Reform of the Polish Armed Forces. How to build an army capable of quick mobilisation?

Reform of the Polish Armed Forces: between numbers and real capabilities

This assumption was reflected in the Polish Armed Forces Development Programme to 2039, which envisages further numerical growth and the strengthening of the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces. According to the authors of this concept, this is a response to the experiences of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the deteriorating security environment in Europe.

However, such an ambitious goal leaves many questions regarding its practical implementation. The number of soldiers alone does not determine the strength of an army. Crucial factors also include: the level of training, equipment, combat readiness, infrastructure, the mobilisation system, human reserve resources, and the state’s capacity to wage a long-term war.

My opposition to the concept of maintaining 300,000 active-duty soldiers and 200,000 active reservists stems primarily from the conviction that the costs of maintaining such a large army in peacetime—including the costs of building and maintaining the necessary infrastructure—have not been properly calculated.

Under conditions of a progressing demographic crisis, limited personnel resources, and the rising costs of maintaining modern armed forces, a mere declaration of reaching a certain numerical strength does not solve the fundamental problem:

How to build a defence system capable not only of functioning in peacetime but, above all, of rapidly expanding its wartime potential in the event of a long-term conflict?

In my opinion, the answer requires a more precise, realistic, and economically sustainable model of military organisation.

A million soldiers for wartime – a concept for the 21st-century army

The new structure of the Polish Armed Forces I am proposing is based on an analysis of the experiences from the war in Ukraine, the state’s real financial capabilities, and unfavourable demographic trends.

Its starting point is the assumption that the size of the military cannot be an end in itself. The relationship between the costs of maintaining the army and the actual combat capabilities the state receives in return is of key importance.

In the proposed model, Poland would maintain approximately 200,000 operational force soldiers and around 50,000 soldiers of the Territorial Defence Forces (WOT) during peacetime.

At the same time, the entire system would be designed so that, in the event of war, it would be possible to rapidly expand the potential of the Polish Armed Forces to one million trained soldiers.

The core of this concept is a departure from thinking solely in terms of professional troop numbers and focusing instead on building an efficient mobilisation system, modern reserves, and varied levels of combat readiness.

Four pillars of the new Polish Armed Forces structure

I propose building the new structure of the Polish Armed Forces based on four essential components:

1. Rapid reaction forces
2. Reinforcement forces
3. Reserve army
4. Pro-defence organisation system

Each of the first three components would differ in their manning levels of professional soldiers and reservists, as well as the extent to which the active reserve is utilised.

Such a solution would allow the readiness level of individual units to be adapted to their operational tasks, while simultaneously limiting the costs of maintaining the entire Armed Forces at the highest level of readiness during peacetime.

Rapid reaction forces

The first component would consist of units deployed between the state’s eastern border and the Vistula River line. These units would be the ones to bear the initial brunt of any potential conflict.

These units should be equipped with the most modern military hardware, maintain the highest level of training, and have manning levels reaching at least 90 per cent of their authorised strength.

The remaining posts would be filled by active reserve soldiers permanently assigned to specific units.

In practice, I propose that this component include the 16th and 18th Divisions, as these are currently the best-manned and equipped tactical formations. Simultaneously, priority must be given to completing the formation and establishment of the 1st Division.

In this way, we would obtain a component consisting of three combined-arms divisions in high readiness to undertake combat operations.

Rapid Reaction Division instead of the 8th Division

In place of the currently unformed 8th Division, I propose the creation of a rapid reaction division, based on the existing 6th Airborne Brigade and the 25th Air Cavalry Brigade, supported by a land forces aviation brigade.

Within the rapid reaction division, a light, mobile rapid reaction brigade should also be formed, serving as its land-based, highly mobile element.

As a result of such a reorganisation, we would obtain a high-readiness component with significant combat potential: three combined-arms divisions supported by a rapid reaction division.

Such an arrangement would constitute a real and credible factor for the strategic deterrence of a potential adversary.

Reinforcement forces – the second level of combat readiness

Reinforcement forces would include all military units deployed in the belt between the Vistula line and our country’s western border.

I propose that these units be manned at a level of 50–60 per cent of authorised professional soldier strength during peacetime, which approximately corresponds to their current manning levels. The remainder of the personnel would consist of reservists.

