The transformation of the “Geran-2” strike drones into a network-centred combat system

Incidents involving Russian drones entering the airspace of Ukraine’s neighbouring countries are by no means isolated. In such circumstances, knowing their technical characteristics and structural weaknesses is critically important. Not only will this enable us to assess current threats adequately, but it will also drive the development and perfection of air defence systems, particularly given the growing threat posed by the Russian Federation to European countries.

The Shahed-136 drone stands as a prime example of this technological evolution, having progressed from a direct copy of its Iranian counterpart to a substantially re-engineered platform tailored to the operational requirements of the Russian Armed Forces. To facilitate such development, a special economic zone known as „Alabuga” was established in Tatarstan. The main innovation at this stage is countering attempts to shoot down the „Shahed” using electronic warfare measures and expanding the capabilities for real-time control of a drone swarm.

Russia has found ways to circumvent sanctions: according to analytical data, up to 95% of the electronic components found in Russian weapons were of foreign origin. For example, the „Geran-2” drone is now almost entirely assembled using Chinese and Western components. In January 2026, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia is ramping up its capacity to launch up to a thousand drones a day against Ukraine, producing up to 404 „Shahed” drones of various types daily, the majority of which are likely to be „Gerbera”-type decoy drones. Made using cheaper materials, they are used to simulate a massive air attack and overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.

Navigation and communications in electronic warfare environments: stages of modernisation

As already mentioned above, countering the systematic effects of electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) is one of the key factors in modern aerial warfare. The fact that the Russians are refining precisely these systems and equipment indicates a comprehensive approach. Technologically, the key element in ensuring GNSS signal stability is the „mounting” of small „Kometa-M” (CRPA) series antenna arrays on the drone, which „scan” the surrounding area using four sensors simultaneously.

It allows the system to clearly determine where the signal is coming from. When a source of interference (an electronic warfare jammer) appears „on air”, the system instantly calculates its direction and creates a digital „blind spot” (spatial nulling) around it, whilst continuing to scan all other areas.

As a result, up to three sources of electronic interference can be ignored simultaneously. The more antennas the drone has, the narrower and more precise the „blind zone” becomes – it is possible to suppress interference without affecting signals useful to the enemy (such as those from satellites). The multi-element system literally overcomes the signal-to-noise ratio, isolating the desired signal from the overall stream and maintaining GPS reception even under heavy electronic warfare (EW) attack.

It is likely that the latest versions of Russian strike drones already utilise a system with an extended frequency range, covering not only the L1 band of GPS and GLONASS but also L2. This significantly complicates the operation of broadband electronic warfare jamming systems.

The next step in the modernisation of Russian unmanned systems was the introduction of backup communication channels based on 4G/LTE mobile networks. Industry-grade modems, typically based on Quectel or SIMCom chipsets, are integrated into the aircraft’s design and connected to Ukrainian mobile operators. It is entirely plausible that the use of SIM cards from local mobile operators allows enemy UAVs to transmit their location coordinates via SMS or IP protocol if the primary GPS channel is completely jammed, but mobile network coverage remains intact.

Moreover, analysis of the internal components of Russian drones has revealed the use of single-board computers such as the Raspberry Pi or Orange Pi. Connected via modems, they are perfectly capable of functioning as repeaters or controlling data transmission. Such an upgrade transforms the drone from a kamikaze into a radio-technical reconnaissance unit directly whilst carrying out a combat mission and even before contact with the target.

Starlink on drones and beyond: a tiered system

The biggest technological leap in 2026 in terms of improving Russian drones was the integration of Starlink satellite terminals. It effectively neutralised the impact of any ground-based electronic warfare systems on drone control and allowed the operator to receive a very clear video feed for better guidance during the final stage of the flight.

It changed the system yet again: from a kamikaze drone to a guided loitering system with unlimited control range, allowing the mission to be altered directly above the target. However, this did not last very long: by February 2026, systemic measures to block Russian access to Starlink had forced them to revert to LTE systems.

A separate but related area is autonomous inertial systems, specifically SADRA. It consists of modules and three gyroscopes that guide the vehicle, along with three accelerometers to measure deceleration and acceleration. This architecture allows the vehicle to maintain a precise course, even when external signals are jammed. It is possible that modern versions are also supplemented with DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator) visual odometry algorithms, which compare what the camera sees with a previously captured frame or a map of the terrain for spatial orientation and course correction.

