“Deal 15%”: U.S.–EU Trade Pact with Direct Impact on Poland

The agreement enters into force on 1 August 2025, without any grace period. It replaces a looming tariff escalation with a unified 15% rate on nearly 90% of European exports to the U.S., including vehicles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. Some strategic sectors—such as aircraft parts, certain chemicals, generics, and semiconductor production equipment—benefit from zero-tariff exemptions under a „zero-for-zero” list. However, steel and aluminum remain subject to punitive 50% tariffs.

In exchange, the European Union will purchase approximately $750 billion worth of U.S. energy, primarily LNG and crude oil, and invest $600 billion in the U.S. economy through 2032. An additional defence procurement package—estimated around $180 billion—forms part of the broader strategic commitment. A „snap-back” clause allows the U.S. to reinstate higher tariffs if purchase targets are not met; the EU has prepared a €93 billion countermeasure plan in response.

While the agreement ensures market predictability, the 15% tariff still marks a substantial increase compared to pre-Trump levels (typically 0–5% for many industrial goods). This could reduce the price competitiveness of European exports in the U.S. market, especially in sectors with lower profit margins or limited brand differentiation. For the European defence industry in particular, the political risk is more strategic than commercial: if EU states shift a meaningful portion of the $180 billion defence procurement package toward U.S. systems, it may undermine long-term efforts under the EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and fragment intra-European capability development. The deal could thus benefit American primes at the expense of initiatives aimed at strengthening European strategic autonomy.

Polish sectors face a mixed outcome. Automotive suppliers stand to gain from the lowered tariff ceiling, easing pressure on EU-based OEM chains. However, manufacturers of furniture, appliances, cosmetics, and processed foods—where Poland has significant export share—must now navigate higher customs costs. For steel exporters, the continued 50% rate sustains market pressure. At the same time, Poland’s LNG terminals in Świnoujście and Gdańsk are well positioned to serve increased energy flows under the EU’s purchase commitments, enhancing regional gas security.

The political context is equally significant. President Karol Nawrocki, aligned with Washington and openly pro-Trump, views the deal as an opportunity to deepen transatlantic ties. In contrast, Prime Minister Donald Tusk remains firmly pro-European and wary of asymmetric concessions. This dual-track leadership could allow Poland to balance interests between Brussels and Washington—if managed strategically. With careful diplomacy, Warsaw may secure trade, energy, and defence advantages from both sides of the Atlantic.