NATO „out of area or out of business” again?

If Russia no longer threatened Europe—at least in theory—and normalisation seemed plausible, what exactly was NATO for? To defend what, and against whom? Then came the shocks: 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, international terror groups. Even in Lithuania, the conclusion felt obvious: we had to act out of area. And we did.

Not always under a formal NATO flag—think of the early days in Afghanistan or the coalition in Iraq, which was more divisive among allies. But the lesson held: when allies agree, NATO can act beyond its traditional geography. There was a shared intuition that failing to do so would give dangerous momentum to the “out of business” argument.

Today, the 2002–2007 mindset feels almost alien. Europe is again at war. Russia threatens the Alliance daily. NATO’s raison d’être looks as clear as it did during the Cold War: defend Europe.

And yet, the long-heard echo still lingers.

What we once called “crisis management” was not improvised—it was codified and reaffirmed in NATO Strategic Concepts from Lisbon to Madrid. Three core tasks emerged: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. So, what happens when an ally—or a group of allies, especially the still indispensable transatlantic power—concludes it must act out of area, and in doing so, directly affects European security?

Military success often hinges on European contributions—sometimes modest, but politically essential. Is reflexive scepticism—questioning purpose, legitimacy, or utility—the right instinct? Europe seems to have rediscovered its purpose—much as Western Europe did during the Cold War. The question today is not about purpose; it is about consistency.

NATO’s core tasks have not changed, but their balance no longer reflects reality. Since 2014—and decisively since 2022—the Alliance has rightly refocused on territorial defence: geography, the eastern flank, and deterrence. This was necessary, and will remain a top priority.

But it does not render everything else irrelevant.

Crisis management and out-of-area engagement have not disappeared. They are returning quietly through practice: through sea lanes, energy security, protection of undersea cables, and supply chains. And now Iran. Practice is moving faster than doctrine. The question is not whether NATO should “return” out of area—it has long been there. The real question is whether the Alliance can acknowledge this politically and manage it operationally.

The alternative is the seductive “not our war” posture. It sounds reasonable, and it is already audible in Europe, echoing rhetoric heard in Washington about Ukraine: “not our war”, meaning it’s “Europe’s war”.

It will not withstand reality.

Not every crisis is NATO’s war. But some crises directly affect allied security: access, basing, security of maritime routes, energy and undersea infrastructure, and the transatlantic link itself. Conversely, the opposite extreme—treating everything as NATO’s domain—will fail both politically and operationally. What is needed is not ever-new missions, but clarity.

Collective defence must remain the foundation—non-negotiable. But crisis management cannot remain discretionary. In today’s environment, acting beyond NATO territory is often a prerequisite for defending allied interests. Cooperative security, too, must become a tool for access and presence in contested spaces.

The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara is an opportunity

The Ankara NATO Summit would be best used not to hide behind platitudes, but to name reality: that NATO operates both in area and out of area. This is not a discretionary choice; it is a strategic necessity. If Allies already act this way, doctrine should reflect it, not obscure it. NATO does not need to rediscover its purpose; it needs to reconnect purpose with action.

Merely acknowledging the return of “out of area” is not a cure-all measure. Yes, it will likely reopen old debates about what is “ours” and what is not. It will not dissolve all the accumulated frustrations on either side of the Atlantic. But this is still a necessary stopgap, and it is far better than descending further into lamentations and grievances.

Agreeing on an “out-of-area” fix will slow down the Alliance’s drift toward fragmentation. At worst, it will buy us some time; at best, it will help lay the groundwork for a new transatlantic deal, and perhaps another serious attempt to agree on first principles: that together still beats apart.

The choice is not between in area and out of area. The real choice is between strategic clarity and fragmentation. NATO will not weaken because it does too much. It weakens when it cannot decide what it is willing to do.

Author: Vytautas Leškevičius

Vytautas Leškevičius is a Lithuanian security and defence policy expert and analyst with 30 years of experience in international security, defence, transatlantic relations, NATO and EU affairs. His professional experience spans senior roles across security policy, international affairs, and strategic analysis, including service as Lithuania’s Permanent Representative to NATO. He also led the team coordinating Lithuania’s first-ever Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Throughout his career, he has been involved in major negotiations and policy processes related to NATO and EU security and defence policies, resilience and crisis management. Ambassador Leškevičius currently serves as Chief Policy Analyst at the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center, a Vilnius-based think-tank. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.