This assumption is entirely plausible, as low-resolution cameras have been observed on some models, which can cross-reference terrain or distinctive landmarks with maps pre-loaded into the drone’s memory. Thus, this combination of CRPA antennas, LTE modems, satellite communication and an autonomous inertial navigation system creates a redundant navigation system, where the failure of one channel is automatically compensated for by another.

Not only navigation: development of combat elements and stealth capabilities

Russian engineers also managed to significantly diversify the range of the drone’s warheads, adapting them for various purposes. The most widely used variant for attacks on Ukrainian residential areas is the 52.4 kg BCH-50 thermobaric bomb, which creates a fireball with a temperature of 2,600°C, capable of striking enclosed targets. In addition, the use of heavy 90-kilogram BCH-90 warheads has been recorded. Unlike their Iranian counterparts, they contain the explosive TGF-35P2 (a mixture of TNT and RDX, with added ignition components based on metal hydrides).

According to technical analysis, the use of such mixtures allows combustion temperatures of 2000–2500°C to be achieved. Although, according to some assessments, peak values directly within the chemical reaction zone may be even higher. This makes it possible not only to destroy structures but also to cause large-scale fires.

The destructive power depends directly on the drone’s stealthiness and the difficulty of intercepting it with air defence systems. The Russians at „Alabuga” have opted to replace fibreglass with carbon fibre. The use of carbon in composite materials, combined with a black radar-absorbing coating, significantly reduces the drone’s cross-sectional area (RCS).

It complicates drone detection by radar stations, especially at low frequencies. The internal geometry of the components has also been revised: the fuel tanks and engine have received additional shielding, which reduces the thermal signature and, consequently, the visibility of the UAV. Although claims of complete „invisibility” are clearly exaggerated, the combination of dark colours and composites significantly reduces the reaction time of mobile fire teams (MFTs) during the night.

Reverse technology transfer, the Shahed-238 drone and future wars

All of the above-described Russian expertise is being actively exported to other countries, including Iran. That led to the development of a jet-powered variant – the Shahed-238 (known as the „Geran-3” in Russian specifications). The modification utilises the Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, enabling speeds of up to 370 km/h. Although the range is reduced to approximately 1,000 km, the high speed makes the drone a more difficult target for anti-aircraft systems. It is important to note that Iranian Shahed-238s have also received Kometa-M antenna array systems, indicating deep integration of the defence systems of both countries.

Russia supplies Iran not only with ready-made components, but also with satellite imagery and data sets on air defence operations. It allows Tehran to refine algorithms for evading strike zones. Such technology was already utilised during the recent Gulf War.

Ultimately, the Shahed platform has evolved from a cheap „missile-plane” into a sophisticated multi-purpose system. Despite the rudimentary nature of some of the solutions, the Russians« ability to integrate Starlink and 4G modems into civilian airframes poses new challenges for air defence systems, which are forced to adapt to the evolving tactics and technical characteristics of enemy UAVs.

This radically alters the landscape of future regional wars. The process of military cooperation between Russia and Iran has also evolved, growing from procurement to a mutual exchange of technologies, with Ukraine serving as a „living laboratory” for industrial-scale testing.

The re-export of Russian modifications – the „Kometa-M” systems, swarm algorithms, composite airframes – has radically enhanced the capability of Iranian proxy forces to overcome Western air defence/missile defence systems anywhere in the world. Under such conditions, the speed at which systems adapt to challenges, particularly the evolution of unmanned threats, is a hallmark of the effectiveness of the entire security architecture.

Ukraine is already offering its partners practical solutions, knowledge and experience gained in high-tech warfare, repelling near-daily massive combined strikes. In March 2026 alone, the Ukrainian Defence Forces destroyed over 33,000 enemy UAVs of various types using interceptor drones alone. Such experience is taking on systemic significance and shaping practical countermeasures that will define the nature of international conflicts in the coming decades.

Authors: Anton Zemlianyi, Senior Research Fellow & Andrii Kushnir, Research Fellow at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center