Missile-Focused NATO Summit in Washington: Tomahawks for Germany, Missile-Defence for Poland

One of the elements of the air defence area is a rotational IAMD model in the Euro-Atlantic region, „with an initial focus on the eastern flank”. Under this model, air defence systems from allied countries will be deployed to the most threatened regions, rotationally. For example, a Dutch Patriot battery would participate in exercises in Lithuania.

Missile Defence in Poland

The deployment of US and British (and earlier, temporarily, German) systems to Poland is also aligned with this rotational model to some extent, all the more so as representatives of the Polish authorities have suggested that after the NATO summit, the Alliance may take over responsibility for defending the logistics hub in Rzeszów. The Allies also pledge to increase the effectiveness of the IAMD system overall, and make all necessary effort to respond to the security environment.

Poland has also been mentioned directly, in the context of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence System (NATO BMD) achieving extended operational readiness (including the defence system deployed in Poland). It was said that the delivery of the Aegis Ashore system in Redzikowo, Poland, complements existing measures in Romania, Spain and Turkey. Noteworthy, the Aegis Ashore system is designed to defend against a limited »non-Euro-Atlantic« attack, originating from the Middle East, particularly from Iran, with ballistic missiles flying outside the Earth’s atmosphere. However, as noted by PISM analyst Artur Kacprzyk, this was not explicitly written into the summit declaration this year (unlike, for example, the Vilnius summit).

In Poland, the Aegis Ashore system uses the Standard SM-3 Block IIA launchers and the AN/SPY-1 radar. These components are used for defence against attacks on targets outside the Earth’s atmosphere, launched from a specific area. However, the system could be modified by adding sensors and launchers. Interestingly, the allies have declared further development of a system to defend Europe against ballistic missile attacks. It would be preferable if this also included the integration of components sourced from different countries (along the lines of the integration of US Patriot systems, CAMM missiles and Polish radars via the IBCS network in the Wisła-Narew system), as the US industry has limited production capacity after all. In addition, the best elements from the US and Europe could be used in this way, creating synergies.

NATO And Defence System

It also raises the question of whether the Allies are ready to respond to the deployment of additional defence systems, should Russia decide to deploy longer-range ballistic missile systems (of range longer than Iskanders«, flying at a higher altitude). Moscow has already signalled its desire to develop the capability to use such missiles, and today they are used on a massive scale by Iran and North Korea.

For now, the assumption for NATO’s defence system is that defence against short-range missiles (with a range of a few hundred to a thousand kilometres, flying in the Earth’s atmosphere - like Iskander and similar effectors) is handled at the national, member-state level. If possible, the member states work within an integrated system, through national commands (in Poland, the Air Operations Centre-Air Component Command). These are the ground-based SAMP/T (France, Italy) and Patriot systems (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Poland, Romania, Spain and US Army Europe) supplemented by warships with appropriate capabilities - generally only a small number of these remain active and on duty.

The NATO BMD system, on the other hand (which is part of the US forces under NATO command), for intercepting short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles (up to several thousand kilometres, as well as short-range missiles flying outside the Earth’s atmosphere) includes components in Poland, Romania (Aegis Ashore), Turkey (AN/TPY-2 radar for early warning) and US warships using the Aegis system.

The latter, moreover, can counter both short-range missiles (using the SM-6 missiles) and heavier missiles (here SM-3 is the weapon of choice). Interestingly, the Arrow 3 SAM, purchased by Germany as part of the ESSI (European Sky Shield Initiative), will also have capabilities similar, at least to some extent, to the SM-3 system. The question is whether it, too, will be included in NATO BMD, and if so, under what conditions.

Furthermore, air and missile defence systems are becoming one of the highest priorities (alongside munitions of various types) in the capability development process, according to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Finally, the declaration acknowledges that missile defence supports, but cannot replace nuclear deterrence. All of this means that NATO is taking comprehensive steps towards strengthening air defence (as well as reconnaissance measures, in the context of the planned replacement of AWACS aircraft), with an increasing focus on the Russian threat.

