The unmaking of American soft power

The American way of life, coupled with the promotion of democracy and human rights, was an attractive force behind victory in the Cold War and laid the foundation for the subsequent period of Pax Americana.

Even Donald Trump, in his first term as president, widely used soft power as a way to introduce himself and his worldview to the world, including to European allies. He was - after all - a master of personal branding, fluent in using PR tactics to close business deals or win elections. Soft power became more personified, more businesslike, but ideas about the U.S. as the key global player were still strongly conveyed by appealing to the imagination, beliefs, and desires of international audiences. What is more, Donald Trump represented a new quality at the highest level - a showman, the first of his kind in the age of the 24-hour news cycle. He - more than his predecessors - became part of global pop culture, exporting the American virtue of the „self-made man” abroad. At times criticized, he remained omnipresent - not only in political sections, but also in lifestyle coverage. Controversial, energetic, successful as a businessman - this largely defined his image abroad up to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Donald Trump tightly linked his personal brand with American public diplomacy and was convinced that he himself was a soft-power asset for the United States.

From Brand America to Brand Trump

But with Trump’s second term, everything changed. The „peace through strength” approach and the core „America First” message shifted the perspective of the U.S. administration: traditional soft-power instruments - such as public diplomacy or support for foreign civil society organizations - began to be treated as signs of weakness and as manifestations of DEI. Donald Trump’s personal image abroad also changed; after the attack on the Capitol, he ceased to be regarded merely as an eccentric, unconventional politician and increasingly came to be perceived as a figure posing a challenge to the democratic system in the United States and to the global order.

It was Pete Hegseth, a controversial nominee for Secretary of Defense - sometimes rhetorically referred to by some as a „Secretary of War”- who first openly told NATO allies, in February, that „there’s nothing like hard power.” Some interpreted this as a rookie mistake, but it was also a harbinger: the first, perhaps hasty, signal that the direction of U.S. foreign policy - and the balance between soft power and hard power - was undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Among the first actions of the newly inaugurated president was ending initiatives supporting diversity. This time, Donald Trump initiated a cultural shift anticipated by many within his voter base, who believed it marked the beginning of truly putting Americans first - the ones who felt left behind by the social changes of the last decade and who longed for recognition from the president. Those lost in an interconnected, global, and diverse reality were mobilized by Donald Trump’s most controversial yet most effective advertisement of the 2024 campaign, claiming that Kamala Harris „cares about they/them - not about you.”

This cultural shift was coupled with the launch of DOGE - the Department of Government Efficiency - led by Elon Musk, who was placed in charge of cutting DEI programs across government agencies. The social change was also framed in fiscal terms - potentially reallocating savings toward programs deemed truly important for „real Americans,” rather than DEI hires or international DEI activists. This is where the anti-DEI crusade became part of a broader American withdrawal from soft power as it had previously been understood. At one point, Elon Musk publicly called for dismantling or fundamentally restructuring USAID, the most important American agency responsible for international aid and for supporting development and democratization worldwide. The stated motive was to end support for programs described as „hideous,” including initiatives such as advancing DEI in workplaces and business communities in Serbia, a transgender opera in Colombia, a transgender comic book in Peru, and a DEI-themed musical in Ireland. „At USAID, Waste and Abuse Runs Deep,” stated a White House article highlighting what it described as the most egregious examples of using USAID funds to finance DEI globally, explicitly framing these efforts as American soft power.

Free Speech as a Weapon

In addition, the Trump administration issued an executive order aimed at the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM). This decision affected Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia - media outlets that had long been powerhouses not only in supporting democratization in Europe and Asia, but also in promoting the American agenda and, at times, quite directly selling the American Dream of liberty to audiences living under authoritarian regimes. Conveying messages about democracy and human rights had for decades been a core element of U.S. foreign policy in strategic regions. As a consequence, Radio Free Asia suspended parts of its news operations, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty significantly scaled back its Hungarian service.

At the same time, a new approach to soft power and public diplomacy emerged within the Trump administration - one centered on defending free speech, primarily in European democracies. Free speech is framed less as protection of dissent against the U.S. administration and more as opposition to EU regulations affecting American technology companies. American business interests are thus presented as advancing free speech across Europe. After the European Commission’s decision to fine X under the Digital Services Act, members of the administration stated that this constituted an attack not only on an American corporation, but on the American people themselves. Defending against such actions was framed as a vital U.S. interest, since freedom of speech is portrayed as a core value the Trump administration seeks to export.

This aligns with the intent expressed in the U.S. National Security Strategy to support parties and candidates who espouse the „right” values - those aligned with the American president. In this context, soft power is applied not toward authoritarian regimes or governments hostile to the United States, but toward long-standing allies who have increasingly been portrayed as a threat - an image emerging both from the recently released strategy and from statements by the U.S. president. Most recently, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy posted on X about potential sanctions against Europeans accused of „extraterritorial censorship of Americans.”

American soft power in its traditional sense has thus been replaced by a gospel of free speech aimed first and foremost at the European Union. For Donald Trump, there are more persuasive ways of exerting influence without resorting to hard power - for example, economic diplomacy. After all, the power of money is the strongest one.