I assume that after the call-up of reserves and the necessary combat integration training, these units should reach full operational capability within a period of 90–120 days.

These forces would primarily consist of the 12th and 11th Divisions.

At the same time, I see the need to introduce changes to the training system of these units. The goal should be to ensure a high level of real preparation for reserve soldiers and to maintain the ability to quickly restore full strength in the event of mobilisation.

Regular training of entire subunits

Reinforcement force units should be obliged to conduct cyclical training for entire subunits.

For example, battalion integration should take place every three years, while the integration of brigades within field exercises should also occur every three years.

This would allow for the systematic maintenance and verification of the actual combat capability of both individual subunits and entire tactical formations.

Such a model would reduce the costs of maintaining units in peacetime compared to high-readiness units, while retaining significant combat potential.

In a threat situation, these units could be expanded in a relatively short time to bolster the state’s main defensive forces.

Reserve army – how to build real reserves?

The third element of the proposed reform is a new approach to building and maintaining human reserve resources for the Polish Armed Forces.

I am convinced that, taking into account the experiences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, we should create a permanent structure of military units based on reserve soldiers.

Therefore, I propose the construction of reserve military units at all organisational levels – from platoon, company, and battalion, through to brigade, and up to division and even corps staffs.

These units should have their own numbers, a permanent organisational structure, and be permanently manned by reservists to a level of 100 per cent.

Regular exercises for reserve units

In addition to specialist training related to their assigned roles, soldiers of reserve units should participate in a tactical exercise of their unit at least once every 3–4 years.

This would allow not only for the maintenance of individual soldiers’ skills but, above all, for the preservation of the actual combat capability of entire subunits and reserve units.

Reserve Forces Command

To coordinate the organisation, registration, and training of reserve units, as well as to manage the reserve resources intended for replacing losses in operational units, I propose the establishment of a Reserve Forces Command.

This would be a specialised command integrating all issues related to the registration, preparation, and training of human reserves.

Such a solution would clarify responsibility for reserves and create a single, coherent system for planning their use, training, and replenishment.

Reserve training and the use of military infrastructure

Simultaneously, I recognise the need to reorganise training centres and proving grounds in the western part of the country to more effectively utilise existing infrastructure for reserve training.

Training within the framework of voluntary basic military service could also be concentrated in these same centres.

I further propose that high-readiness units should not be burdened with the day-to-day organisation and conduct of voluntary basic military service training. These units should concentrate their resources and efforts primarily on combat training and maintaining high operational readiness.

At the same time, I see the possibility of using reinforcement force units not only for training reserves for their own needs but also for participating in the training of reserve units created within the reserve forces.

This would allow for better utilisation of existing personnel potential, infrastructure, and the training base.

Such a solution would increase the throughput of the entire reserve training system while ensuring a more rational and economical use of available human, infrastructural, and training resources.

Pro-defence organisations – the social pillar of Poland's security

Building an efficient reserve system will not be possible without the appropriate social backing.

No reform of military structures will solve the problem of personnel shortages if it is not accompanied by the systematic preparation of citizens for service to the state’s security.

Therefore, the next element of the proposed model should be an expanded system of pro-defence organisations. Its goal would be not only to prepare society for potential military service but, above all, to build a culture of security, civic responsibility, and a positive attitude towards state service.

The system should be built according to the principle of “one standard, many environments” and include activities directed at various social groups – from school youth, through students and working professionals, to social organisations and local communities.

Its foundation should be voluntarism, attractiveness, and the opportunity to gain real competences useful both in the military and in the state’s entire security system.

Naturally, it will not be possible to build such a system without regular state funding based on transparent rules.

Pro-defence training for youth

An important element should also be the creation of opportunities for youth to voluntarily participate in pro-defence classes, conducted through cooperation between schools and pro-defence organisations.

Participants in such programmes should have the opportunity to gain specific qualifications that will facilitate their future entry into military service or service in other elements of the state security system.

The state should create clear rules for cooperation with pro-defence organisations, including training standards, a certification system, and a catalogue of competences recognised in the subsequent military training process.

This would allow for better use of existing social potential and create a specific pathway from an interest in defence, through training and voluntary military service, to professional service or remaining in the reserve.

