINT. It also underlines that intelligence is an expensive tool, but investments in it can yield great savings and allow, for example, the development of a range of scientific capabilities and drive innovation.