Proposed directions for changes in collective security mechanisms and the future of Central and Eastern Europe

Dynamic changes in the security environment of Central and Eastern Europe require a revision of existing collective security mechanisms. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, growing hybrid threats, energy crises and intensifying great-power competition mean that the European Union, NATO, the UN and the OSCE must adapt their structures and instruments to new operational conditions. 

One of the key trends is the ongoing development of the EU’s strategic autonomy, which includes the enhancement of its own military capabilities, modernisation of defence infrastructure and investment in advanced technologies: unmanned systems, AI and space technologies. Within PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) Central and Eastern European states are being given increasing scope to cooperate and co-develop joint defence projects — which, over the longer term, is intended to strengthen the region’s resilience to geopolitical pressure.

At the same time, Brussels does not intend to replace NATO but to reinforce the complementarity of the two organisations« structures. Harmonization of military standards, joint training and the development of intelligence and cyber-defense capabilities are intended to directly raise security on the eastern flank.

Hybrid threats: the EU is building an early response system

The Central and Eastern European region is one of the primary targets of hybrid operations: cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and manipulation of electoral processes. The EU therefore plans to expand structures responsible for countering such threats — including European cyber-competence centres, rapid incident-response teams and mechanisms for monitoring the information space. This is of particular importance given Russia’s aggressive policies, which test the socio-political resilience of member states. 

Energy as a pillar of security — infrastructure integration and diversification of supplies

Regional security is inextricably linked to energy security. The EU continues to diversify energy sources: development of LNG, construction of interconnectors, investment in renewables and the introduction of regulations on strategic reserves. These actions minimise the risk of raw materials being used as a tool of political pressure — a tactic frequently employed by Russia. 

The Eastern Partnership and future accession of Ukraine — an EU geopolitical investment

One of the most important processes that could transform the security architecture is the deepening of relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and above all the possible future accession of Ukraine. Kyiv, following the Euromaidan and Russia’s aggression, has become a key EU partner; its membership would strengthen the Union’s eastern border and create a geopolitical counterweight to Moscow’s actions.

The precondition for integration remains, however, fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria — including strengthening the rule of law and fighting corruption. Brussels views support for Ukraine not only as an investment in state transformation but also as a tool for building a European deterrence strategy.

UN: need for reform and adaptation to hybrid conflicts

Faced with conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, the UN has exposed structural weaknesses — including paralysis of decision-making in the Security Council and limited effectiveness of traditional peace-building mechanisms. The organization requires modernization of its tools, especially in the areas of:

• early warning systems,
• rapid response to hybrid conflicts,
• cyberspace protection,
• strengthening the role of mediators and regional experts.

It has also been proposed to limit the use of the veto in cases of serious violations of international law — a change that could increase the effectiveness of UN action, particularly in regions affected by aggression from states that hold permanent Security Council seats.

OSCE: potential of observation missions and political limitations

The OSCE remains one of the pillars of security in the post-Soviet space — particularly through observation missions and election monitoring. However, the unanimity mechanism and decision-blocking by Russia and Belarus significantly limit the organization’s effectiveness. Difficulties in accessing authoritarian states and attempts at political interference reduce the OSCE’s capacity to act as an impartial arbiter in crisis situations. 

Conclusions: toward a new security architecture

Changes in European and global security mechanisms point in the direction of:

• greater European military autonomy,
• deeper transatlantic integration,
• social and infrastructural resilience,
• partnership with eastern neighbors,
• reform and reshaping of international organizations,
• adaptation of those organizations to hybrid and cyber threats.

Central and Eastern Europe — as the region most exposed to Russia’s aggressive actions — will be a key testing ground for new solutions. The ultimate shape of the future security architecture will depend on the determination of EU states, NATO’s cohesion and the willingness of international organizations to adapt.

Author: Agnieszka Rogozińska, PhD