- WIADOMOŚCI
Germany knew about the GRU link. The suspect left for Russia
A failed drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport may have been directly linked to Russian military intelligence. The most important element, however, is not only the possible involvement of the GRU. German authorities reportedly knew that one of the suspects had links to Russian intelligence, yet he was not placed under surveillance and was later able to leave Germany.
According to classified security assessments cited by Welt am Sonntag, a Russian national with known links to the GRU was responsible for the logistical preparation of the attempted drone attack. A Belarusian citizen is also mentioned as an accomplice.
The case is particularly serious because the Russian suspect was already known to German authorities when he entered the country from Turkey. Despite this, he was reportedly not placed under surveillance. He later left Germany from Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, travelled to Serbia and is now believed to be back in Russia.
This is exactly the type of weakness that Russian services try to exploit. The operation does not require uniformed Russian personnel, large military formations or direct attribution at the moment of the attack. It requires several people, logistics, reconnaissance, access to drones and gaps between national security systems.
The German case should therefore be analysed together with sabotage, arson, reconnaissance and recruitment cases identified in Poland, the Baltic states and other European countries. Russia is not conducting separate campaigns in each state. It is using the same methods across Europe and adjusting them to local conditions.
The most worrying element is that the problem was apparently not a lack of information. The authorities reportedly knew about the suspect’s links to the GRU. The problem was that this information did not lead to effective control. This is precisely where European counterintelligence still has to improve: identifying a suspect is not enough if he can continue moving freely, prepare an operation and then leave the country.
There is also a broader lesson. Russian sabotage activity is becoming more aggressive because Moscow sees that it can operate below the threshold of open conflict while forcing European states to spend more resources on protection, investigation and counterintelligence.
If the reported findings are confirmed, the Leipzig case will not only be another example of Russian activity in Europe. It will also be another example of how a known security risk was allowed to move through the system until it was too late. It must be underlined that many perpetrators – who carried out attacks in Poland and Czechia – also fled.