Tomahawks Return to Germany

During the NATO summit, the German and US authorities also issued a joint release, on the deployment of strike capabilities. The US intends to temporarily (’episodically«) deploy Standard SM-6 missile launchers (with a range of several hundred kilometres), and Tomahawks (with a range of 1,500 km) to Germany as of 2026, as part of a multi-domain task force operating there. Land-based hypersonic missiles would also be ultimately deployed in Germany.

The declaration that these missiles will be deployed in Germany comes as no surprise, as the 56th Artillery Command was already established in the Federal Republic at the end of 2021 to coordinate the deployment of this type of capability. However, Germany and the US have confirmed previous assumptions and deployment of this type of capability. First will be the Typhon system (owned by the US Army and used against land targets, employing Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles as effectors), followed by LRHW hypersonic missiles, which are currently in development. According to the US doctrine, all of these missiles are to have conventional warheads and there are no plans to develop nuclear-capable versions.

The preparation of all these systems is the ramification of Russia’s violation of the INF treaty banning land-based intermediate-range missile launchers. Russia violated that treaty through the deployment of the 9M729 cruise missiles. The US also terminated the treaty in 2019. The Typhon system has already been deployed in the Philippines as part of an exercise.

Another similar system, but used by the US Navy and designed to launch SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, has already been deployed by the Americans on Bornholm in 2023 and 2024. These did not fall under the no-longer-valid INF Treaty (as air defence assets).

Noteworthy, Vladimir Putin has suggested that Russia intends to develop intermediate-range missile systems (above 500 and below 5,500 km), allegedly in response to the aforesaid deployment by the US. Given that Russia was the first to have violated the INF Treaty, this probably means that work on such missiles has been going on for a long time there, and Moscow intends to use the American training deployment of these missiles as a pretext to »justify« the standing presence of the Russian counterpart.

Nuclear Deterrence

In terms of Allied nuclear deterrence, the steps taken during the Vilnius Summit and the Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit in 2022 have been reaffirmed. In practice, this means, on one hand, that a commitment would be made to participate in arms control and transparency initiatives, and on the other hand, that a statement would be issued, stating that any use of nuclear weapons against NATO would »fundamentally« change the nature of the conflict and that the Alliance has the capability and willingness to impose the cost and consequence on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far in excess of the ramification of using nuclear weapons alone. This can be seen as a strong commitment to extended nuclear deterrence.

It shall not be expected, for example, that the Nuclear Sharing system would be extended to Poland, although such demands have been made by Warsaw. It is worth noting, however, that the declaration also assumes »adaptation when necessary«, so NATO leaves itself open to modernizing its nuclear weapons delivery means to a greater extent than at present, should this be deemed necessary. Today, a key element of Allied deterrence, alongside the strategic forces of the US and to some extent, given their national character, France and the UK, is the NATO Nuclear Sharing system, which involves the delivery of B61 bombs by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) tactical aircraft.

Prospectively, this translates into the upgraded B61-12 bombs being employed by the F-35A fighters, while Russia has a more diversified arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, including various types of cruise and ballistic missiles. For the time being, there is no decision on expansion of the NATO’s nuclear toolkit, but this possibility remains on the table (perhaps to be implemented in response to Russia’s deployment of intermediate-range missiles).

Missile Summit

Nevertheless, the declaration made after the NATO summit in Washington marks important progress in terms of the development of an allied missile defence system. It is becoming an increasingly important priority. The relevant capabilities are to be developed in coordination between the member states. They are also to take into account the threat from Russia and the specific requirements defined by the member states on the eastern flank. A caveat should be given here that a counterforce capability, i.e. to counter an adversary’s means of strike, should be regarded as an integral element of air defence. Here, NATO should take more extensive action. The second matter pertains to the implementation of plans and their adaptation in response to threats.