Information security in Central and Eastern Europe amid Russian information and cyber warfare

Information as a core instrument of geopolitical competition

An assessment of information security in Central and Eastern Europe highlights the critical importance of this domain within the region’s broader security architecture. Information has become one of the principal instruments of geopolitical competition, with Russia’s strategic use of information warfare and media disinformation posing a serious challenge to states across the region. The principal threats include disinformation, the manipulation of public opinion, attacks on media freedom, and systematic efforts to influence political decision-making and societal dynamics through propaganda and cyber tools.

As part of its broader strategy of destabilisation, Russia employs a wide range of information operations aimed not only at undermining the internal stability of Central and Eastern European states, but also at discouraging them from pursuing deeper integration with Western security structures such as NATO and the European Union.

Disinformation as a tool of destabilisation and political influence

In Poland, according to a report published by the country’s military counterintelligence service, Russia, with Belarusian support, conducted disinformation campaigns between 2022 and 2024 that promoted conspiracy theories to undermine trust in climate science and environmental policies. These efforts were intended to fuel social and political instability, particularly in the run-up to Poland’s presidential election.

In Romania, the 2024 presidential election was followed by a rise in the influence of pro-Russian political forces, which was widely seen as the result of effective Russian disinformation campaigns. The victory of Călin Georgescu, a pro-Russian and anti-EU candidate, raised concerns within EU institutions, which viewed the outcome as a result of Russia’s disinformation efforts. Such developments may ultimately weaken Romania’s integration with both the European Union and NATO.

Russian propaganda is often geared toward supporting anti-Western, populist, and Eurosceptic movements, which serve as channels for spreading narratives that erode regional and international cohesion. In this context, Russia relies both on so-called “hard” disinformation tools and on “soft” forms of manipulation, such as cultural narratives, designed to foster distrust of democratic institutions and Western alliances among the region’s societies.

Disinformation constitutes one of the most significant threats facing the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia employs a wide range of methods to spread false information intended to spark social chaos, inflame political tensions, and undermine citizens’ trust in their governments. Among the clearest examples are fake news stories related to political and economic crises, which have been disseminated on a large scale through social media and other digital platforms.

For example, Russian and Belarusian media, working in coordination with troll farms, spread false claims that Poland was treating migrants brutally and denying them access to humanitarian assistance. Videos, photographs, and manipulated reports were circulated on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram in an effort to provoke international criticism of the country and damage its international reputation.

One of the most sophisticated aspects of disinformation is the so-called deepfake — the manipulation of video and audio in ways that make false information harder to detect while enhancing its apparent credibility. In June 2024, a fake video appeared online showing US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller commenting on American support for Ukraine. The recording was intended to mislead public opinion and undermine trust in official communications. Similarly, in November 2023, fabricated recordings appeared purporting to show representatives of the Ukrainian military authorities calling for internal conflict. These efforts were designed to provoke divisions within Ukrainian society.

Manipulating public opinion and undermining Western institutions

Manipulating public opinion constitutes another important element of Russia’s information warfare. Russia relies not only on traditional media but increasingly also on the Internet to disseminate narratives aimed at creating internal divisions within the states of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, these information operations target political elites, international institutions, and Western values.

One example of such manipulation is the spread of disinformation about NATO defence exercises. The Kremlin portrays these drills as provocations in order to weaken trust in the Alliance and stir opposition to military cooperation with the West. Another example is the promotion of narratives depicting Ukraine as a “failed state” which are intended to erode public support for Ukraine and foster distrust toward political leaders backing Kyiv.

Additionally, Russia conducts disinformation activities aimed at portraying NATO as the aggressor and Russia as the victim, with the goal of fostering distrust toward the Alliance and undermining its credibility. The objective is not only to weaken the legitimacy of governments, but also to erode civil society and increase its susceptibility to external influence.

Moreover, during the border crisis between Poland and Belarus, Russia and Belarus carried out a coordinated disinformation campaign accusing EU and NATO member states of violating international and humanitarian law. These efforts sought to discredit Euro-Atlantic structures and weaken the influence of Poland and Lithuania on the NATO and EU’s eastern policy.

Russian propaganda also seeks to fuel anti-Western attitudes, including populist and Eurosceptic ones, which over time may weaken the region’s political unity while undermining European cooperation. One example of such propaganda aimed at stoking anti-Western and Eurosceptic sentiment is the disinformation operation „Doppelgänger.” It involved the creation of fake websites imitating the official sites of European institutions such as NATO, on which false press releases were published suggesting, among other things, that NATO members were planning to double the Alliance’s military budget or were considering the deployment of Ukrainian paramilitary units in France to suppress protests. Another example is Russia’s disinformation campaign ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, in which it created a network of websites to spread pro-Russian propaganda. In both cases, the aim was to generate distrust toward European institutions and inflame anti-Western sentiment.

Assaults on media freedom and control of the information space

In its efforts to shape political and social processes in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia often resorts to censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression. Particularly important in this respect are attempts to gain control over the media or to pressure journalists and editorial teams to refrain from publishing inconvenient information. One example is the strategy for taking control of Moldova by 2030, revealed by Moldovan investigative journalists. The plan envisaged, among other things, expanding the Russian Federation’s informational influence in Moldova, potentially through attempts to capture parts of the media landscape or exert pressure on journalists in order to promote pro-Russian narratives and silence critical voices.

The increasingly important cyber dimension of information warfare

The discussed information warfare tools — such as disinformation, the manipulation of public opinion, and attacks on media freedom — constitute only part of a broader problem, which resides in Russian attempts to shape political decision-making and social processes through propaganda and cyber tools. Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, including energy systems, banking networks, and state administrative infrastructure, are becoming increasingly common and are often pursued as part of a wider strategy of destabilisation.

After 2022, a significant rise in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure was recorded across various countries. In Poland, around 40,000 cyber incidents were registered in 2022, while in 2023 that number rose to 80,000. Forecasts for 2024 pointed to a further increase in threats of this kind. In 2022, 58% of companies in Poland experienced at least one security breach-related incident, while 33% reported an increase in their intensity. This surge in cybercriminal activity was at least partly linked to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Russia is intensifying its activities in cyberspace, employing both traditional hacking techniques and more advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and self-learning algorithms. These cyberattacks are aimed not only at deleting or altering data, but also at spreading disinformation and creating chaos that hinders an effective response to crisis situations.