In the long term, the system of pro-defence organisations should thus become the hinterland for the Polish Armed Forces.

It would not replace professional military training but would prepare as large a portion of society as possible for conscious and voluntary entry into subsequent levels of the security system.

Universal State Service – reserves for the entire security system

The success of the entire project also requires the creation of a modern form of service to the state.

The proposed Universal State Service would not be limited solely to the needs of the military. The system would also support:

• civil defence,
• the Police,
• the State Fire Service,
• the healthcare system,
• crisis management.

Such a solution would allow for the building of reserves not only for the army but for the entire national security system.

Universal State Service and total defence

Significantly, this would not be an entirely new concept. To a large extent, similar assumptions have already been formulated in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2020.

This document pointed to the need to build a total defence system based on the effort of the entire nation and the utilisation of the potential of public administration, local governments, the economy, social organisations, and citizens.

Total defence was linked to building state resilience, protecting the population, preparing state structures to act in crisis situations, and the ability to restore necessary resources.

In this sense, Universal State Service would be a practical development of the assumptions that the Polish state has already defined at the strategic level.

Its goal would be to create a broad personnel base for the entire security system, rather than exclusively increasing the size of the Polish Armed Forces.

It would prepare citizens for various roles: military, rescue, medical, administrative, or related to civil protection.

It would thus be a practical tool for implementing the idea of total defence and building state resilience.

A million-man army for wartime – is it a realistic goal?

The proposed model assumes maintaining approximately 250,000 soldiers during peacetime, while simultaneously creating a system that allows for the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces to approximately one million trained soldiers under wartime conditions.

It is not, therefore, about creating a million professional soldiers.

It is about creating a system that will allow the state to utilise the potential of operational troops, the Territorial Defence Forces, the active reserve, reserve units, and prepared citizens.

This structure allows for the separation of two fundamentally different goals:

readiness for action in peacetime and the capacity for mass mobilisation in wartime.

It is precisely this difference that should become one of the foundations of the discussion on the future of the Polish army.

Why might this concept be more effective?

The concept assuming a structure of 300,000 active-duty soldiers and 200,000 active reservists is impressive, but – in my assessment – not necessarily effective.

My proposal does not focus solely on the number of soldiers. Above all, it concerns the method of military organisation, the costs of its maintenance, and the state’s capacity to expand its wartime potential.

The arguments in favour of the proposed model primarily include:

• a more realistic adaptation of the army's structure to Poland's demographic capabilities;
• lower costs of maintaining some units during peacetime;
• a clear division of forces according to combat readiness levels;
• the construction of real reserves, rather than merely those on paper;
• the ability to rapidly expand the army to a scale unachievable for a system based mainly on professional troops;
• better use of training infrastructure and personnel resources;
• increased throughput of the reserve training system;
• the creation of a permanent system of cooperation between the state and pro-defence organisations;
• the building of social foundations for state security and resilience.

Not the number of soldiers, but the capacity to wage war

The most important difference between the two concepts, however, lies in the philosophy of action.

The vision of 500,000 soldiers in peacetime assumes a very high level of permanent commitment of state resources. In my view, the subject of debate should be not only the target numbers but also the costs, personnel possibilities, infrastructure, and the actual combat capabilities that can be obtained through them.

My concept attempts to answer a significantly more important question:

How can we ensure that, in a moment of trial, the state – with the active support of society – is able to quickly field and maintain a massive, million-man army capable of waging a long-term war?

The answer does not have to mean maintaining a million soldiers in peacetime or maximising professional troop numbers.

It should, however, mean creating a coherent mobilisation system in which high-readiness troops, reinforcement forces, the reserve army, pro-defence organisations, and the Universal State Service form a single security system.

In the realities of modern conflicts, it is precisely the capacity to rapidly expand potential, replenish losses, maintain continuity of operations, and wage a long-term war that may prove to be one of the decisive factors for effective deterrence and national defence.

Therefore, we should evaluate the future of the Polish Armed Forces not only through the prism of how many soldiers we are able to maintain in peacetime but, above all, by answering the question:

What kind of army will Poland be able to field, train, equip, and maintain when the security of the state is truly threatened?