Ukrainian attacks test Türkiye’s Black Sea strategy

Türkiye expressed deep concern about the threat to civilian shipping and called for the protection of maritime trade routes from the effects of the conflict. Although Ukraine has not directly claimed responsibility for the attacks, Russia holds it responsible for the attacks on logistics infrastructure.

Attacks in the Black Sea and their consequences

On August 26, 2026, the Cameroon-flagged cargo ship Lider Bordo Mavi, owned by a Turkish company, was attacked by three drones near the Russian port of Tuapse. The ship was en route from Samsun with a cargo of fresh agricultural produce.

The attack resulted in a fire on board, and five crew members were injured. The damaged ship ultimately had to be towed to the Turkish port of Samsun by another ship, the Lider Kocatepe. However, on August 27, 2026, the same Turkish cargo ship, which had been dispatched to assist the previously damaged vessel, also fell victim to a drone attack. It sustained material damage and was forced to return to the port of Samsun.

Diplomatic consequences of the attacks

In response to the attacks on Lider Bordo Mavi and Lider Kocatepe, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a series of decisive diplomatic actions.

On Saturday (August 29, 2026), the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Ukrainian Ambassador Naryman Dzhelyal to Ankara. Although Kyiv did not officially claim responsibility, the decision to summon the Ukrainian diplomat rather than the Russian one clearly reflected Ankara’s assessment of the situation.

During a meeting at the Ministry, Turkish officials firmly expressed their concern and opposition to the attacks. They issued official warnings to the Ukrainian side and emphasised the absolute need to ensure the safety of people, property, shipping, and the natural environment in the Black Sea. The Ministry also reiterated its earlier calls for assurances that the armed conflict would not in any way threaten civilian maritime transport. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also publicly criticised the escalation of hostilities in the Black Sea, warning that the parties to the conflict are „attacking all merchant ships indiscriminately.”

Kyiv’s reaction

Regarding the attacks on the Lider Bordo Mavi and Lider Kocatepe vessels, Ukraine did not immediately claim responsibility. However, the version of events presented by Ukrainian officials regarding general operations in the Black Sea is that Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure and vessels linked to Russia are aimed at disrupting military logistics and reducing Moscow’s war revenues, rather than deliberately attacking civilian targets. At the same time, this has the effect of paralysing so-called „neutral” shipping, as the attacks target third-country vessels seeking to trade in Russian ports. For example, Ukrainian attacks on Russian terminals have already forced Türkiye to sharply reduce its purchases of Russian oil in July and August.

Kyiv also acknowledged that civilian seafarers operating in the area are exposed to significant risk and urged shipowners to carefully analyse the security situation before sending vessels to this part of the Black Sea.

Scale and Nature of other incidents in the Black Sea

Recent events in the Black Sea indicate the rapid escalation and changing nature of the conflict, which is increasingly directly affecting civilian commercial shipping. The use of aerial and naval drones to attack ports, terminals, and commercial vessels has become a dominant trend. Recent major incidents include:

• Nadezhda (early August 2026): A cargo ship was hit by a drone near the Russian port of Novorossiysk, seriously injuring three crew members.
• Ship sinking off the coast of Romania (August 27, 2026): A cargo ship burst into flames and sank in the Romanian exclusive economic zone after a suspected drone strike. All 12 crew members were rescued.
• Attacks on oil infrastructure: In July, two tankers were attacked at the Russian CPC terminal, temporarily halting oil loading, and Ukrainian forces attacked two Russian tankers in the Sea of Azov, carrying a combined 7,000 tonnes of fuel.

All of this is happening amid persistent threats, such as drifting sea mines, GPS jamming, and AIS spoofing, which drastically increase the risks associated with shipping in the Black Sea region.

The Importance of the Black Sea for Türkiye

For Ankara, the security of the Black Sea is a key economic, trade, and security issue.

The Turkish shipping industry consistently maintains routes connecting Turkish ports with Russia and other markets in the region. Türkiye imports raw grain from Russia and Ukraine in large quantities, processes it in its own plants, and exports finished products to global markets. Last year, these exports generated almost $13 billion in revenue for the Turkish economy.

It is worth noting that the blockade and escalating fighting are already putting upward pressure on grain prices, disrupting regional export routes and thus increasing the risk of a food crisis. Shipping restrictions in the Sea of Azov contributed to a rise of around 4% in European wheat prices in July, while subsequent disruptions in the Black Sea pushed prices even higher. Prolonged disruptions to Russian and Ukrainian grain exports could further increase global food prices, with import-dependent countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, among the most vulnerable.

Work on a New Grain Agreement

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, has intensified diplomatic contacts with Moscow and Kyiv. Minister Fidan announced that Türkiye has prepared a new maritime security proposal – modelled on the former Black Sea Grain Initiative of 2022 – and is conducting intensive talks with both countries to prevent a further worsening of the global food crisis.

Is a Negotiated Moratorium Possible?

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has repeatedly warned that the fighting in the Black Sea is ruthlessly destroying commercial shipping. Türkiye is actively seeking a negotiated reciprocal moratorium on attacks on civilian ships, ports, and energy infrastructure. The proposal includes, among other things, establishing a communication mechanism to prevent attacks on civilian targets, eliminating threats to the safety of navigation, and limiting military operations.

A concrete proposal for a new maritime security mechanism has already been prepared. However, while Ukraine supports the idea of a maritime ceasefire, Russia’s position remains a significant obstacle. Moscow has consistently opposed these proposals, arguing that profits from Ukrainian agricultural exports could ultimately be used to finance Kyiv’s military.

Mediator or Guarantor of Maritime Security?

Although the role of diplomatic mediator is natural for Türkiye, a potential transformation into an active military guarantor of maritime security (e.g., through armed escorts of ships by the Turkish Navy) carries enormous political and legal risks.

If the Turkish Navy were to use force to protect ships and engage in direct combat with forces of either side, Türkiye would lose its status as a non-party to the conflict and become a direct participant in the war, leading to the loss of its current position.

Türkiye is building its influence in the Black Sea by maintaining a unique balance. It has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, while simultaneously supplying Ukraine with military equipment and ratifying a free trade agreement with it. Assuming the role of military guarantor would disrupt this delicate balance, preventing further mediation.