EU and Libya: Migration cooperation or a counterweight to Russia?

EU-Libya relations

The funds are intended to support Libyan services in border management, search and rescue operations, and efforts to combat people smuggling. EU-Libyan cooperation is not a new phenomenon, and Libya, as a transit country, has been supported by the EU for years through training for border services and deliveries of equipment. Following the 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, enhanced cooperation with Libyan authorities and local actors contributed significantly to reducing migration inflows to Europe during the 2015 migration crisis by limiting the number of migrants reaching Italy via the central Mediterranean route, as evidenced by the drop in the number of sea arrivals from over 181,000 in 2016 to just 11,471 in 2019.

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 and the outbreak of civil war, Libya has been divided between two centres of power. The Government of National Unity in Tripoli is internationally recognised and mainly controls the western part of the country. Eastern Libya is backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar.

An interesting fact is that the EU formally recognises only the Libyan government in Tripoli, which controls the western part of the country, yet the recently approved funding is to be directed at the eastern part controlled by Haftar. This is not the first attempt to establish relations with a part of the country that is not formally recognised. In July of this year, the EU agreed on plans to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi. The choice is justified by the increased influx of migrants passing through the eastern part of the country. According to UNHCR, more than 19,000 migrants reached Italy by sea between January and August 2026, of whom 81% departed from Libya.

Russian influence

At the same time, Russia, which has been expanding its influence in Africa for years, is also consolidating its role in Libya, among other things through the presence of soldiers from the paramilitary Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) and the modernisation and expansion of military bases. Russia turned greater attention to Libya after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024. Gen. Haftar is a close ally of Vladimir Putin, as demonstrated, for example, by the parade in Benghazi in May 2025, during which Libyan soldiers displayed a wide range of Russian weaponry that was reportedly delivered from Syria, as well as by the general’s visit to Moscow. For Russia, Libya is not only a strategically important area for locating military bases, but also an opportunity to underline its role in the drive towards unification, and a chance to secure favourable deals and contracts in a country in need of reconstruction.

Given Libya’s strategic location, linking the Mediterranean Sea, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel, the European Union should take Russia’s growing influence in the country seriously. Since the Arab Spring, Libya has been in the process of building its own statehood, which, combined with the current division, makes it vulnerable to external influence. In the context of migration, Libya, as one of the main transit countries through which the central Mediterranean migration route runs, is an important partner whose situation could be exploited for further Russian provocations.

Possible threats

Not long ago, the international community could see, in the example of Spain’s Ceuta, how migration can be used as a tool of hybrid warfare by North African states. Putin is also no newcomer to showing the EU how uncontrolled migration flows can serve as a means of destabilising a country’s internal situation and deepening political divisions, as Poland, for example, has experienced.

The need to hold talks with Gen. Khalifa Haftar in order to prevent the instrumentalisation of migration was raised by, among others, EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner in 2025. He pointed out that Russia’s growing activity in eastern Libya is forcing Europe to establish dialogue with the forces controlling that region, despite reservations from some member states. According to the Commissioner, negotiations on controlling migration routes should be combined with incentives in the form of development aid and visa facilitation.

Cooperation between the EU and the eastern Libyan regime raises numerous controversies, beginning with the issue of human rights. The EU’s cooperation with Libya on protecting its borders has been criticised from the very beginning by human rights organisations, which have pointed to cases of human rights violations by that state and to the fact that Libya is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. As a result, it is not bound by the principle of non-refoulement, which may endanger people who are entitled to apply for international protection. Ironically, by allocating additional funds, among other things, to search and rescue operations at sea and to combating people smuggling, the EU is lending support to a regime accused of committing human rights abuses.

Dual interests

The issue of limiting unregulated and often dangerous migration to Europe by sea is undoubtedly very important for the EU, and cooperation with third countries is essential in this case to increase the effectiveness of the services’ operations. However, in recent years the EU has also repeatedly had the opportunity to see how much damage the instrumentalisation of migration and its use as an element of hybrid warfare can cause. Russia is currently implementing increasingly bold provocations, such as acts of sabotage, disinformation campaigns and violations of European airspace, which we witness daily. Russia’s possible use of its position in Libya to trigger an increased influx of migrants to the European continent would be an act in line with current Russian tactics, and could overburden European structures and pose a serious threat to internal security.

In the current situation, it is extremely important that the EU be perceived by North African states as a valuable ally and an alternative to Russian influence, taking into account the potential controversies related to the protection of human rights that the Union will have to reckon with. Establishing dialogue with Gen. Haftar is a move that carries risk but is also necessary, both to strengthen the EU’s position in Libya and to ensure adequate support for efforts to limit unregulated migration.