Ukraine’s weapons procurement system is failing

The New York Times, citing confidential Ukrainian government audits, reports that around $1.2 billion was lost in 2024 through fraud, waste and mismanagement in military procurement. Seven of Ukraine’s ten largest military contractors reportedly continued to receive contracts despite criminal investigations, failures to deliver or corruption cases. Some companies received new contracts even after failing to fulfil earlier ones.

This is not a marginal accounting problem. Ukraine is fighting a war in which every artillery shell, air-defence interceptor and functioning weapons system matters. Yet auditors found contracts awarded without sufficient justification, companies unable to prove that they could actually deliver, and repeated failures without serious consequences. Kyiv is asking its partners for more weapons while parts of its own procurement system are losing money that could have purchased exactly those weapons.

One of the clearest examples concerns rockets. According to the audits cited by The New York Times, Ukraine had the opportunity to buy the same Turkish-made ammunition directly at a lower price. Instead, the contract went through a subsidiary of Czechoslovak Group, which offered the highest price among the bids described by the auditors. The decision reportedly added around $130 million to the bill. The audit does not accuse CSG of wrongdoing. The question concerns the Ukrainian procurement decision: why pay an intermediary substantially more when a cheaper direct offer existed?

This case is particularly important when viewed from Poland. From the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Poland transferred large quantities of weapons to Ukraine free of charge. Tanks, ammunition, artillery and other military equipment were sent because Ukraine needed them immediately. Poland accepted the cost because stopping Russia was considered essential for Polish and regional security.

Today Poland is in a very different position. Much of what could be transferred quickly from existing stocks has already been transferred. In several categories, Poland now has neither large reserves to give away nor enough production capacity to immediately sell large quantities.

At the same time, other companies in Europe have built a substantial part of their recent business around supplying Ukraine.

Czechoslovak Group is an obvious example. According to The New York Times, more than 40 per cent of its revenue in 2024 came from Ukraine-related sales. The war and the wider increase in European defence spending helped transform the company into one of the largest defence groups in the region.

This inevitably raises questions about relations between Warsaw and Kyiv. Poland provided equipment first, quickly and in many cases without treating Ukraine primarily as a commercial customer. Several years later, Poland has significantly less equipment available, while other European companies have developed very profitable business models around Ukrainian demand. That difference will increasingly matter politically.

The timing could hardly be worse for Kyiv. Ukraine needs weapons before winter. It needs air defence, ammunition and protection for its energy infrastructure. At the same time, negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States are again taking place. Kyiv therefore needs military assistance and political credibility simultaneously.

And this is where the procurement system becomes dangerous. European societies have supported Ukraine for years, but that support cannot be treated as unlimited. France and Germany are entering another period of political competition, and Ukraine will increasingly become part of domestic debates. Every report about overpayments, failed contracts and money disappearing inside the procurement system gives opponents of further assistance another argument.

The problem is therefore not only that European voters may become less willing to finance Ukraine. European politicians will also become less willing to ask them to do so. Every new support package will be harder to defend if governments cannot explain how previous money was used. This is especially important in countries where public finances are already under pressure and where opposition parties increasingly question the scale of support for Kyiv.

Ukraine cannot demand more weapons from Europe while treating procurement failures as an internal technical issue. If a partner provides equipment free of charge, or finances ammunition from its own budget, it has every right to ask what happens to Ukrainian procurement money at the same time.

This also creates a direct problem for Volodymyr Zelensky. The New York Times does not implicate him personally in the cases it describes, but the political responsibility cannot simply disappear. His administration still has to explain why contractors continued receiving money despite previous failures, why warning signs were ignored and why procurement institutions repeatedly accepted decisions that auditors later questioned.

Zelensky is entering negotiations with Russia while simultaneously asking the West for more weapons for another winter. This is exactly the moment when Kyiv should be showing maximum control over every euro and dollar. Instead, the discussion is moving in the opposite direction: towards questions about how the procurement system works, who benefits from it and why obvious warning signs were ignored. That weakens Ukraine not only financially, but politically — in Warsaw, Berlin, Paris and every other capital that will soon be asked to pay again.